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Abstract 
This thesis explores the conditions under which the immediate and local 
narratives of communities might produce a culture of resistance. Focussing 
primarily on research with the Chakma people of Chittagong Hill Tracts(CHT), 
it recounts the complex role of legal pluralism in sustaining communities as 
political units in the postcolonial state, exploring how law’s framing narratives 
produce different iterations of communitarian legal practice ostensibly within the 
same postcolonial legal form. This exploration uses a conceptual frame of ‘critical 
communitarianism’, which draws specific attention to the parallels between 
political identity and legal culture, and community and legal mobilisation within a 
legally plural setting. Using legal culture and mobilisation as analytical tools, this 
thesis unpacks the relationship between law, power and resistance in a context 
where community and state are inherently unstable. In the post-conflict CHT, it 
appears that the processes of colonisation and de-colonisation have caused the 
boundaries and ideations of community to be highly mutable and contested, yet 
these very instabilities appear to diffuse power more equally across the 
community, and subvert the colonial legacy of feudal hierarchies. To further 
illustrate this hypothesis, the brief contrast drawn between the CHT and an 
Indian Chakma community demonstrates how a rigid system of constitutional 
recognition under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution has an ossifying 
effect on communitarian law; recognition reinforces an elderly and conservative 
customary elite and ultimately pushes communitarian legal practice to the margins 
of community. The thesis concludes that conditions of crisis appear to diffuse 
power across communities, causing dynamic and resistant interpretations of law 
and culture to emerge from within non-state communities.  
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Chapter One. The Chakma nation and the Pahari 
1. An Overview 
1.1. Thesis Objectives 
Legal form in a postcolonial context plays a complex but central role in producing 
and sustaining ‘community’ as a political entity in the postcolonial South Asian 
state. This thesis suggests postcolonial legal form in certain circumstances not 
only sustains community as a political form but also creates the conditions under 
which the interior world of the postcolonial community is transformed. Its central 
premise is that state violence provokes a community resistance that simultaneously 
and paradoxically disperses power amongst community members, whilst state 
recognition ossifies communities and empowers a narrow elite. Focussing on the 
Chakma nation, this proposition is explored through the prism of legal culture in 
the complex, uncertain and violent post-conflict region of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT), an area of exceptional geographical and human diversity in the 
illiberal state of Bangladesh.1 The premise is underscored by contrast with the 
relatively stable Tripura Chakma community formally recognised in 1976 as a 
Scheduled Tribe under the ostensibly protective provisions of Sixth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitution. 
The notion of community as an organising and value-imbued unit remains 
problematic in progressive theories of law and rights, and perhaps more so in 
South Asia due to the valorisation of certain communities and their cultures 
through the colonial ‘politics of difference’.2 Theoretically, this thesis seeks an 
understanding of the sources of resistance where the development of class 
                                                        
1 The definition of Bangladesh as an illiberal state is discussed further in 
this chapter in Section 1.3 
2 Partha Chatterjee, ‘500 Years of Love and Hate’ (1998) 33 Economic and 
Political Weekly 1330. Discussed in chapter two, section 2.4 and 2.5. 
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consciousness was precluded by the deliberate exclusion of communities from 
developing markets and equal citizenship in the colonial era. These communities, 
the tribes of British imagination, were produced by racialised legal hierarchies and 
are now sustained by the ‘classical legal pluralism’,’3 that across South Asia forms 
one common legacy of colonial rule. Though these plural structures preserve 
elements of precolonial and colonial legal culture in current incarnations of 
customary law, this thesis will demonstrate that each iteration of customary law is 
truly communitarian in being formed from the narratives that immediately 
surround it, and in particular, are influenced by the nature of the postcolonial 
state. The sheer diversity of the hill areas and their troubled postcolonial history 
provides a febrile environment for comparative study; each section of this project 
probes the conditions under which resistance might arise within such 
communities and the ways in which that resistance is expressed through law.  
The conceptual frame hones the nebulous concept of legal culture4 by reference to 
its more critically engaged offspring, ‘critical communitarianism’ , a move that 
deploys the method of the legal culture paradigm to locate non-state communities 
as the ‘cultural foci of mobilization for, or resistance to, state law in the political 
context of state-society relations’.5 Using the disaggregated tools of the legal 
culture school, critical communitarianism explicates the legal cultures of non-state 
communities by reference to their position vis-à-vis the state and to power 
struggles within the boundaries of community in an environment of legal 
                                                        
3 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 
869. 
4 David Nelken  29 Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 1 (2004) ‘Legal culture, in its most general 
sense, is one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social 
behaviour and attitudes.’(Pg. 2) As Nelken acknowledges, the opacity of the 
legal culture concept has invited strong criticism. Discussed in chapter two, 
section 4.1.  
5 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities 
(University of Michigan Press 2010).Pg. 1 
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pluralism.6 In the following chapters, analyses will cover the historical formation 
of the Chakma/ community, and legal mobilisation and consciousness amongst 
elite leaders and ground level practitioners. Recurring questions emerge as to 
whether customary law is now mobilised by communities for or against the state? 
To what extent does the state continue to determine the boundaries of community 
in postcolonial South Asia? And lastly, what are the effects of this mobilisation on 
the distribution of power within communities and the production of legal 
consciousness? 
Field research is framed by a genealogy connecting the racialised jurisprudence 
that produced tribes as organising units in colonial India, with the contemporary 
dissonance between state and communities now self-defined by cultural alterity 
and territorial attachment. Primary data will demonstrate how customary law, 
despite its imbrication with the racialised tropes of ‘backward’, ‘primitive’ and 
‘tribe’, has been strategically mobilised by community elites to augment 
community solidarity and in support of claims to territorial and political 
autonomy. It will suggest the diversity encapsulated by the colonial demarcation 
of the hill peoples has survived to destabilise the contemporary iteration of 
community, whilst the echoes of feudalism in erstwhile customary structures 
further fragments legal consciousness. Tension between an outward-facing desire 
to repel the state and an internal diversity and dissension within the borders of 
community is identified as a critical factor in the formation of Chakma/Pahari 
legal culture. Paradoxically, at ground level, this thesis will demonstrate these 
tensions and instabilities disperse power more equally across the community, 
democratising dispute resolution practices and subverting the fixed quasi-feudal 
customary hierarchies introduced to the hill communities by colonial rule. 
Conditions of crisis create a contingency and mutability in the political form of the 
postcolonial hill community that produces a dynamic and resistant legal culture. 
As a contrast, a brief sojourn to the Indian State of Tripura demonstrates how an 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 
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established and rigid recognition process under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution marginalises the Chakma from sources of political solidarity and 
power, and at the same time produces an insular, conservative and ossified 
customary legal culture. The ultimate paradox is suggested as the empowerment 
of an oppressed minority community through sustained violence, and the 
oppression of an ostensibly empowered community through liberal recognition. 
1.2. A Brief History of the Chakma 
Though the mountain communities of South Asia broadly share migratory 
origins, a reliance on swidden or jum agriculture, hunting and foraging as modes 
of production, and oral forms of social organisation, cultures and laws, these 
commonalities obscure a vast diversity of language, religion, social organisation 
and cultural symbols amongst the many nations of the mountains.7 Scott argued 
that the hill peoples were defined not just by their alterity to settled societies but 
their active avoidance of incorporation into settled states.8 This thesis will 
suggest, in contrast, that hill and plain life-worlds were closely connected through 
trade, politics, and through intermittent conflict until the colonisation and 
pacification of the territories in the 19th century replaced a previously symbiotic 
relationship with an absolute bifurcation.9 The contemporary differentiation of 
plainland and hill communities in South Asia is thus better explained by reference 
                                                        
7 James C Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History 
of Upland Southeast Asia (Yale Univ. Press 2009). Scott argues in 
addition that that the hill-based groups occupying the vast ranges of 
Western Thailand, North East India and South East Bangladesh 
originate in outsiders expelled or migrating from the strictures of city-state 
and share an inherent mobility. 
8 Ibid. Pg. 178 
9 Ibid. Although Scott advances a theorisation of the hill communities as 
refugees from the state, and their cultures designed to avoid settlement, he 
acknowledges that their variety related to their relationality to the state.  
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to colonial history and its consequences than by any supposedly inherent 
difference.  
The Chakma are a case in point. They remain the largest and most dominant of 
the precolonial hill communities which together still form the majority population 
of the CHT region and the largest territorial concentration of indigenous people 
in Bangladesh.10 Though now objectively and subjectively defined as indigenous 
or Pahari (hill people), the precolonial Chakma occupied a ‘zone of transition’ 
between the plains and the hills, with most clan groups residing in settled villages, 
some practising plough cultivation and some using temporary hill camps for the 
purposes of jum farming only.11 In politics, the Chakma chiefs were tributaries to 
the Moghul rulers with whom they appeared to have a close and respectful 
relationship.12 When the Moghuls granted the Diwani of Bengal to the British 
East India Company (BEIC), their domain over the Chakma was established 
only after a protracted struggle that ultimately confined Chakma settlements to 
the Chittagong Hills, apparently tribalising a community that had previously 
incorporated many state-like attributes.13 From their defeat in 1790 to the eventual 
annexation of the territory as a full colony in 1860, the Chakma were tributaries to 
the BEIC and resisted persistent attempts to exert direct control over the region’s 
economy. Even after claiming sovereignty, the British desire to transform the hill 
                                                        
10 The eleven communities of the Hill Tracts are the Bawm, Chak, 
Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro, Pangkhua, 
Taunchangya, and Tripura. Devasish Roy, Philip Gain and Society for 
Environment and Human Development (Dhaka, Bangladesh) (eds.), The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and Nature at Risk (Society for Environment 
and Human Development 2000). 
11 David E Sopher, ‘The Swidden/Wet Rice Transition Zone in the 
Chittagong Hills’ (1964) 54 Annals of the American Association of 
Geographers 107. 
12 The Chakma chiefs adopted the suffix Khan in the 16th century as a mark 
of respect to the Moghuls. S B Qanungo, Chakma Resistance to British 
Domination (Shanti Press Chittagong 1998). Pg. 24 
13 Ibid. 
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societies to something more closely resembling a feudal peasantry evolved into a 
regionally specific form of indirect rule that threw exclusionary legal and territorial 
borders around hill territories and peoples, and prohibited external interference in 
community affairs excepting the default powers vested in colonial authorities.14 
This system of government was formalised in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Regulations 1900, which concretised indirect rule through three territorially 
bounded administrative Circles led by tribal chiefs, excluded any foreign or non-
indigene from settling in the Hill Tracts and afforded limited legal recognition to 
the common property frontier that provided livelihoods to most hill 
communities.15 Although a technique of domination, the CHT Regulations 1900 
have survived two further iterations of statehood in the Republics of Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, to found the highly contentious constitutional basis for the Chakma’s 
contemporary claims of legal and cultural difference. 
1.3. Pakistan and Bangladesh 
From the colonial era to the current period, the geographical location of the CHT 
has been a critical factor in the fate of its peoples. For the British, even before 
partition, the Chittagong Hills were problematic in being similar in nature to the 
mountain areas of Assam but closer to the administrative centre of Bengal in 
Chittagong. The tension generated between bureaucratic rationality and 
pragmatism was strong enough to cause a mutability in administrative boundaries 
                                                        
14 Tamina M Chowdhury, ‘Raids, Annexation and Plough: 
Transformation through Territorialisation in Nineteenth-Century 
Chittagong Hill Tracts’ (2016) 53 The Indian Economic & Social History 
Review 183.The process of territorialisation and the creation of leadership 
hierarchies within the hill communities is discussed in more detail in 
chapter three. The default clause was the common ‘repugnancy clause’ that 
reserved ultimate power to British administration in the event that any 
aspect of community law was repugnant to the state. See chapter 3.2 
Section 3.2  
15 The legislative framework and history are explored in detail in chapter 
three, Section 3. 
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of the CHT in the decades before Partition. To 1895, parts of the CHT region 
were redrawn into the government of Assam from Bengal, until the first partition 
of Bengal foundered in 1911. When the Simon Commission was formed in 1929 to 
consider the future government of the north Eastern Hill Tracts, its thinking was 
still to combine the administration of the ‘Backward Tracts’ of Assam with the 
Arakans, Chittagong and Pakkokko Hill Tracts.16 By 1947, however, the logics of 
development, that is the proximity of the CHT to Chittagong and the city’s need 
for water resources, appeared instrumental in Radcliffe’s decision to despatch the 
territory and hill communities to a majority Muslim and overwhelmingly Bengali 
state.17  
The first Republic of Pakistan was a curious experiment of a nation-state, east and 
west were divided by over 1000 miles of territory, by language and culture, and 
even by differences in the practice of Islam. From 1947, the problems presented by 
its extraordinary form, the immediate material problems of food shortages, and 
the failure to agree a Constitution distracted attention from the border 
communities, indeed, the colonial District Commissioner was retained to provide 
oversight to tribal government for some years.18 The legislative framework of the 
CHT was not seriously challenged until, in 1957, the Pakistani military assumed 
                                                        
16 Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: The Crisis of India’s North East. 
(SAGE Publications India Pvt, Ltd SAGE Publications, Limited 
[Distributor] 2015) Pg. 9 <http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/troubled-
periphery/SAGE.xml> accessed 2 January 2016. 
17 Nehru was most insistent that ‘On religious and cultural grounds, the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts should form part of India. Sir Cyril Radcliffe had 
had no business to touch them’. British Library Archive. Minutes of a 
meeting held at Government House, New Delhi, 16 August 1947, to 
receive the awards of the Boundary Commissions which demarcated the 
boundaries between India and Pakistan in Bengal and the Punjab. 
http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/i
ndiapakistan/partition9/ 
18 Pierre Bessaignet, Tribesmen of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Asiatic 
Society of Pakistan 1958). 
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power in a coup they justified by reference to the failure of democratic government 
to develop the economic base and steer land reform in East Bengal.19 The new 
government introduced the Basic Democracies Order in 1959 which legitimised 
martial law on development grounds and confined democratic control to minor 
decision making at a local level.20 Through this legislation autonomy conferred on 
the hill peoples by the CHT Regulations was tangentially undermined by the 
centrifugal sensibilities of military rule. In 1960, the Chakma first experienced 
forced displacement on a large scale when the zenith of this development policy, 
the damming of the Karnaphuli River by the Kaptai Dam, flooded nearly 80% of 
cultivable lands in the Rangamati valley. As many as 250,000 Chakma were 
displaced and dispersed across the Hill Tracts and to India.21 The prohibition on 
settlement in the Hill Tracts was explicitly voided in 1964, ostensibly to auger 
further development of the hill regions and retrospectively legitimise the Kaptai 
displacement.22  
                                                        
19 Anti-Slavery Society Report Number 2, The Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Militarization, Oppression and Hill Tribes (Indigenous Peoples and 
Development Series 1984). 
20 Willem van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge University 
Press 2009). Pg. 119 
21 The Kaptai project was conceived in the early 1950’s and only reached 
fruition under the military government. It has been argued, however, that 
the decisions taken under military rule, that is the level at which the lake 
was created was politically motivated by distaste for the cultural and 
religious minorities of the CHT, and a desire to dismantle colonial 
protections. Chakma refugees were resettled to Arunachal Pradesh, and 
though accepted as Indian citizens controversially remain excluded from 
AP state politics and benefits. Deepak K Singh, Stateless in South Asia: 
The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India (Sage ; New India 
Foundation 2010). Harikishore Chakma and Centre for Sustainable 
Development (Dhaka, Bangladesh) (eds), Bara Parang: The Tale of the 
Developmental Refugees of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (1st ed, Centre for 
Sustainable Development 1995). 
22 Anti-Slavery Report Number 2, (n 19) 
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The constitutional reforms introduced by the military leadership effectively 
legitimised martial rule across Pakistan by reference to the poverty and low 
capacity of the citizenry and their consequent inability to participate in democratic 
processes. Despite this, the martial government did little to tackle the material 
poverty of its eastern wing, continuing to govern Bengal from afar and for the 
benefit of the Western Urdu-speaking elite. In East Pakistan, opposition to the 
junta grew during the 1960s, with increasingly strident calls from the Awami 
League-led opposition coalition for greater autonomy within Pakistan and a 
return to democracy.23 Elections were called in 1970, and the refusal of General 
Ayub Khan to honour the result and cede power to the newly elected Awami 
League government instigated the war of independence, and the creation of the 
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.24 
In the forty years since independence, Bangladesh has moved through many 
incarnations to its position, now, as a functional but politically troubled 
democracy.25 The first government of the Republic (GOB) expressed the 
nationalist fervour that had displaced West Pakistani hegemony in an idealistic 
constitutional form of centralised but democratic socialism.26 Idealism 
notwithstanding, Sheikh Mujib, the putative Father of the Nation, had already 
limited the original constitutional checks and balances on prime ministerial power 
                                                        
23 Schendel (n 20). 
24 Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of 
Bangladesh (Permanent Black 2013). Although outside the scope of this 
thesis, Raghavan makes a convincing case for the war of independence 
being a proxy war between India and Pakistan, with the outcome largely 
influenced by geo-political considerations. India’s subsequent hostility to 
martial rule in Bangladesh drove their financing of the Chakma-led 
insurgency.  
25 Ali Riaz, Inconvenient Truths about Bangladeshi Politics (Prothoma 
Prokashan 2012). 
26 Abdul Fazl Huq, ‘Constitution-Making in Bangladesh’ (1973) 46 Pacific 
Affairs 59. 
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before his assassination by the army in 1975.27 From 1975 to 1992 Bangladesh 
remained under martial law with the justification for the suspension of democracy 
again found in the need for rapid and centralised economic development.28 When 
democracy was eventually restored in 1992, the travails of government continued, 
with political instability deeply embedded as power shifted between two bitterly 
entrenched political dynasties, the ostensibly liberal and secular Awami 
League(AL) headed by the daughter of murdered Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib, 
and the Islamist conservative Bangladesh National Party(BNP) led by the wife of 
murdered President General Ziaur Rahman.29  
After winning the 2o11 election, the Awami League(AL) consolidated their hold 
on power through a sustained attack on the opposition that was met with a BNP 
boycott of two subsequent elections and the installation of the AL as a 
government without opposition.30 Though ostensibly the liberal opponents of 
military rule, the AL appeared to enter an insidious alliance with the Army.31 In 
                                                        
27 Sheikh Mujib had in fact augured an era of one-party government prior 
to his assassination through constitutional amendment in 1974. One 
reason for the continued dysfunction in the Bangladesh polity is frequently 
attributed to his early failure to reconcile the victorious Awami League 
with the vanquished supporters of a more Islamic iteration of state. Many 
of these supporters were either in the Army or associated with it, and the 
military-bureaucratic complex remained (and remains) a powerful element 
of the state after independence.  
28 Abanti Adhikari, Bangladesh since 1952 Language Movement (Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies; Shipra Publications 2011). 
29 Riaz (n 25). 
30 Ibid. Even before the BNP boycotts, Riaz identified the failure of the 
two main parties to oppose effectively within a parliamentary democracy as 
the fault line in Bangladeshi democracy. In opposition both the AL and 
BNP attack the legitimacy of government rather than engaging in scrutiny 
and oversight. In power, both the AL and BNP have resorted to direct 
attacks on and oppression of political opponents, with the BNP suspected 
of an attempt on AL leader Sheikh Hasina’s life in 2005. 
31 See Ramachandra Guha on the positioning of the Bangladesh military 
and the Awami League, in Too Quiet for Comfort, Telegraph of India, 
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relation to this thesis, the salient point of this commentary is that the development 
focussed and majoritarian trajectory initiated by its former Pakistani military 
rulers was broadly sustained by the Bangladeshi state, regardless of whether the 
new nation was ruled as a democracy or a dictatorship. Further, though now a 
functioning democracy, Bangladesh remains illiberal in the sense that the liberal 
constitutional protections afforded to individuals and the more limited and mainly 
indirect constitutional protections32 afforded minority communities are regularly 
abrogated, falling prey to the political whims of whoever holds power at the 
time.33  
                                                        
published 3 December 2015 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1151203/jsp/opinion/story_56299.jsp#.Vm
KEEON968r 
32 The Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh contains 
numerous rules of law provisions, upholds the independence of the 
judiciary and defends freedom of religion and culture. It also provides for 
special treatment for backward groups, and is discussed in more detail in 
chapter three. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367  
33 Zakaria (n 1). Zakaria defines illiberal democracy as plebiscite rule 
without the checks and balances associated with constitutional liberalism, 
that is the protections afforded to individuals against tyranny from state, 
church or society. Bangladesh is included as falling between liberal and 
illiberal democracies, in that its structures include some of the protections 
associated with constitutional liberalism, namely an independent judiciary 
and a constitution that enshrines individual rights, even if those 
protections are difficult to invoke. During fieldwork human rights activists 
such as Iftekar Zahman, the Director of Transparency International and a 
member of the CHT Commission explained how, in the current polity, his 
personal freedoms had been curtailed by government surveillance and the 
apparently strategic failure of the security services to curb attacks on 
secularists and liberal activists. The recent arrest of internationally 
renowned photographer Shahidul Alam after documenting student 
protests is another example of the increasingly illiberal nature of AL 
government. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-45173303  
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1.4. Minorities and Rebellion in Bangladesh 
The increasing uniformity of the population of Bangladesh is perhaps the starkest 
illustration of how political upheaval and a majoritarian ethno-nationalism has 
homogenised and polarised the nation, placing all minorities in varying states of 
jeopardy.34 At Partition, the population of East Pakistan was still diverse, with the 
proportion of Bengali Hindus and Buddhists at 30% of the total, and the small 
borderland communities at around 2%, of which the largest group were 
concentrated in the CHT.35 In the 2011 census, 90% of the population of 
Bangladesh were Bengali Muslims with the reasons for this extraordinary 
demographic transformation suggested as outward migration of Hindus under 
growing persecution of minorities.36 Populations shifts have followed each 
upheaval, the 1965 Pakistan/India war and the war of independence creating 
spikes in migrations of Bengali Hindu and plainland Adivasi to India.37  
Nation building in the aftermath of the war of independence did little to address 
the apparently hostile environment for non-Bengali, non- Muslim denizens, and it 
                                                        
34 Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (University Press 1997). Mohsin 
analyses the location of Pahari minority communities in relation to the 
state in Bangladesh, concluding that their position is precarious due to the 
type of exclusionary nationalism produced by the revolution  
35 Ahmed Kamal, East Bengal at Independence, Pg.333 in Sirajul Islam, 
Harun-or-Rashid and Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (eds), History of 
Bangladesh, 1704-1971 (Asiatic Society of Bangladesh : Distributing agent, 
Academic Publishers 1992). 
36 Housing and Population Census 2011, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics; 
http://203.112.218.69/binbgd/RpWebEngine.exe/Portal?BASE=HPC2011
_short&lang= 
37 Nahid Kamal, ‘The Population Trajectories of Bangladesh and West 
Bengal During the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Study’ (PhD, 
London School of Economics 2009). Pg. 129. Religious persecution 
remains an entrenched problem. See Report for US Department of 
Justice, ‘Bangladesh: Treatment of Religious Minorities’ (Global Legal 
Research Center, Law Library of Congress 2016) 2016–013914. 
 
 
22 
was in this dangerous context that the hill-based minorities experienced further 
marginalisation as the state approach to diversity unfolded in its valedictory 
Constitution.38 The 1972 Constitution of the Republic of Bangladesh 
encapsulated the ideals and aspirations of the victorious Awami League, but 
contained only sparse recognition of minority cultures in the enablement of 
progressive measures for backward races. At the same time, Bengali ethnicity and 
language were determined as symbolic of national citizenship, cementing the 
distancing of the hill peoples and other borderland communities from the 
mainstream of the Bangladeshi polity. Protests from Manabendra(M N) Larma, 
Chakma activist and sitting MP for Rangamati, were met with insouciance from 
Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib, who famously told him to ‘go home and become 
Bengali’.39 Whilst these political skirmishes infected national discourse, the CHT 
the hill communities were targeted by still armed parties of Bengali freedom 
fighters who frequently ascended the hills to raid villages for food, a matter which 
excited the defensive formation of armed Chakma cadres. Under the leadership of 
the M N Larma the hill people’s political movement, the Jana Samhati Samiti 
                                                        
38 Aftab Ahmed, ‘Ethnicity and Insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Region: A Study of the Crisis of Political Integration in Bangladesh’ (1993) 
31 The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 32. Ahmed 
suggests the majority of the Paharis were indifferent to the struggle for 
independence, seeing it as a competition between Bengali elites, but notes 
that the Awami League did nothing to persuade their leadership to join 
this struggle. Two of the Circle chiefs, Raja Aung Shwe Prue Choudhury 
and Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy aligned with the Pakistani leadership, the 
latter being exiled to Pakistan at the end of the conflict. After the war, 
Tridiv Roy fled to Pakistan, taking up an ambassadorial position and 
remaining in exile until his death in 2012. The ambivalence of the Chakma 
leadership toward independence is suggested a reason for the victorious 
Awami League’s diminution of indigenous minority groups. 
39Snehar Kumar Chakma gives a personal account of Mujib’s speech in 
Rangamati in 1972, at which this statement was apparently made.  Chakma,  
Chakma SK, My Life and Struggle for Peace (Mrs Anamita Chakma 2014) 
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(JSS),40 organised these defensive formations into an insurgent army, the Santi 
Bahini.41 In 1975, in response to this accumulation of material and political 
provocations, the former hill tribes or ‘Pahari’, under Chakma leadership armed 
themselves against the state.42  
That year, the first offensive raid by Santi Bahini took place shortly after the return 
to martial law to Bangladesh. By then, the Santi Bahini were well trained and 
well-resourced due to support from the Indian government, and in the early 
phases of the conflict inflicted casualties and real damage on military facilities in 
the CHT.43 Their activities invited a military response of disproportionate 
brutality, mainly visited on the wider Pahari population. Throughout the late 
1970s and 1980s, mass killings, rape and disappearances by the army caused 
further massive population shifts of mainly Chakma indigenous residents to 
refugee camps in India.44 Land settlement was explicitly deployed by the state to 
neutralise and undermine the Pahari during the conflict; the ‘transmigration 
policy’ introduced by General Ziaur Rahman in 1979 settled half a million landless 
Bengalis on previously protected CHT territory, their presence creating a need 
                                                        
40 United Peoples Party. Post 1997, the JSS were renamed the PCJSS or 
Parbatta Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti. 
41 Shapan Adnan, Migration, Land Alienation, and Ethnic Conflict: 
Causes of Poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (1st ed, 
Research & Advisory Services 2004). 
42 Ibid. For a further historical account of the insurgency see S Mahmud 
Ali, The Fearful state: Power, People, and Internal War in South Asia 
(Zed Books 1993)  
43 Ibid. 
44 For an account of human rights abuses see Amnesty International (ed.), 
Bangladesh: Unlawful Killings and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(Amnesty International 1986). And the report by the Anti-Slavery Society 
(n 19). Though focussed on Chakma development refugees, Singh also 
touches on the later waves of forced migrations to Tripura state and the 
longstanding Refugee Camps only dismantled in 2002. Deepak K Singh, 
Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India (n 
21). 
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for protection from Santi Bahini that further legitimised the militarisation of the 
region.45 By 1991, transmigration had reduced the proportion of indigenous 
residents in the CHT to 51% of the population, from 98% at Partition.46 At the 
time of field research, and in the absence of up-to-date census data, most Pahari 
commentators and the PCJSS leadership believed the policy to transform the 
region through settlement had effectively created a Bengali majority in the Pahari 
homeland of the CHT.47  
Peace was finally established by the UN brokered Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord 1997 (CHTPA), but its failure either to reconcile state and community 
after the abuses of the war, or to address directly the consequences of land 
settlement left the CHT region still wracked by division and low level conflict.48 
Criticised as too little, too late, the CHTPA offered no timetable for 
demilitarisation of the region, and left the army a powerful and highly visible 
                                                        
45 The impact of the insurgency on CHT is covered in detail in Shapan 
Adnan, Migration, Land Alienation, and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of 
Poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (n 41).For details of 
human rights abuses and displacement. Amnesty International (ed.), 
Bangladesh: Unlawful Killings and Torture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(Amnesty International 1986). 
46 The settlement policy was known as the Transmigration Programme 
and was formally initiated by General Ziaur Rahman in 1979. Population 
shifts in the CHT were tracked until 1991, since when no census has been 
conducted. At that time, the indigenous population was recorded as 
501,144 against a non-indigenous population of 473,301, e.g. Bengali 
settlers formed 49% of the population, from only 2% in 1872. Rajkumari 
Chandra Kalindi Roy, ‘Economic Solutions to Political Problems’, 
Minorities Peoples and Self Determination (2005). Pg. 130 
47 The PCJSS website flags the difficulty in assessing the impact of 
settlement. https://www.pcjss.org/population-in-cht/. However, in 
conversation with chief Press Officer Mangal Kumar Chakma and chief 
operating officer Shakti Tripura, the figure of 60% Bengali majority was 
guessed at and attributed to continued settlement and faster population 
growth among the Bengali population.  
48 Kumar Panday Panday and Jamil Ishtiaq, ‘An Unimplemented Accord 
and Continued Violence’ (2009) 49 Asian Survey 1059.  
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aspect of life in the Hill Tracts to the present day.49 It created an irresolvable 
conundrum in auguring democratic institutions but simultaneously rendering 
them ineffective as autonomous bodies by an absolute failure to address the 
demographic consequences of transmigration.50 These palpable weaknesses 
ensured that even at the time of signing, the terms of peace were opposed by the 
main regional opposition to the JSS, the United Peoples Democratic 
Front(UPDF), who argued against disarmament without a concomitant 
commitment from government to demilitarise and resettle the now numerous 
Bengali residents. Their continued opposition to the JSS is now the source of 
frequent internecine violence, compounded by splits in both main parties and a 
seemingly relentless fragmentation of the armed cadres that still populate the 
hills.51  
This unstable post-conflict environment provides the material context for the core 
study of the genesis and practice of customary law in the Chakma community in 
the CHT, and the benchmark against which customary law from the apparently 
more fortunate Tripura Chakma community is contrasted. Though the laws and 
cultural symbols of the Chakma nation suggest a superficial homogeneity between 
Bangladeshi and Indian iterations of customary law, this thesis will argue their 
residual similarity barely conceals an ocean of complexity swollen by more than a 
century of history, highly divergent state approaches to managing diversity and 
equally divergent alignments between the respective Chakma communities and 
global campaigns for human rights and recognition as indigenous people. 
                                                        
49 The CHT is still governed under a state of Emergency and the Army 
now have entrenched commercial interests in tourism, construction and 
plantations. Reportedly, they are still instrumental in determining 
government policy toward the CHT. 
50 Over twenty years later, elections have still not been held to the new 
democratic bodies. Considered in chapter three, section 4.4  
51 A Reform JSS has been formed by former Members protesting the 
highly centralised leadership of the Party, whilst a recent split in the 
UPDF has been attributed to up to 20 deaths in 2018 alone.  
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Exploring both legal mobilisation and consciousness amongst the Chakma elite, 
and at a village level, it will show how conditions of revolt against an oppressive 
and illiberal state has empowered the Chakma, expanding the concept of 
community to a broad if unstable solidarity with similarly marginalised Adivasi 
communities in the Hill Tracts and beyond. In the apparently peaceful conditions 
of Tripura state, however, recognition through the appeasement of a liberal state 
recreates the pacifying effects of colonial domination. Below, a short detour 
through two appeal cases provides an indication of the emergent differences now 
embedded in legal culture in the two selected communities.  
1.5. Two Forms of Justice 
This short story of two separate appeals made to the highest level of the 
communitarian legal hierarchy offers a brief illustration of the radically different 
outcomes possible in the culture, consciousness and mobilisation of 
communitarian law in the Chakma communities. The cases, though not entirely 
analogous, were considered of great importance to the respective communities, 
both related to issues of communitarian jurisdiction and, more pertinently, were 
revealing of the highly divergent social dynamics and relations of power in the 
customary legal institutions operating in the two localities.  
First to Bangladesh and an appeal taken to the Mong Raja, the highest-ranking 
official of the customary system in the Khagrachari Circle District of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts.52 The Botoli School dispute related to the disposal of a 
small parcel of land owned by a wealthy Chakma businessman and adjoining a 
                                                        
52 The Botoli School hearing was held on 6 November 2015, in the office of 
the Mong Raja in Khagrachari. Village parties to the dispute were 
interviewed between 7 November 2015 and 9 November 2015, and the 
landowner interviewed in his Dhaka apartment on 3 December 2015. Note 
that the customary system in Bangladesh is territorialised into 
administrative circles and the Khagrachari the appellate judge in this case 
was a Marma chief. The Circle System is analysed in chapter three. 
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Pahari school in a mainly Pahari/Marma village. An agreement had been reached 
between the landowner, and an intermediary – a Tripura (Pahari) businessman - 
to sell a larger piece of land including this segment to a Bengali businessman, thus 
alienating a substantial portion of the village footprint from Pahari ownership. 
The local headmen, in line with his customary powers, had refused to approve the 
sale of land as the landowner had previously promised to donate the land to the 
school. His utilisation of customary powers in favour of the school led the 
landowner to bypass the headman and appeal directly to the Raja to issue the 
report on title and facilitate the sale. In effect the Raja was being asked to act 
against a headman who had used his administrative role to prevent the alienation 
of land from the Golabari village community to one of the wealthy new settlers to 
the region.  
Of particular interest was the visibly strained and contradictory juxtaposition of 
the ‘customary’ domain, that is the traditional and historically transmitted concept 
of non-state law, with a highly politicised and critical conception of community 
law emanating from the villager parties to the dispute. Though the dispute related 
to a highly specific deployment of customary institutions and procedures to 
prevent land alienation, the representatives of Botoli School disregarded the 
processual issue and presented the Raja with a passionate appeal for Pahari 
political solidarity based on wider notions of social and economic justice. The 
headman, himself a customary official, asserted his legal power to stop the sale of 
land on an explicitly political claim, namely that the community’s need for a larger 
school took precedence over a sale that alienated land to Bengali settlers.  
A hearing was convened at the Raja’s Office for all parties to put their case, 
including members of the school committee, Teachers, the headman and the 
landowner. The Raja, though asserting his neutrality at the outset, reverted to a 
mainly procedural justification for supporting the sale in the face of opposition 
from the community, an appeal to custom which, according to later conversations 
with the villagers, masked an inclination toward supporting the community elite. 
The headman was joined by male and female members of the village community 
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who argued passionately on behalf of Botoli School, and their need for a larger 
playground. The hearing itself was fractious and even though the Raja chaired 
proceedings, fierce arguments between parties and with the Raja occurred 
throughout. The case for the school was based entirely around the justice of the 
situation; a promise had been made, and the consequences of it not being 
honoured was the Bengali acquisition of Pahari lands in an exclusively Pahari 
village.  
The Raja’s decision to refer the dispute back to the community antagonised both 
the landowner and the customary officials, the former hoping for a speedy 
resolution and the latter acutely aware of their relative weakness in a private 
negotiation without the authority of the Raja. Yet, whilst unwilling to honour the 
donation in its entirety, the landowner afterwards explained he had been 
persuaded to defer the sale agreement and allow the village to purchase the plot 
necessary for school expansion. The management committee were bitterly critical, 
in private, of the Raja’s refusal to deploy his customary authority, attributing his 
reticence to a lack of experience and awareness of the politics of land. Still, it 
appeared from subsequent discussions with participants that despite the 
limitations of the customary system being at the fore in the Botoli case, the 
customary route to justice was still considered of primary importance to their 
community. The mobilisation of customary institutions had ultimately caused a 
wealthy, powerful and cosmopolitan individual to consider their moral obligations 
to the Pahari community, through the promotion of an explicitly political 
conception of community justice.  
Contrast the position in Tripura state, India, where the appellate system of the 
Chakma customary system was invoked to hear a case in which allegations of 
partiality and corruption were made against a lower level of the customary 
hierarchy.53 Chakma law, according to officials in Tripura, allowed parties to a 
                                                        
53 Hearing observed on 24th June, 2016, Santipur Village, Tripura 
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dispute to prove their innocence by taking a traditional oath before the Panchayat. 
In this case, a woman and man of Santipur village had been accused of adultery at 
their village Panchayat by the husband of the woman concerned. The male party 
to the alleged adultery had agreed with the Panchayat Chair to pay a reduced fine 
in return for an admission of guilt, but the sub-text of the case was allegedly a 
dispute between the alleged male adulterer and the female party’s husband. She 
protested to the Panchayat on the grounds that her reputation was destroyed by 
this action, and argued that she should be allowed to take an oath of innocence. 
The villagers supported the female party and presented evidence of corruption on 
the part of the Adam (village) Panchayat to support their request that the 
Panchayat Chairman and Members be removed from their posts. 
The Appeal was convened by the President of the Chakma system and addressed 
to the Suleane (Regional) Panchayat, which is the third strata of legal hierarchy.54 
Twenty-one male customary officials attended the hearing, but with a smaller 
group of seven being appointed as the decision-making panel. The hearing 
process was formal and stylised, and included the symbolic resignation of the 
Panchayat headman. After hearing arguments, the inner circle of headmen left the 
room to consider their verdict, and returned after a short while to adjudicate in 
favour of the aggrieved female party and villagers and to order the suspension of 
village Panchayat members. But on announcement of their verdict, President 
Nironjon intervened to overturn the judgment. Though he agreed that Chakma 
law and the facts of the case supported the Panchayat decision, he asked the 
committee to remember that the role of the court was to maintain peace and unity 
within the community. To this end, facts were less important than maintaining 
cooperation and collaboration in the community, and making sure that people 
respected the customary system. The Panel then reconsidered their verdict, and 
returned to the hearing to concur with the President of the Panchayat. All 
                                                        
54 Nironjon Chakma, President of the Suleane Panchayat, interviewed on 
23rd and 24th June.  
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involved expressed their approval of the judgement and reinstatement of the 
suspended Panchayat members.55 
Both cases were heard within Chakma customary systems ostensibly similar in 
their structures, hierarchies and their utilisation of community solidarity to ground 
decision making. Yet in Bangladesh, two different Pahari communities, Marma 
and Chakma, utilised a communitarian system that cut across ethnic divides to 
address an issue of wider political significance. A rowdy, contested, inclusive, 
relatively democratic process suggested an expansive accommodation of 
community perspectives within the erstwhile customary system and a partial 
rejection of the strict hierarchy associated with the hereditary authority of the 
Raja.56 In India, however, an exclusively Chakma process appeared highly 
stylised, gendered, hierarchical, and oppressive in its rejection of the entreaties of 
the villagers to act against officials of the system. The selected President overruled 
the decision of the villagers and met with approval for doing so. These differences 
in communitarian legal process appeared reflective of a sharp divergence in the 
narratives and subjectivities attaching to the customary legal systems across 
communities of the same nation, now geographically separated by state borders. 
A number of lines of enquiry are raised by the apparently divergent trajectories of 
the customary legal institutions of the Chakma in Bangladesh and India. This 
thesis will present qualitative data gathered from Chakma people involved in the 
mobilisation of customary law, and will attempt to identify the effects of 
state/minority interactions on the distribution of power within a community. 
                                                        
55 Interviews after the case suggested that the woman would suffer 
reputational damage, but according to the elders the pursuit of community 
harmony was of greater import than her personal reputation 
56 It should also be noted that this case took place in the Khagrachari 
District, and respondents asserted that under the leadership of the 
Chakma chief, in the Rangamati District, they would have expected the 
chief to support the community, perceiving the Chakma chief to be a 
stronger and more politically astute operator. 
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Theoretically it seeks understanding of the contemporary location of the 
communities previously excluded from equal citizenship and capitalist markets, 
using the guiding conceptual frame of ‘critical communitarianism’ to link state 
context and local practice to its analysis of communitarian legal culture. It argues 
that under certain circumstances, customary/communitarian law is potentially a 
force not only for eliciting resistance to the state, but also for generating emic 
change and dispersing power within the boundaries of community. Yet 
paradoxically this potential appears less obviously manifest where community 
autonomy is ostensibly strongest, calling into question the efficacy of liberal modes 
of recognition in empowering the weakest community members. Finally, noting 
that state violence appears to have a democratising effect on communitarian legal 
practices, it asks whether the lessons learnt from the transmission and creation of 
communitarian legality in the context of an illiberal state offers wider intelligence 
on the relationship between community, law and liberation.  
1.6. Terminology 
The language of community in both Bangladesh and India is complicated by the 
highly politicised nature of discourse over minority rights, radically different 
political and constitutional frameworks in Bangladesh and India, and a resulting 
divergence in Chakma self-definitions in the Republics of Bangladesh and India 
respectively. Neither Bangladesh nor India are signatories to the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP);57 formal recognition 
of the hill communities in both states accrues through the Constitution only. 
Nevertheless, across Bangladesh, the mainly borderland minorities that comprise 
only 2% of the population tend to self-identify as Adivasi, a definition used across 
South Asia to refer to the pre-Aryan inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent.58 
                                                        
57 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 2007. 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.  
58 Andre Beteille, ‘The Concept of Tribe with Special Reference to India.’ 
(1986) XXVII Archive of European Sociology, 297. 
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The assumption of an Adivasi identity is underlined by political identification as 
indigenous people, and the longstanding alignment of representative political 
organisations with the global indigenous people’s movement.59 Adivasi is rarely 
used in government circles and remains a matter of controversy,60 and 
constitutional recognition is limited to special quota provisions and a default 
affirmation of the jurisdiction of pre-existing custom and law.61 Definitions of 
‘tribe’ and ‘backward’ pepper state and majoritarian communications, whilst being 
deeply resented and rejected as pejorative by the Adivasi communities. Given this 
context, concepts of indigeneity in this thesis are utilised and discussed in relation 
to political identity, but not in relation to state recognition. Further, given its 
pejorative connotation in Bangladesh, ‘tribe’ is not used unless explicitly related to 
a government communication, or in relation to the positing of ‘tribe’ to reference 
the colonial political form imposed on the hill communities. For all these reasons, 
the term Adivasi / indigenous will be used to identify the larger group of minority 
communities in Bangladesh. 
There is a further territorial element to Adivasi identification however, which 
distinguishes the hill communities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts from the wider 
                                                        
59 Mesbah Kamal, ‘Parliamentary Caucus on Indigenous Peoples: A 
Genesis of Parliamentary Advocacy in Bangladesh’ (Research and 
Development Collective 2014). Note that the indigenous definition was 
utilised by the Supreme Court recently, see chapter three, Section 4.5 
60 Terminology is regularly debated in the press, as in this article posted by 
the Parliamentary Caucus. 
https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2014/08/10/js-body-no-
constitutional-bar-to-using-term-adivasi-2  
61 The current definition of indigenous people under UNDRIP reflects 
more closely experiences of settler colonialism and does not fully capture 
the peripatetic nature of Asian mountain communities. Both Bangladesh 
and India use the uniqueness of the hill communities to justify their 
reluctance to sign the Declaration. See Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The 
Applicability of the International Legal Concept of Indigenous People in 
Asia.’, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press 1999).Joanne H Bauer and Daniel Bell. Eds.  
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minority communities of Bangladesh. Two further categorisations relate 
specifically to the Bangladeshi hill areas; ‘Pahari’,62 meaning of the hills, and 
‘Jumma’,63 meaning a swidden farmer, are terms used interchangeably by the hill 
people to self- describe and distinguish indigenous CHT hill dwellers from both 
minority Adivasi communities elsewhere in Bangladesh and Bengali settlers in the 
CHT. The Bangladesh focussed chapters of this thesis uses the term Pahari to 
describe communitarian legal institutions, which serve all hill communities, and 
the term Chakma when necessary to distinguish Chakma law, history or political 
positioning from this generality. It is perhaps useful to note even at this early stage 
that due to the hybrid nature of the erstwhile customary system in Bangladesh, the 
hierarchical structure and laws in relation to land, tax and dispute resolution were 
consolidated in the CHT regulations 1900 and are defined as Pahari because they 
are common to all eleven indigenous groups. The rule-set in relation to personal 
and clan business remains solely Chakma.64 
In India, the anthropological genealogy of ‘tribal’ has been usurped by the specific 
constitutional meaning created in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, which 
frames the benefits and protections carried over from the colonial era into the 
framework of the newly independent Republic of India.65 The Tripura Chakma 
                                                        
62Devasish Roy, ‘Challenges Towards the Implementation of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997’, The Politics of Peace (Institute of 
Culture and Development Research 2012). The primary chronicler of 
customary law in the Hill Tracts expresses a preference for the less 
politicised term of ‘Pahari’, though it the term Pahari was from a generic 
name for hill dwellers coined by Bengali plainspeople.  
63 Willem Van Schendel, ‘The Invention of the “Jummas”; State Formation 
and Ethnicity in South Eastern Bangladesh’ 26 Modern Asian Studies 95.  
64 This describes the broad composition of the system as set out in chapter 
three; the material realities of its practice are discussed in more depth in 
chapters four and five. 
65 Beteille, (n 58). Beteille discusses the complexities of tribal definitions 
given its colonial connotations, anthropological specificity and its current 
legal traction within the Indian constitution. 
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achieved recognition as a Scheduled Tribe in 1976 and define themselves as a 
tribal community. Explicitly cognisant of their relatively recent migration to 
Tripura, they do not identify either as Adivasi or as indigenous people, and have 
no political connection to Indian Adivasi groups or to the global movement for 
indigenous people. The discussion of the Kanchanpur Chakma contained in 
chapter six reflects their self-definition and uses only the terms ‘Chakma’ and 
‘tribe’.  
A final semantic point relates to the use of ‘customary’ and ‘communitarian’. The 
Chakma of Bangladesh and India describe their laws and legal system as 
‘customary’, and ‘customary’ is the constitutional term used to describe community 
generated law in both Republics. This thesis recognises customary as a descriptor 
but also seeks to reveal its colonial roots and understand the term as both a 
strategic deployment and potentially at least, a limiting concept. It uses 
‘communitarian’ as a more appropriate descriptor of community generated law in 
Bangladesh as its practice is at only partly drawn from concepts of custom and 
partly from alternative ideological foundations. The meanings of ‘communitarian’ 
and ‘critical communitarianism’ are further discussed in chapter two. Chapter six 
retains the customary descriptor in India to reflect the terminology of the Sixth 
Schedule of the Constitution as it relates to recognition of law. 
2. Hypothesis and Methodology 
2.1. Hypothesis 
The primary object of this thesis is to explicate the communitarian legal culture of 
the Chakma people of the CHT region of Bangladesh, with a focus on the 
productive effects of two centuries of state domination on Chakma law and 
society. The Chakma were the most numerous and dominant of the eleven CHT 
hill nations (Pahari) determined as ‘extremely backward’ under British rule and 
governed in accordance with legal protections reserved for peoples deemed too 
primitive to benefit from participation in markets or equal citizenship. 
Decolonisation elicited state violence toward the Chakma-led Pahari, and 
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produced a community of interest and shared ideology capable of a powerful 
progressive resistance to capitalism. The hypothesis advanced is that resistance to 
the state and the internal dynamism of the contemporary Pahari/Chakma 
community are productive of a participative and highly adaptive communitarian 
legal culture, with both conditions reflected in and reinforced by the mobilisation 
and practice of communitarian law. Ergo, this thesis argues that there is a strong 
connection between the strategic mobilisation of law to reinforce the boundaries 
of the wider Pahari community against the state, and the co-terminous 
competition and contestation that accompanies each legal mobilisation at a local 
level. This hypothesis asserts that the internal plurality of the erstwhile customary 
arena drives the legal mobilisation of customary institutions as a practice of 
identity and simultaneously produces a legal consciousness that challenges the 
internal hierarchies of the Pahari/Chakma customary system and disperses power 
within the boundaries of community. This hypothesis is tested by contrasting the 
customary legal culture of the CHT Chakma with a migrant Chakma community 
in Tripura state, India, where customary law is consensually mobilised ‘for the 
state’ as part of the constitutional recognition processes defined under the Sixth 
Schedule of the Constitution of Republic of India.  
2.2. Research Questions 
At the core of the thesis was a qualitative research project that collected primary 
accounts of legal mobilisation and consciousness to gain insight into the co-
constitutive relationship between communitarian law and political form by 
reference to the sub-concepts of legal culture, consciousness and mobilisation. 
Research questions were constructed to elicit information on social context and 
legal practice in the CHT region, and in Tripura state, India. The following 
research questions were used to structure this project. 
• How is law mobilised by the Chakma to negotiate the boundaries between 
community and the state? 
• What defines legal culture and consciousness within the Chakma 
communitarian legal system? 
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• How is communitarian law mobilised in different village settings, by whom and 
to what ends?  
• Are there differences arising in the culture, consciousness and mobilisation 
produced by the different circumstances and contexts of customary legal practice 
in Bangladesh and India? 
2.3. Methodology 
A qualitative methodology was employed to collect subject perceptions of the 
communitarian legal system in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh. 
Fieldwork amongst the Chakma and Taunchangya community was conducted in 
the Rangamati area, and amongst the Marma community in Khagrachari, though 
work at this site was halted due to interference by the intelligence services. In 
India, field research was based amongst the Chakma community in the 
Kanchanpur valley of Northern Tripura. 
In the three months permitted in the Rangamati area, 54 individual interviews 
were conducted with the Chakma chief, headmen, karbari, political and civil 
society activists and lawyers. A workshop was held with the leader and selected 
members of the Rangamati Hill District Council, and a further workshop with 
advocates from the Rangamati Bar. In situ workshops and meetings were held in 
six villages identified as possible model studies, which were attended by villagers, 
women, karbari and headmen, and followed up where possible by further 
individual interviews. A further visit to the village of female karbari Rini Chakma 
was arranged to talk specifically to women about the impact of the Chakma Circle 
female karbari project. Safety considerations prevented any travel to the UPDF 
controlled Sebakkon area, but the UPDF were kind enough to arrange for a 
group of villagers to travel to Chittagong to discuss their approach to village 
justice. Restrictions on travel, however, meant that no village could be visited 
more than three times. The low number of customary cases combined with this 
restriction meant that cases could not be observed in the time available, but at 
village workshops participants in customary justice were interviewed about their 
experience. In Khagrachari, research had to be curtailed after ten days due to 
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heavy surveillance by intelligence officers. However, three in-depth case studies 
were possible, and a number of preparatory interviews undertaken.  
Thirty interviews were conducted in Dhaka with lawyers, political and civil 
society actors and development professionals. The CHT Secretary, Naba Bikram 
Kishore Tripura,66 agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of the project but 
asked that some of his comments remained off the record. One informal meeting 
was held with a local Rangamati Army Major, but requests for a formal discussion 
were refused. A further two months of fieldwork was conducted amongst the 
Chakma community of the Kanchanpur Valley in Tripura, during which a total of 
eighteen in-depth interviews were conducted with customary officials, five 
workshops in village sites were held, and five case studies conducted of customary 
cases in progress at the time of field work. It was possible to observe the conduct 
of cases in Tripura and speak to participants.  
This study also utilised primary and secondary research materials to create a 
multi-layered study of the history, development and practice of communitarian law 
in the Hill Tracts. Historical data was drawn not only from established academic 
texts, but from original research conducted in the Bengal Archive and National 
Library of Bengal in Kolkata. Where possible, Chakma accounts of their history 
and society were used to illuminate chapters concerning Chakma law, history and 
origins. Supreme Court judgements were used to illustrate the particularly 
Bangladeshi controversies over the constitutional status accorded to customary 
law. 
2.4. Interview and Workshop Structure 
Qualitative interviews with customary officials and village workshops were open 
ended and structured around four main subject areas, power and leadership, 
                                                        
66 The Secretary is the most senior bureaucrat in the CHT Ministry, the 
government Department created to coordinate implementation of the 
CHTPA and drive development of the region.  
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development, law, and justice. Where possible, interviews were conducted in 
English and contemporaneous notes were taken. Simultaneous translations of all 
other interviews and workshops in the Rangamati area were provided by two 
Chakma research assistants. Translations are believed to be largely accurate but it 
is likely that some of the nuances and complexities of the situations reported were 
lost through the process of transcription. Although this thesis is not directly 
concerned with gender, the marginalised position of women in customary 
Chakma law brought gender considerations to the fore. Women only workshops 
were held in two of the villages under analysis in Bangladesh and in Kanchanpur 
in Tripura. Attitudes to gender parity were revealing of different approaches to 
change amongst the Chakma/Pahari leadership, and formed part of enquiries at 
all stages of research.  
2.5. Constraints 
Fieldwork was conducted between September 2015 and September 2016 at a time 
of a deteriorating security situation in Bangladesh as a result of a number of 
attacks on civil rights activists and foreigners by militant Islamist groups. The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts remained under full Army control, and foreigners were 
required to gain permission to enter the area for any reason. For the purposes of 
research, permission was needed by the Minister of the Interior, and although it 
was granted for six months research duration in the Khagrachari and Rangamati 
Circle Areas, severe restrictions were imposed on the conduct of research. In the 
Khagrachari area, the presence of heavy security and army intelligence rendered 
interviews extremely difficult due to harassment of subjects. As a result, the 
research programme in Khagrachari ended after ten days after discussions with 
SOAS management. In Rangamati, research was conducted without direct 
interference, but permission was withdrawn after three months. This limited the 
range of the research and led to a comparative study being drawn up with 
reference to the Chakma of Tripura. 
The conditions surrounding research in Bangladesh and India were subtly 
different and militated against a direct comparison of the material context of 
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customary legal practice. In Bangladesh, the severe restrictions on movement 
coupled with the low number of cases rendered the planned participant 
observation unfeasible, so evidence of legal practice and outcome was drawn from 
secondary accounts. A very wide-ranging research sample was collected from 
political, customary and cultural leaders, many of whom took on more than one 
activist role, for example many customary officials were actively engaged in 
politics. In India, though travel to the villages was much easier, a strict division 
between the customary system and the political arena in Tripura was maintained 
by customary officials and community members. This division was itself relevant 
to the conclusions drawn and is discussed in chapter six, but in practical terms 
hindered field research into the wider political positioning of the Chakma within 
the arena of tribal politics in Tripura. Where necessary or illuminating, these 
methodological limitations are referred to in the text of this thesis. 
3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis focusses predominantly on research into the construction of legal form 
and the practice of communitarian law in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of 
Bangladesh. The next two substantive chapters contextualise the study, first 
through an exposition of theories of community and the core concept of critical 
communitarianism, and secondly through a historical narrative of the birth, 
decline and resurgence of customary law in the Hill Tracts. Research chapters 
four, five and six shed light on the conditions under which legal culture can 
become the loci of resistance against the state, through the deployment of the 
analytical sub-concepts of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness.  
Chapter Two – The Location of Community. This chapter establishes a 
theoretical frame for the thesis and identifies the key concepts deployed in the 
analysis of communitarian law. A brief discussion of the location of community in 
universal theory contextualises the politics of difference. A contrast is drawn with 
the explicitly racialised colonial politics of difference that produced tribal 
communities defined an exteriority that now manifests as a potential source of 
resistance. With this theoretical potentiality established, the discussion moves to 
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review the literature on legal pluralism and legal culture, identifying critical 
communitarianism as an appropriate guiding frame for a study that places 
community as the foci of culture, consciousness and mobilisation.  
Chapter Three – Invention and Return. This chapter begins by providing a 
historical overview of the location of tribal communities in colonial iconography 
and their inception in the comparative jurisprudence of indirect rule. It then 
moves to the specific case of the Chakma, recounting the evolution of their law 
from its precolonial ontology through its gradual but uneven incorporation into a 
British technology of rule. This culminated in the formative legislative institution 
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulations 1900 (CHT Manual). In the last part 
of the chapter, the contemporary relevance of the CHT Manual is discussed in 
terms of the default recognition of minority difference contained in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Bangladesh. It links the transference from military 
to political and legal resistance after the 1997 Peace Accord, to the current 
environment of conflict and fragmentation within the Pahari community. 
Chapter Four – The Cultural Curators. This chapter uses the analytical tools of 
legal culture and legal consciousness to deconstruct approaches to communitarian 
law in the CHT, as expressed by Chakma customary officials, political and 
development actors, lawyers, and participants and users. It suggests that the 
relatively recent alignment of customary law with the political identity of the 
Pahari/Jumma has created a much wider and more contested iteration of 
communitarian law, and consequently generated radical and disruptive changes in 
the way Chakma law is conceived, interpreted and applied. This exploration of 
culture and consciousness teases out the inextricable connectedness of state 
violence, community identity and the practice of law, ergo, the ways in which legal 
culture is produced by the power relations that surround it.  
Chapter Five – CHT Village Practice. Shifting to village practice, this chapter 
focuses on the mobilisation of law at a village level, and approaches to legal 
consciousness generated amongst local participants. This chapter proposes that at 
a local level, legal mobilisation is influenced by different and highly localised 
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‘constellations of power’ that reflect, amongst other things, the relative power of 
political and legal actors, geographical location and modes of production, and 
proximity to alternative sources of dispute resolution. The customary domain is 
portrayed as porous and expanded by internal plurality, whilst still playing a vital 
role as the foci of resistance to state domination. It suggests the erstwhile 
customary system is becoming broadly communitarian, admitting many influences 
and becoming increasingly democratic, mutable and participative.  
Chapter Six – A Culture of Perfection - The final substantive chapter offers a 
contrast to the CHT drawn from qualitative research into the practice of Chakma 
customary law in the Kanchanpur Valley of Tripura state, India. It shows the 
hierarchies of the customary system in Tripura to have been recently reconstructed 
by elder members of the Chakma community as a means of further demarcating 
the Chakma from other tribal communities in the context of Tripura state politics. 
The customary system demonstrates an essentialised iteration of Chakma identity 
and a highly conservative understanding of customary law. Customary institutions 
appear closed, static and rigidly hierarchical. Again, the links between identity, 
culture and consciousness are discussed through the prism of critical 
communitarianism.  
Chapter Seven – Conclusion – The thesis concludes by presenting the reasons for 
the divergence between the legal cultures of the two Chakma communities under 
scrutiny using the conceptual frame of critical communitarianism. The thesis 
posits that, paradoxically, conflict causes a community to evolve into the foci of 
resistance, and produces an internal plurality that disperses power, causes rapid 
and radical changes in communitarian law, and provokes a wider resistance to 
capital. It argues in support of engaged universals, concluding that resistance and 
dynamism in legal culture can only emerge from a dialectical relationship between 
community and state, or from a situation where the boundaries between these two 
units of social organisation are constantly in the process of negotiation. In 
contrast, the limited recognition conferred on terms dictated by the state 
concentrates power in a community elite and tends to ossify legal culture. 
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Chapter Two. The Location of Community 
1. Introduction 
The chapter explores the theories and concepts chosen to illuminate research 
outcomes and frame the hypothesis that state violence toward communities 
ultimately empowers its members, whilst the accommodation of communities on 
terms designed by the state only contributes further to their ossification. The 
broad paradigm of legal culture frames analysis of the conditions under which law 
empowers communities, not only in terms of legal mobilisation in defence of 
communities as separate sites of resistance, but also the role law can play in 
creating a resistant consciousness within a non-state community. This is 
articulated through the concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ which explicitly 
identifies legal cultures as deeply affected by their articulation with the state.  
The first section of this chapter, however, doubles back to discuss the location of 
community in both liberal and Marxist ideations of law and rights, noting the 
limitations of universal theories in accounting for diversity, and clarifying the 
concept of communitarianism as a situation in which alternative normative 
frameworks are formed through the immediate and local context 0f community. A 
discussion of the ‘politics of difference’ demonstrates the process through which 
communities have been accommodated by the liberal state, whilst a critique of its 
limitations draws on Marx to place the state as a partial and oppressive force. This 
frames discussion of the centrality of local contexts to the hill communities under 
scrutiny due to their historic exclusion through the colonial politics of difference. 
Broadly, this theoretical discussion positions the postcolonial communities under 
scrutiny as defined by potentially resistant culture and by struggles for power and 
resources. The intention is to expressly locate communities as a potential focus of 
power and resistance as well as a site of legal meaning.  
The second part of the chapter traces the development of the legal pluralism 
paradigm from its initial focus on ostensibly customary systems within a state 
hierarchy to its widening ambit as an explanatory tool for the proliferation of 
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alternative legal orders. Legal pluralism, it is asserted, explains the structural 
subordination of customary to state law, but not the differences arising in non-
state legal systems with similar precolonial roots. Using the recently developed 
concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ the chapter suggests these differences can 
be better illuminated through analysis of legal culture explicitly in the context of 
state/community relations. This concept is expanded to identify the extent to 
which power is dispersed amongst community members as a key variable of legal 
culture and a determinant both of the ways in which law is mobilised locally, and 
the way community members participate in the construction of legality, that is, 
their legal consciousness. The invocation of legal culture as a frame for analysis 
and contrast draws explicit attention to the narratives that surround legal practice. 
In the case in hand these narratives are driven by the immediate and local context 
of communities in constant iteration with the state. 
2. Universalism, Culture and Community 
2.1. Theories of Law and Rights 
The early liberal characterisation of Western law introduced two notions 
absolutely central to its material practice, abstraction and neutrality.67 The 
abstracted legal subject was equal before the law regardless of economic or social 
status, indeed, the investment of a chimerical equality in each legal citizen perhaps 
explained the popular appeal of liberal ideology. Abstract rights were vested by 
the state, which was seen as both the neutral protector of citizens from the abuse 
of power, and the guarantor of the stability needed for citizens to engage in 
markets. The institutions, practices and ideology of Western law were thus 
inextricably linked both to the concept of the state as the primary unit of 
government and to the progressive extension of capitalism as the mode of 
                                                        
67 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge 1992). 
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production from England to the rest of the world.68 The notion of a particular 
type of (Western) law being conjoined inextricably with the emergence of the 
human from their natural condition mirrored the enlightenment trajectory of 
modernity. Kant observed the self-incurred and easy immaturity of man ceding to 
an emboldened state of reason.69 Both Locke and Hobbes, the foremost political 
theorists of rights in the 17th century theorised law and political rights as emerging 
from and in opposition to a ‘state of nature’.70  
Marx’s theorisation of rights similarly established a similar close connection 
between the abstract political rights conferred by citizenship and the development 
of the capitalist state, though with a clear direction that the state was not neutral 
but representative of bourgeois interests. For Marx, the emergence of the political 
citizen created a two-fold life from the ruins of feudal structures, true man was 
found in his ‘sensuous, individual, immediate existence’ only in the private sphere, 
with civic recognition limited to that of an ‘abstract, artificial man… an allegorical, 
juridical person’.71 Abstraction was the form through which the relationship 
between man as an egoistic individual and the state was mediated, and notions of 
community and identity melted away or were relegated to a previous epoch to be 
replaced by class as the organising principle of resistance. Pashukanis advanced 
this theorisation by observing law as produced by civil society, based on a specific 
ideology and operating for the most part without coercive force.72 He argued that 
                                                        
68Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought 
at the Turn of the Century (Hart Pub 2000).  
69 Emmanuel Kant, ‘Kant. What Is Enlightenment’ 
<http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html> 
accessed 16 April 2018.  
70 Douzinas, (n 68)  
71 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’.(1844) 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/  
72 Evgeny B Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Pluto 
Press 1989). Tomlins, Christopher, Marxist Legal History (2017) 
Forthcoming - The Oxford Handbook of Historical Legal Research. 
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law fulfilled a material need for certainty in commercial transactions under 
capitalism, but also operated on a subjective level as a distinctive ideology that 
legitimised profoundly unequal social relations.73  
Whilst illuminating the structural inequalities that attended to Western law 
however, the radical progressivity of Pashukanis essentialised Western law to a 
homogenous superiority, a theoretical move described by Hirst as the replacement 
of one form of reductionism, that of law to class oppression, with another, that of 
legal form to commodity form.74 Hunt found any attempt to unify theories of state 
and civil law in one overarching generality produced a level of abstraction that 
inevitably homogenised legal subjectivity and denied the variety exhibited in legal 
form even within capitalist systems.75 Marxist theory, therefore, found little space 
for heterogeneity in legal form and provided little scope for understanding the 
racial sources of legal pluralism and the extent to which a source of opposition to 
capitalism could be found in legal difference. In respect of this project, however, 
Pashukanis has a dual utility. First, his theorisation exposed the core concepts of 
liberalism as deeply imbued with capitalist ideology, in that abstracted equality 
concealed the rich identity of the ‘real man’ and his social position, whilst the 
asserted neutrality of the state is exposed as imbricated with capitalist interests. 
Additionally, Pashukanis understood law as originating in the social world, its 
ability to pacify and protect most powerfully evident in its subjective assimilation 
into the consciousness of the citizen. This notion of law as a specific ideology 
                                                        
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3082322. Tomlins 
believes this attempt to create a genuine jurisprudence sets Pashukanis 
apart from antecedents who failed to theorise law other than as a veil of 
capitalist social relations. In doing so they fail to account for its specificity 
and multi-faceted roles and interpretations.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Paul Hirst, On Law and Ideology (MacMillan 1979).Pg. 110 
75 Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Towards a Constitutive 
Theory of Law (Routledge 1993). Pg. 26.  
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chimes well with concepts of legal culture insofar as it locates law’s power in the 
subjectification of legal concepts rather than coercive force.  
2.2. Community as an Intervening Variable 
Both liberal and Marxist theory, for different reasons, diminish the importance of 
community as a form of social organisation. The construction of contemporary 
rights, for example, is still theorised by political liberals in terms of individuals 
constantly making voluntary commitments to maintaining the state. Rawls 
exemplified a school of liberal thought that saw the state as providing a neutral 
foundation of equal rights through which difference could be brokered and 
diversity managed.76 He believed that individuals within a liberal democracy were 
invested in concepts of the ‘right’, defined as a political consensus over how 
individuals should live together, before concepts of the ‘good’, defined as those 
elements of individual identity drawn from family, community or religion.77 With 
ethnic and social diversity permanently etched into the political culture of liberal 
democracies, a conscious commitment to the abstractions of rights conceived in 
the political sphere was necessary to create social cohesion and unity.78 Thus, the 
primary link between contemporary theories of rights and their enlightenment 
antecedents was the prominence attached to the concept of a self-possessed 
individual making a reasoned choice of allegiance to the political domain 
unencumbered by pre-ordained values.79  
                                                        
76 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’ (1985) 14 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 223. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Rawls, J, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, Pg. 
160 in Derek Matravers and Jonathan E Pike (eds), Debates in 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Routledge, in 
association with the Open University 2003). 
79 Ibid. Pg. 160. See also Brian Z Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of 
Law and Society (Oxford University Press 2001). 
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Communitarian critiques of Rawls propounded the impossibility of a ‘de-
ontological self’, that is of personhood unencumbered by prior loyalties.80 Sandel 
argued that people understood themselves in relation to their immediate 
attachments rather than the abstraction of citizenship, noting that;  
‘We cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great 
cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly 
in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding 
ourselves as the particular persons we are as members of this family or 
community or nation or people, as bearers of this history.’ 81 
Rawls failed to account for the moral experience in insisting that the self could be 
detached from its immediate aims and attachments without creating a person 
wholly devoid of character and moral depth.82	Thus, a concept of justice based on 
the ‘good’, defined as localised, specific moral concepts should be inserted above 
the ‘right’, being the abstracted notion of political justice that, in Rawlsian terms, 
transcends notions of community. Sandel challenged the rights basis of liberal 
democracy by suggesting that community values secured loyalty more immediately 
than the abstract and distant state, but created a vision of community as inevitably 
conservative through the identification of these loyalties in loaded concepts of 
family and tradition. 
One of the most pellucid responses to Sandel’s communitarian critique of 
liberalism focussed on the artificiality of the radical dualism it propounded, and 
suggested the inevitable result of Sandel’s assertion of community in opposition to 
liberalism rendered the core concepts of both liberalism and communitarianism to 
                                                        
80 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, in Matravers and 
Pike (n 78). Pg. 140 
81 Ibid. Pg. 155 
82 Ibid. 
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be equally unacceptable.83 This dualism required a false choice between the 
concept of right, as represented by the social justice that founds contemporary 
liberalism, and the concept of a communally defined good rooted in plural and 
necessarily divergent traditions. According to this artificial dichotomy, justice was 
necessarily entirely ahistorical and asocial, or completely encased on particular 
social practices. Gutman stated;  
‘Either our identities are independent of our ends, leaving us totally free 
to choose our life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us 
totally encumbered by socially given ends’.84 
Such a communitarian construct left the private, or non-state domain denuded of 
any potentially transformative effects.  
This thesis asserts that communities hold just such a potential, but whether this 
potential is realised will depend on the narratives that surround it, of which one 
powerful strand will be its relationship with the state. A more helpful theorisation 
of communitarianism positioned community as a neutral unit of organisation, 
albeit one shaped and formed by their material and political context. Croce 
suggested communitarianism was neither conservative nor resistant, but indicated 
a situation where;  
‘Communitarian concepts such as community, family or political 
association are practical and social preconditions for the formation of 
personal identity.85  
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Communitarianism in this theorisation signified only that identity was drawn 
from the immediate materiality of life rather than the abstract symbolism of nation 
or state. A communitarian notion of justice was based on notions of the ‘good’ 
found in the immediacy of community, or in Croce’s terms;  
‘The highest common good represented by a particular lifestyle that is 
shared by all members of a communitarian context who identify 
themselves as belonging to a particular ethical or cultural tradition’.’86 
Communities were neutral, however, rather than inherently superior to the state, 
Croce argued that in regards to indigenous communities, a particular ethical or 
cultural tradition;  
‘Might reflect narrow and parochial concerns, (be) based on power 
differentials, may be harshly and indiscriminately coercive and may 
significantly harm weak subjects.’ 87  
In the following discussions of community, this thesis follows Croce in his 
theorisation of communities as holding neither a superior nor inferior morality and 
thus containing the potential either to empower or oppress its members, and to 
resist or succumb to state power.  
Establishing communitarianism as neutral in operation opens an important path 
to distinguishing territorially specific sources of political identity. Community 
with its emphasis on the immediate and the local as a basis for solidarity is not 
necessarily co-terminous with nationalist inspired loyalties that coalesce around 
shared symbols, historical narratives, and mutually recognised representations of 
commonalities such as language, culture, history, and territory in an imagined 
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community.88 Croce’s communitarianism offers a mutability and flexibility in the 
concept of community appropriate to comparative study of the divergent 
evolution of communities separated by the almost diametrically opposed state 
ideologies of Bangladesh and India. In this thesis, community as a unit of analysis, 
and communitarianism as a theoretical and conceptual frame for its analysis 
underpins the contrast of the disparate historical narratives and legal cultures of 
the once unified Chakma nation. 
2.3. The Politics of Difference 
With this understanding of community established, the following brief discussion 
outlines the problematisation of ethnic communities in contemporary liberal 
philosophy, and the emergence of a politics of difference in western liberal states. 
This discussion is tangential in the sense that neither of the constitutional 
frameworks of Bangladesh and India fall easily into the category of liberal on the 
question of managing diversity, indeed subsequent chapters will demonstrate that 
the treatment of the hill communities from colonisation through partition to 
contemporary Bangladesh and India has been based on a distinctly illiberal 
cognition of their backward and primitive nature. It is informative, however, in 
illustrating the potential ontological conflict between the very notion of equal 
rights and the existence of community, and for its exposure of the partiality that 
inevitably imbues every state. Additionally, it reveals the interpellative effect of 
political recognition, or more specifically the potential recognition contains for 
essentialising cultures and denying their porous and fluid nature. In so doing, this 
discussion informs a context when the terms of state recognition still reference the 
derogatory and divisive colonial tropes of the backward tribe.  
Although multiculturalism is an imprecise term, it is used here broadly to describe 
the existence of minority communities and cultural diversity within the borders of 
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the state. As previously discussed, such communities generate alternative 
normative frameworks and cultural practices that coexist, sometimes 
uncomfortably, with the core liberal notions of abstract equality and state 
neutrality and the ingrained assumption of the normative superiority of the 
progressive liberal state.89 A further response to the state of multiculturalism 
accounted for difference through recognition of identity within ‘a politics of 
difference’.90 Rawlsian liberalism was deemed ‘difference blind’ in positioning the 
equal rights proffered by the liberal state as a neutral ground through which 
differences can be acknowledged and synthesised. Taylor argued instead that if 
equal rights were to attach to the authentic self, a politics of difference was 
required that recognised the distinctiveness of the individual, noting that; 
‘The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, 
glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this 
assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity’.91  
An ‘authentic’ recognition of individual rights involved acceptance that each 
singular identity is constructed through a ‘web of interlocution’, more simply put, 
it is through discourse and interaction with others that identity is formed. Ergo, to 
recognise difference was not foreign to notions of equal rights and dignity, but 
grew from a new understanding of the human condition, that is the construction 
of the self by reference to unique and distinctive traits and practices. From this 
philosophical stance, Taylor concluded that full recognition of each individual 
necessitated recognition of different communities and minority normative 
frameworks within a democratic state. Whilst difference-blind liberalism projected 
a demeaning image onto minority communities from the superior vantage point of 
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the ostensibly neutral state, the politics of difference reinforced the equal worth of 
minority communities and accepted the consequential variation in rights 
frameworks that allowed communities to practice their distinctiveness.92 
At the same time, Taylor argued that the ‘hospitable liberalism’ he advocated was 
also ‘a fighting creed’ , and that lines would have to be drawn around acceptable 
variants from the majoritarian norms.93 Though cognisant of the role of 
community in forming the self and the paradoxical intersection of diversity and 
equal rights, when moving to a political solution Taylor re-asserted the state as the 
arbiter of acceptability. Kymlycka also confronted the sometimes problematic 
intersection of state and community norms by differentiating between internal 
restrictions, that is limitations on individual freedom arising within the group, and 
the external protections that community members directed toward majority 
society.94 He argued that liberalism, defined as a political system that maximised 
the freedom of each individual, should broadly reject internal restrictions but in 
recognition of the constitutive and subjective importance of group identity to 
individual freedom, should provide external protection to minority communities. 
Where conflicts arose between these liberal ends and group identity, however, 
Kymlycka felt the acceptance of internal restrictions on individual liberty was 
justified to protect the integrity of the group. Kymlycka also attempted to classify 
minorities and their rights on a regressive scale, for example First Nation 
communities deserved some form of autonomy within the state, whilst racial 
minorities deserved recognition of their cultural difference within mainstream 
society.  
In the ensuing debate over the politics of difference, the problem of normative 
conflicts between state and minority communities arose most frequently over 
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gender relations, indeed some critics went as far as to suggest that multi-
culturalism was bad for women in empowering patriarchy within the state.95 This 
statement drew from instances where cultural recognition worked to diminish the 
rights of women of minority ethnic communities, the most notable being the 
acceptance of a cultural defence that violence against women has been legally 
sanctioned by the intervening variable of culture.96 Whilst supporting Taylors 
theorisation of identity and recognition, Benhabib critiqued his dramatic shift 
from the philosophy of the self toward political solutions that placed the state as 
the arbiter of alternative cultures.97 The same problem arose with the political 
solutions proposed by Kymlycka, insofar as he also privileged certain facets of 
group identity, namely ethnicity and culture, over others, namely gender and 
sexuality.  
Benhabib asserted that a politics of difference that only recognised certain facets 
of group memberships essentialised cultures as definable wholes. This was only 
possible if viewed from the outside, but from the inside; 
Participants in the culture, by contrast, experience their traditions, 
stories, rituals and symbols, tools, and material living conditions through 
shared albeit contested and contestable narrative accounts.98  
Thus, Kymlyckas focus on ‘societal cultures’ essentialised groups or communities, 
denied their internal plurality and in the process potentially silenced both 
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individuals and groups within communities. Benhabib saw no conflict between 
individual rights and group protections if cultures and cultural identity within 
group boundaries were recognised as porous, fluid and contested, and engaged in 
complex dialogues with each other.99 However, she saw that the logical 
consequences of recognition as constructed through the politics of difference 
could easily be illiberal in drawing firm boundaries around communities, engaging 
the state in policing these boundaries through external constructions of authentic 
life forms, and privileging the preservation of cultures over their reinvention and 
subversion.100 
Benhabib engaged only briefly with the unique struggles of indigenous people, 
which she defined as ‘peoples whose cultural identity is rooted to a particular 
region, territory or hunting of fishing domain.’ Their claims were not solely for 
recognition of ways of living but for restitution or protection of the territorial 
resources historically removed from or under threat by the state. Such resource 
claims were justified but, noting the potential incommensurability of indigenous 
cultures with gender equality norms, Benhabib argued the right of indigenous 
people to autonomy should be read with the right to participate in the wider 
community of the majoritarian state. Her view of recognition created a pre-
supposition of continued discourse between community and state through which 
contradictions and clashes in systems of normative ordering were resolved 
through dialogic engagement.101 This accommodation of indigenous recognition 
was, however, preceded by scepticism of their ability to survive even within a 
paradigm of recognition.  
Benhabibs weak engagement with colonial history invited trenchant criticism of 
the idea that justice for indigenous people lay entirely in terms of their greater 
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inclusion into the state and society’.102 Coulthard argued that this presupposed 
the necessity of integration of indigenous people into the majority in order that 
their non-modern non-liberal norms were modified through inter-community 
discourse.103 Where Benahabib suggested dialogic method was a source of 
resolution for the contradictions and tensions between state and group, 
Coulthard countered by drawing attention to the naivety of conceptualising 
discourse as neutral ground, highlighting its role in constructing power relations, 
either between state and community, or between indigenous community elites and 
group members. Indeed, Coulthard identified a violence inherent in the process of 
recognition in its subordination of the indigene on terms set by the state, with the 
inevitable consequence that difference was minimised by state management. 
Benhabibs underlying assumption of an intermediate place in which difference 
could be negotiated militated against honest confrontation of the colonial, racist, 
and patriarchal forms of domination that conspired to deny indigenous people 
their land and sovereignty. Coulthard, deliberately echoing Fanon, drew attention 
to the interpellative effect of recognition on the indigenous subject, by arguing 
that it necessarily involved the internalisation of inferiority. He instead 
distinguished ‘discourses that naturalise oppression and discourses that naturalise 
resistance’, calling attention to the way that essentialised notions of culture could 
be deployed to ‘transcend not reinforce oppressive structures and practices’.104 
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This articulation of culture, resource claims, and resistance grounded the more 
idealistic aspects of Coulthards’ theory, namely that the potential to challenge 
capitalism and the racialised inception of the liberal state lay in a consciousness 
emerging not from class or socio-economic marginalisation but from within the 
alternate lifeworld of indigenous peoples. In the context of settler colonialism, 
Coulthard asserted the incommensurability of indigenous claims with liberalism, 
and argued that if capitalism must die in order for these claims to be met, 
indigenous people should engage in the construction of alternatives to it.105 
Nothing less than ceding sovereignty to historically oppressed communities was 
acceptable. 
What does this debate tell us about the case in hand? The first salient point is the 
identification of community as a problematic within the state, insofar as each 
attempt to theorise a politics of difference ends in an assertion of the primacy of 
the state and of its default power to determine the limits to community autonomy. 
In a postcolonial context such an unquestioned assumption of the state’s 
progressive nature has the effect of ameliorating narratives of historic oppression 
and exclusion, and providing a normative justification for the continued exercise of 
state power. The second salient point is the highly mutable nature of culture, and 
the concomitant danger that processes of recognition might harden the external 
borders of communities, deny their porosity, and diminish or understate their 
internal heterogeneity. Finally, the postcolonial critique of recognition advanced 
by Coulthard drew the question of resistance to the fore. The limits of social 
constructivism were found in the idea that discourse solved the problematic 
contradictions that arose from communities as an intervening variable between 
state and individual when the scope and terms of that discourse are set by the 
colonial state.  
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2.4. Resistance in the Postcolonial World 
So far, this thesis has argued that the theorisation of community as the ‘other’ of 
progressive liberalism carried risks of essentialised conceptualisations of culture 
and community, and was driven by an underlying assumption that the liberal state 
was normatively superiority to the communitarian realm. Marxist theories of law 
shared a root in the conception of state/society relations mediated through fictions 
of equal rights and state neutrality, but still shed light on their ideological 
underpinnings and the operation of law on a subjective level. Nonetheless, in 
locating law as produced solely from the commodity form, untempered Marxist 
theory accounted only weakly for the heterogeneity of legal form in the global 
south, the location of community within distinctive legal forms, and the potential 
of communities to generate alternative and potentially resistant legal cultures. 
This section establishes the context for resistance and law in the hill communities 
as arising from the colonial production of the tribe as an autonomous political 
unit. It explores the displacement of both progressive meta-narratives by the 
interjection of colonialism and the production of certain South Asian communities 
as a highly particular ideological legacy of the colonial era. Once defined as tribes, 
the hill communities were only marginally subject to the cultural domination 
associated with colonialism, and survived as a site of alterity that now potentially 
destabilises the contemporary state.  
In the highly pertinent context of legal pluralism, Merry defined colonialism as;  
‘a relation between two or more groups of unequal power in which one 
not only controls and rules the other but also endeavours to impose its 
cultural order onto the subordinate groups(s).’ 106  
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The element of cultural domination distinguished the ontology of colonialism 
from imperialism, and was essential to understanding the theoretical dissonance 
that until recently characterised discourse between structural Marxism and 
postcolonial theory. In India, colonisation failed to displace systematically the 
indigenous population from their land and territory, and ended when the British 
relinquished power and ceded independence in 1947.107 This relatively peaceful 
transition from foreign domination to independence on one level marked the 
defeat of colonialism,108 but only after colonial rule had effected enduring changes 
in the cultural realm, in the form of English bureaucratic institutions,109 the use of 
English as the dominant language of the Indian elite,110 the transplant of Western 
legal institutions,111 and, disastrously, the coercive introduction of land 
management practices inspired by the particularly English experience of 
capitalism.112 In the light of the British colonisation of the cultural realm, the 
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delineation and production of communities as explicitly excluded both from 
markets and from the cultural legacy of colonialism is of central import to this 
thesis. 
Postcolonial theory attempted to rectify the cultural deficit in universal or 
structural theories, that deficit being their perceived failure to account for the 
cultural and psychological facets of colonial experience and the irreversible effects 
of this failure on the consciousness of indigenous populations. Colonisation, 
according to Fanon, was explicitly racialised and worked on the colonised 
subconsciousness to instil a subjective inferiority enduring long after their actual, 
material subjugation had ceased.113 The instillation of white, Western superiority 
over the cultural domain obliterated whole histories; colonisation denigrated and 
denied pre-existing social and political orders, and led to the internalisation of 
racial inferiority by the indigenous population.  
The dissonance between Marxism and postcolonial theory arose from the 
materialist denial of the centrality of race and culture to the colonial experience. 
Bhabha exemplified a post structuralist reading of culture in his attempts to 
recover the dissonant and distinctive narratives erased through colonial 
domination of the literary canon.114 He dissected postcolonial literature to 
illustrate how class consciousness, as understood in Marxist terms, could not 
develop within the splintered post-colonial narratives and fragmented 
subjectivities of the postcolonial world. This position was countered by Marxists 
who posited a theoretical commensurability between universal consciousness and 
heterogenous cultural contexts. Lazarus, for example, argued that though 
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capitalism was heterogenous in form, its effects tended toward structuring 
societies in ways that undermined the diversity and centrality of culture.115 This 
theoretical dissonance is worthy of exploration given its contemporary relevance 
to the location of the hill communities in India and Bangladesh, insofar as they 
were constructed in the colonial era according to racial categorisations but were 
also targeted for protections due to their primitive and backward nature.  
Of direct relevance is the subaltern studies school in India, which initially used a 
Marxist frame to illuminate the specific failures of capital expansion in India, 
memorably captured in Guha’s argument for an Indian exceptionalism formed 
around a concept of colonial dominance imposed without a concomitant 
hegemony emerging within the indigenous population.116 The subaltern studies 
approach evolved into a more explicitly post-structural sociological analysis of the 
history and consequences of colonialism. Chakrabarty criticised the structuralist 
tendency to attach absolute primacy to economic transition in the development of 
resistance and class consciousness, and argued that the Marxist paradigm negated 
the contribution of caste, community and kin to the construction of Indian 
identity.117 He surmised the baffling nature of political modernity in postcolonial 
India lay in a comprehension of the many alternate narratives to Capital that 
emerged from these deeply rooted social constructs. Further, he identified the 
historical materialist tendency in Marxism as inherently Western; with only 
temporal distinction in the outcomes of capitalist development, the global south 
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was inevitably consigned to the ‘the waiting room of history.’118 These many 
alternate histories modified capital’s spread, deferred its self-realisation and 
challenged the Marxist insistence on an absolute coincidence between being 
human and being the bearers of the capacity to labour.119 Postcolonial theory in 
this explicitly Indian context thus supported a possibility of alternate and resistant 
identities occurring in the spheres of clan, culture and community. Spivak also 
opened new avenues of postcolonial critique in directing attention more directly to 
the failure of structural theories to account for the psychological aspects of 
colonialism. She asserted the Marxist analyses of the early subaltern studies series 
unwittingly removed agency and individuality from those designated as belonging 
to the subaltern class by homogenising individual experience and 
consciousness.120 Her critique doomed any attempt to recover subaltern 
consciousness to failure in that the very process of attributing a class identity to the 
oppressed denied their rich and textured identity.  
This explicitly Indian rebuttal of the possibilities of a homogenised global 
experience still failed to account for one of most distinctive and exceptional 
features of colonial government, which was the creation and preservation of 
political forms entirely inconsistent with Marxist universalism.121 Concepts of 
‘tribe’ were specifically identified as antithetical to Capital because they; 
‘Are not about capitalists using traditional ideologies to dominate their 
workers, but about colonial states withdrawing potential laborers from 
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capitalist labour markets altogether – literally limiting the spread of 
capitalist economic forms’.122 
Communities emerged through the ‘rule of colonial difference’, a term deployed by 
Chatterjee to describe situations where ‘a norm of supposedly universal validity… 
is held not to apply to the colony as result of some deficiency of the latter’ .123 The 
rule of colonial difference introduced an intractable paradox into British rule in 
that the systems of government adopted by colonial rulers specifically undermined 
their hegemonic power. To follow Chatterjee’s logics, tribal communities 
considered too backward as to be incapable of reason and rationality were 
rendered incapable of loving their rulers and consequently could not internalise 
their normative order. In the realms of culture, community was thus transformed 
through colonialism into a stubbornly resistant political form that occurred 
outside the labour force and absent of class consciousness. 
Still, the uncompromising dualism between Marxism and postcolonial theory 
limited rather than elucidated the concept of community in the contemporary 
South Asian context, in that these political forms survived within a structure of 
capital-in-dominance. Given the ubiquity of the state as the primary unit of 
government, it was more recently suggested that universals can be engaged in a 
postcolonial context without compromising the search for thickness and 
complexity in the subject.124 Gidwani found an alternative politics of work 
displaced the colonial ideology of waste and improvement in the Patel clan of 
Gujerat, concluding that India now contained numerous political relations of 
difference that were ‘transgressive of the established order, contradictory and 
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fraught with danger’.125 The sphere of non-capital was separate from the dominant 
form of social relations, subversive, potentially destabilising, but always intimately 
connected. Gidwani expressed the possibility that;  
 ‘Even when life is structured-in-dominance to capitalist value, (it) has 
remained an interlacing of multiple value-productions that are not-
capital’.126 
In a similar vein, Chandra suggested a fruitful navigation was possible between 
Marxist theories of culture and postcolonial theories of capitalism by analysing 
resistance in existing capitalisms.127 In relation specifically to the tribal 
communities in India, he criticised the sterility of pitching idealised constructions 
of tribal communities as resisting subjects against anthropological studies that 
claim total identification with them. This unwarranted avant-gardism produced 
false representations of indigenous struggle that obscured both engaged 
universalism and the quest for thick constructs of identity. Similarly focussed on 
indigenous resistance, Hale considered how neo-liberal capitalism embraced 
cultural recognition of indigenous people as a neutralising strategy when faced 
with opposition to material expansion into their territory, highlighting the inter-
relationship of material struggles for land, the quest for cultural recognition and 
the consequent need to navigate between these two aspects of indigenous 
resistance.128 All these essays demonstrate the value of synthesising materialist 
with cultural theory in the search for the conditions that produce resistance.  
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In this thesis, these conditions will be ascertained through an examination of legal 
cultures within a legally plural framework constructed around communities as 
autonomous units, in a region where the colonial politics of difference produced a 
mode of rule which encapsulated the hill communities in a state-in-dominance 
structure which was explicitly and deliberately absent of cultural domination. 
Despite postcolonial divergence in state strategies toward minority communities, 
analysis of legal culture will be suggested as an appropriate tool for identifying the 
many narrative strands that link contemporary strategies of state recognition of 
the hill communities with the exclusions of the colonial past.  
2.5. Governmentality of the East 
The final reference to the colonial politics of difference expressly addresses its 
propensity to exclude tribal communities from the technologies of modernity. 
According to Chatterjee, tribal communities were not only beyond capitalist 
markets, they were ‘beyond policy’;129 colonial governments deployed a highly 
specific ‘governmentality of the east’, that produced communities as stable political 
entities exempt from the disciplinary techniques deployed by the state to control 
populations. Before moving to discuss legal pluralism, its framing in terms of 
Foucauldian concepts of power lends weight to the idea that legal pluralism is 
generative of divergent legal cultures that are themselves produced by power 
relations.  
Power, its nature, source and manifestations evolved in Foucault’s considerable 
canon of work from an initial theorisation as a deadening, oppressive and 
inescapable condition of modern life, to a more dynamic and productive 
understanding of power relations as an exercise of power always exciting a 
resistant opposition. Foucault initially observed modernity as precipitating first 
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the demise of social control exercised through centralised Sovereign power, and 
enforced by law and performative punishment, and then the consequent ascension 
of a disciplinary power that was dispersed, localised, and exercised through 
invisible systems of normalisation and control.130 Effectively, the modern subject 
was conditioned or disciplined to conform to dominant norms, and internalised 
the behaviours conducive or essential to the control of populations. This 
disassociation of structural forces and individual consciousness marked Foucault’s 
rejection of the basic tenets of Marxist theory in that power structures were 
fragmentary and only tangentially and mystically related to social relations and the 
state. Thus, Foucault’s characterisation of power as opaque, dispersed and all-
pervading reduced the space available for human agency by its implicit denial of 
consciousness on any level emerging from a reasoned individual.131  
Foucault’s later theoretical adventures addressed the absence of structural 
reference points for the theory of disciplinary power by reference to the concept of 
governmentality, defined as an ensemble of; 
‘The institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form 
of power which has as its targets populations, as its principle form of 
knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security.’ 132  
Governmentality elicited the systematic nature of the operation of state power, or 
more specifically the role of state centred systems in objectifying populations 
through statistical and ethnographic endeavour. These techniques rendered 
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populations subject to various technologies of control in pursuit of dominant 
interests which were not structurally determined but unnamed and unspecified.133 
Governmentality produced a large number of diffuse exercises of power to which 
resistance could only occur sporadically, as part of a highly specific relation.  
This articulation of power was further developed in Foucault’s description of 
power as always involving a transaction of unequal social relations, in which each 
exercise of power contained the possibility of resistance eliciting from the 
subject.134 This more dynamic theorisation was deployed by Foucault to explain 
the various types of struggles against power that emerged regardless of the 
exercise of disciplinary power. These included transversal struggles forming 
beyond state boundaries, immediate struggles directed at the ‘closest’ enemy, 
struggles by individuals to maintain their difference, and struggles against the 
privileges of knowledge.135 Each struggle emerged from a particular relationship 
and a particular option, and in relation to each of these struggles for power, 
resistance is formed; 
If it is true that at the heart of power relations there is insubordination 
then…there is no relationship of power without the means of possible 
flight. Each power relationship implies at least in potentia, a strategy of 
struggle, in which two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their 
specific nature’.136 
Despite this, Hunt observed that Foucauldian resistance remained a weak 
concept in that the many instances of resistance elicited by the dispersal of power 
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brought no possibility of unity.137 In counterpoint, it has also been suggested that 
the unifying element of Foucault’s theory was expressed by his notion of the 
political.138 A political sphere was not possible without some form of aggregation 
of power, and logically a possibility of a similar aggregation arose in relation to 
resistance.139 Thus, though modernity created subjectified methods of social 
control, and exercised power through their operation of publics, the process also 
potentially had the effect of creating political unity from the mechanics of 
oppression and resistance. 
Legal pluralism in all its guises involves a decentring or dispersal of power. In the 
case in hand, the organising unit of community is situated as the object of state 
power and potentially the site of resistance. In the following exposition of the legal 
pluralism paradigm, Foucault’s theories of power are referenced to elucidate the 
complex relationality of state to communities historically excluded from 
technologies of control. At the same time, Foucault’s belief in the dispersed 
qualities of power and its insidious nature illuminate the struggles for power and 
resources that, according to Croce, legal pluralism always represents.140 These 
struggles occur not only between community and state but within the boundaries 
of the communitarian field.141 With this in mind, the discussion now turns to the 
colonial roots of pluralism, and the effects of the colonial exclusion on the 
postcolonial theatre of law. 
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3. Legal Pluralism 
From the previous discussion of community, three core assumptions have been 
drawn. The first was that theoretically, community was a neutral concept that was 
neither necessarily regressive nor resistant, but creative of primary loyalties based 
on the immediate and the local. The second broadly related to the partiality that 
infused even discourse-based theorisations of multiculturalism and recognition in 
placing the liberal state as the arbiter of the limits of community and patroller of 
their boundaries. The third was that community in South Asia emerged under 
certain circumstances into a stable political form - that of tribe - intentionally 
constituted as external to capital and immured at least partially from the cultural 
domination associated with colonialism.  
With these broad theoretical directions in mind, the remainder of this chapter 
discusses the articulation between community and law through the conceptual 
lens of legal pluralism, and more explicitly through the concept of ‘critical 
communitarianism’.142 It argues that the related concepts of classical pluralism 
and of customary law potentially overdetermine South Asian communitarian law 
as a product of a particular colonial formation, in that whilst the colonial legal 
hierarchy still subordinates erstwhile customary law to the state system, within 
minority communities the way law is mobilised to position communities for or 
against the state produces distinctive legal cultures. Whilst legal pluralism 
requires an understanding of the effects of the dispersal of state power through 
legal form, ‘critical communitarianism’ establishes these sites as also productive of 
legal meaning that is constructed in part through their relationship with the state. 
The concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ in effect articulates a communitarian 
tendency of thought within law and is explored through the related analytical tools 
of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness.  
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3.1. The Colonial Roots of Legal Pluralism 
So far it has been argued that the expansion of capitalism through colonialism 
produced a highly particular political form of communities intentionally excluded 
from markets and from the transplant of Western law. From this position, Marxist 
theories of law helpfully identified the structural inequalities that underpinned 
core liberal concepts, and the operation of law on a subjective level, but were 
inadequate to explain communities founded by a legally enforced exclusion from 
even the chimera of equal citizenship and thus from the psychological 
internalisation of Western ideologies of law.  
Critiques of the commodity form theory that identified its homogenisation of legal 
form(section 2.1) resonate in the paradigm of legal pluralism, an oppositional 
antidote to the progressive narratives of both liberal and Marxist legal theory. At 
around the time Pashukanis was developing his general theory, Western sociology 
began to challenge a conceptualisation of law as necessarily generated by the state, 
presenting it instead as an ‘offspring of society itself’.’143 Meanwhile, ethnographies 
in the global south exposed the law-like social regulation generated independently 
by communities within non-state settings. By the mid-20th century, studies of 
alternative adjudication systems in the Americas, Africa and Asia catalogued 
examples of the complex legal reasoning deployed within oral systems, and 
challenged prevalent legal orthodoxies by positing oral systems as legal in 
nature.144 In colonial settings, alternative systems of legal ordering were observed 
as capable of exhibiting the same faculties of rule and purpose as the Western 
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canon,145 and as characterised by a focus on process above form.146 The concept of 
law being confined to the particularity of a technocratic and differentiated 
Western form thus lost traction in a slew of evidence of indigenous systems of 
social regulation being recognisably legal.  
Legal pluralism as a theoretical paradigm emerged from these earlier explorations 
of legal systems decentred from the state, classical’ legal pluralism arose in colonial 
settings when; 
‘the sovereign commands different bodies of law for different groups of 
the population varying by ethnicity, religion, nationality, or geography 
and when the parallel legal regimes are all dependent on the state legal 
system’ 147  
Classical pluralism was in effect produced by the hybridisation of transplanted 
state centric legal systems and pre or co-existing systems of community regulation. 
The term described relationships which were always ‘embedded in relationships 
of unequal power’, in that under colonial rule, ‘customary’ informal law was always 
subordinated to the ostensibly superior and more developed Western canon.148 
The labelling of non-state law as customary was itself revealing of an 
understanding of alternate legal systems as defined by their antiquity, unchanging 
nature, the primitivism of its practitioners, and their inevitable subordination to 
state law. Take for example this jurists’ discovery of order within South Asian 
societies; 
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‘ These people are not loose, incoherent assemblages of savages, but are 
very ancient societies, restrained and stringently directed by custom and 
usage’.149  
The dichotomy between law and custom that characterised Western jurists’ 
comprehension of alternative legal systems played into a much wider narrative that 
attributed indigenous populations with a timeless and static quality. Indeed, 
Fitzpatrick observed colonialism as producing a mythology that generalised the 
Western subject as enlightened and rational, and the non-western subject as 
savage and inferior.150 Through the propagation of myth, European nations 
homogenised the infinite variety of social formations they encountered into broad 
racial categories. Their material objectives of extraction and enrichment were 
paralleled by a civilising mission that sought to impose ‘order on chaos, creating 
forms and norms.151 For those living under indirect rule, however, customary law 
remained the primary or only form of legal regulation, leading Merry to 
conceptualise these ostensibly subordinate legal systems as spaces in which 
resistance and alterity could flourish.152  
Though classical pluralism always implied the subordination of a non-state legal 
system to the state’s legal architecture, the material reality of the colonial 
encounter belied a more complex constitutive relationship between the law of the 
coloniser and colonised.153 Numerous indigenous ethnographies described how 
an iterative relationship between subjected populations and colonising powers 
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created highly diverse forms of law that owed at least as much to this iteration as 
to custom. Snyder’s study of Senegal, for example, revealed how the application of 
the customary label to non-state law conjured an image of a rather bucolic and 
static community, when in fact customary system of law that was relatively recent 
in origin and comprised an uneasy hybrid of capitalist market principles and 
substantially altered indigenous institutions.154 Colonial hybridity saw the 
ideology of the coloniser ‘working with what is already to hand without 
eradicating and existing the lifeworld’ ,155 or involved in a; 
 ‘Structuration-process in which actors draw upon elements of different 
normative systems and combine them in compounded legal 
rationalisation and justification schemes.' 156 
The structuration process alluded to was a dynamic engagement between 
Western transplanted law and its customary other, of a customary sphere created 
by the iteration between coloniser and colonised even whilst being characterised 
as unchanging and rooted in the normative values of an ill-defined and ancient 
past.157 The concept of classical legal pluralism illuminated the structural 
subordination of communitarian law in a postcolonial context, but fell short of 
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explicating the nature of socially embedded systems of regulation that arose within 
and outside colonially anointed structures. The next section introduces the 
expanded theory of ‘social science’ legal pluralism to extend analysis of customary 
legal practice beyond the conceptual yolk of colonial essentialism. 
3.2. Law from Society. 
The anthropological roots of legal pluralism perhaps account for its focus on the 
potentiality of law emerging outside of the state, and its expansion toward 
conceptualising law as made and enforced in multiple locations within and beyond 
the nation state.158 When defining legal pluralism, Griffiths wrote that;  
‘A descriptive theory of legal pluralism deals with the fact that within any 
given field, law of various provenance may be operative. It is when in a 
social field more than one source of law, more than one ‘legal order’ is 
observable, that the social order of that field can be said to exhibit legal 
pluralism’159.  
Within this broad descriptive category, the colonial variant of legal pluralism was 
‘weak’ pluralism in that it described a particular state-centred legal form, whilst 
‘social science’ or ‘strong’ pluralism portrayed a situation in which multiple 
alternative systems of legal regulation overlapped in less predictable equations. 
Griffiths drew heavily on Moore’s concept of ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ to 
conceptualise ‘strong pluralism’ as a situation where different and competing rule-
sets or fields existed within the same jurisdiction.160 Moore’s earlier argument was 
that the boundaries of the semi-autonomous social field were generated by ‘a 
processual characteristic’ rather than organisational considerations, processual 
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meaning the rule-generating nature of the social field. Thus, her concept focussed 
attention on; 
‘Issues of autonomy and isolation, or rather, the absence of autonomy and 
isolation, as well as focussing on the capacity to generate rules and induce 
or coerce conformity’ 161 
Varying degrees of legal autonomy could exist within a social field, on a scale that 
moved from complete autonomy to complete domination, and many such semi-
autonomous fields worked in articulation with each other, forming overlapping, 
mutually reinforcing or even conflicting normative frameworks within one 
domain.162 
Moore thus not only created a conceptual foundation for social science pluralism, 
but also introduced a scalar element into the discussion by suggesting that each 
semi-autonomous social field was characterised by degrees of dominance and 
plurality. Griffiths adopted a similar scalar characteristic in his descriptive 
definition by defining legal pluralism on a scale of strong to weak. For Griffiths, 
however, it was not the degree of domination that determined strength, but the 
extent of autonomy of the social field from the state, broadly the more independent 
the regulation, the stronger the pluralism. State recognition, by implication, 
created a weak pluralism the object of recognition was absorbed into the state 
panoply, thus rendering colonial legal orders so subsumed within the state system 
as to be an extension of it. Strong pluralism, on the other hand, extended the 
paradigm toward understanding multiple forms of regulation as explicitly legal, 
ostensibly diffused the conceptualisation of law as emerging solely from the state, 
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or indeed solely from markets, and thus further diluted the eurocentricity of 
Western jurisprudence.163  
This simplistic characterisation belies the agency of communities who achieve 
state recognition on their own terms. In the case in hand, even within a structure 
of state domination, classical pluralism will be shown to create the potentiality for 
resistant legal cultures emerging from oppressed communities. The work of 
Santos in constructing an explicitly ‘postmodern’ legal pluralism is usefully 
extended to the interior worlds of the hill communities. 164 His innovation was to 
suggest self-regulation allowed subaltern communities to make their own laws 
and created a space and potentiality for resistance to emerge, drawing inspiration 
from participant observations of quasi-legal adjudications in Brazilian favelas, 
some pertaining to transfers of land within the settlement which was illegally 
settled according to state law.165 Regardless of the prevailing illegality of such 
transactions, they were experienced and observed as law within the Favela, being 
the only source of dispute resolution to slum dwellers living beyond the reach of 
state regulation. The Favela had developed its own rituals and signifiers, and 
enforced them through local sources of power such as local governing hierarchies 
and community coercion. As a consequence, a complex system of land regulation 
and transfer, entirely unconnected with the dominant state legality, had emerged 
from the Favela community. 
Santos identified the connections between different legal orders and normative 
ordering to be a crucial area of study. He coined the term ‘inter-legality’ to 
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emphasise a kind of non-chaotic fragmentation of law, characterised by multiple, 
overlapping sources of rule generation. Inter-legality was; 
The conception of different legal spaces, superimposed, interpenetrated 
and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions…our legal life is 
constituted by the intersection of legal orders, that is by inter-legality’166 
For Santos, the relationship of any legal order with the state was essentially only 
one of many such relationships that arose within different ‘constellations of power’, 
each constellation being a realm productive of its own legal ordering. Examples of 
these constellations included state, family, church, and community, all 
representing spheres of regulation that were linked and co-mingled, but which 
produced distinct sets of power relations, defined in the Foucauldian sense of 
being a social relationship of unequal power.167 This theorisation was heavily 
influenced by the wider paradigm of globalisation, which presupposed that 
communities organised in ways that traversed local, national and global spheres, 
and were increasingly connected through global paradigms such as human rights 
and the indigenous people’s movement for example.168 Inter-legality was therefore 
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both a cause and consequence of legal fecundity within the new reality of global 
society, and legal pluralism the foundation for a postmodern theory of law.  
The notion of inter-legality is relevant to this study in that it will be shown in 
chapter five that more than one source of legal ordering exists within the 
communitarian arena in the CHT, and that furthermore, the mingling of 
potentially competing and ontologically different sources of law is productive of 
legal culture. Yet the near exclusive focus of Santos on the oppositional and 
resistant qualities of legal practice in communities, suggests an under-theorisation 
of the lop-sided role of the state in structuring inter-legality. The conceptual frame 
of critical communitarianism has been chosen precisely because it situates the 
state/community axis as central to the way law and identity is formed in the 
communitarian field. The next section considers critiques of legal pluralism, 
suggesting that the concept of a state-in-dominance must be tempered by an 
understanding of the state as itself heterogenous and polycentric.  
3.3. State and Power 
Many of the most trenchant critiques of Santos focus on the veil his particularly 
wide conception of legal pluralism throws over the unequal power of state and 
non-state sources of legal ordering. Tamanaha, for example decried the fuzziness 
of the definition of law adopted, drawing attention to the conceptual difficulties of 
de-coupling concepts of law from the state given the unparalleled symbolic 
prestige enjoyed by state law.169 In a similar vein, Roberts raised the conceptual 
difficulty of a legal system without a legal subject and argued that only those 
systems of ordering experienced as law be defined as law.170 Tamanaha and 
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Roberts together suggested it was the undeniable power and symbolic prestige of 
the state that gave rise to law-ness, thus confirming their belief in a state monopoly 
over the production of law.  
These critiques highlighted a dualism between structural and post structural 
theory breached most effectively by Fitzpatrick, who suggested that a social field 
could maintain its distinctiveness even if the complex of Capital itself took 
precedence over any particularity.171 His Marxist conceptualisation of legal 
pluralism argued that the dispersal of power to community in a legally plural 
environment occurred within a framework still dominated and structured by the 
state. For Fitzpatrick, legal pluralism was not satisfactorily explained as a mere 
element of a totality, but was better conceptualised as a more complex 
phenomenon in which law was partly legitimised through its interaction with 
pluralities that had the contradictory effects of constraining and enabling their 
operation.172 His articulation of Marxism and post structuralism thus offered a 
theoretical understanding of Western law as arising from the operation of 
capitalist markets and dominated by the state, but also generating dispersed sites 
of legal fecundity productive of their own relations of power. This reconciliation of 
apparently dissonant theories is highly relevant to the Hill Tracts context in that 
the Chakma community maintain their separation from the state through law, but 
operate within a legal sphere that contains multiple struggles for power. 
Shahar’s perspective on the location of the state in legally plural order noted a 
similarity between legal pluralists and their critics in an apparently two-
dimensional conceptualisation of the state.173 In characterising state law as 
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homogenous, and always dominant, Tamanaha reduced customary systems to an 
adjunct of a monolith. Similarly, Griffiths strong-to-weak scale of legal pluralism 
suggested to Shahar that when the state recognises a customary system; 
‘The latter immediately becomes an integral part of the former, and loses 
any distinct social impact it ever had. Legal pluralism, as much as we can 
speak of it in such cases, is no longer real and consequential, but merely 
doctrinal or "nominal’ 174  
According to Shahar, both positions were flawed in representing state law as 
separate, distinct and above society, when it was in fact internally heterogenous 
and polycentric. Boundaries between state and society were socially constructed 
and context dependent, just as the boundaries between state, non-state law, and 
non-legal social orders were always ‘blurred and open to social construction and 
negotiation’ .175 Using customary law in Israel as an example, she observed a 
relationship between state and non-state law constructed by dispute and 
negotiation and reflective of identity politics and powers struggles at a national 
level.176 This approach suggested a relationship between the strength of identity 
politics and the extent to which communitarian law was utilised to reinforce the 
boundaries between state and community, in other words the exercise of legal 
choices in a plural environment was a practice of identity.177  
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This exposition of legal pluralism has provided the context for the study of legal 
culture through an explication of the close alignment between postcolonial 
communities and the production and practice of communitarian law. Postcolonial 
legal pluralism has been discussed in terms of state power and power relations, 
and connected to practices of identity in a multi-cultural state. The chosen frame 
of critical communitarianism for this thesis was informed by an understanding of 
communities as not only the focus of power, but also as a site of legal meaning. 
The next section explores in more detail the broad paradigm of legal culture and 
the concept of critical communitarianism, establishing in the process that legal 
pluralism, power and culture are intricately connected and productive of one 
another.  
4. Legal Culture 
4.1. Critical Communitarianism 
The defining concept in this thesis is that of ‘critical communitarianism’, which 
refines broader concepts of legal culture to provide a more explicit understanding 
of the role of legal culture in the articulation between communitarian legal systems 
and the contemporary state.178 The legal culture school initially developed to 
identify patterns of legally oriented social behaviour through the analysis of legal 
institutional composition and the more ephemeral values and aspirations that 
encase legal behaviours. Its study gained traction as a means of placing black-
letter law within a social context, with culture itself posited as ‘an essential 
intervening variable in the process of producing legal stasis or change’.179 Nelken 
observed law was a product of both action and identity being, ‘like culture itself… 
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about who we are not just what we do’.180 Legal culture might be seen as 
theoretically connecting the practice of law with identity, emphasising the 
constitutive and formative role of law within culture, and establishing law’s role in 
creating an orderly universe and reconstructing normative beliefs as palpably 
real.181.  
By adopting ‘critical communitarianism’ as its guiding frame, however, this thesis 
not only engages with the broad paradigm of legal culture, but also employs its 
sub-concepts as analytical tools. Barzilai’s concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ 
specifically illuminated an articulation of political identity, law and power relations 
which both recognised the disproportionate influence of the state , and 
established community as a potential source of resistance. It viewed: 
‘Nonruling communities as cultural foci of mobilization for, or resistance 
to, state law in the political context of state-society relations. It dwells on 
legal cultures as practices of those identities that have become embodied 
in legal consciousness and that have been generated through state-society 
relations as well as struggles for power.182 
One critical facet of critical communitarianism was its emphasis on minority 
communities in the context of their relationship with the state and majority 
society, with political identity conceptualised as a construct of legal practice, and 
state dominance theorised as a function of social relations. Both state recognition 
and community resistance were therefore identified as closely aligned with, and 
even productive of, legal practice.  
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Turning toward the state, Barzilai enlisted a Marxist perspective to illuminate its 
dominance in three instances of legal pluralism in Israel,183 stating that  
‘Bourgeois legal culture is accordingly not a “veil of ignorance” (to use a 
Rawlsian term) but a veil meant to promote state domination. Legality, 
in post-Marxist phraseology, is a state-produced illusion that disguises 
the micro mechanisms of power in which discipline enforces 
subordination’. 184  
This critical sensibility explicitly rejected the predominant liberal assertion of state 
neutrality and identified the state as a multi-faceted entity broadly representing the 
interests of the dominant class. However, Barzilai’s theorisation transcended the 
limitations of a strictly Marxist determination of class as produced solely by 
economic relations by suggesting instead the focus on political and legal culture 
offered a more fruitful frame for the analysis of difference in a multi-cultural 
context. Drawing on the idea of law as an ‘identity postulate’,185 Barzilai argued 
that state domination should be perceived as ‘a constitutive force in the 
construction of political culture and legality’.186 Concomitantly, the cultural 
hegemony of the state rarely extended into non-ruling communities, which usually 
retained a level of cultural autonomy and were sources of diverse practices, 
including resistance. Critical communitarianism captured the complex 
positioning of non-state law within a power relation dominated by state 
approaches to diversity. 
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Barzilai drew inspiration from the pluralist assertion that no one form of law was 
superior to another, and his consequent theorisation of legal culture was driven by 
a perceived duality of state violence and communally generated pluralisms. Cover 
phrased this dualism as an interpretative opposition, state law representing law-as-
power, and community law representing law-as-meaning.187 Barzilai, as a 
communitarian of the left, augmented the proposition by stating that nonruling 
communities represented a primary source of meaning in democratic regimes, and 
from this position posited that unique perceptions of the communal good were 
expressed in law by nonruling communities. He continued; 
‘Communal legal culture, as we now understand it, is not only about 
social being and legal consciousness but about the ways in which 
collective identities of nonruling communities are expressed in law and 
toward law’. 
Minority communities expressed their alterity and resistance through their 
allegiance to community law, and by doing so drew attention the failure of the 
state to ‘recognise, protect, and empower’  those who challenged its ideology and 
jurisdiction.188  
A further tangential similarity between Barzilai’s research object and this thesis 
was his alignment of state identity itself with a particular racial and cultural 
formation and the placement of both politics and law within the context of 
racialised state relations, and struggles for power.189 Rejecting class relations as 
the sole source of legal structuration, Barzilai gave equal prominence to racial, 
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ideological and cultural factors when framing the community legal culture as an 
act of resistance against state power. The concept of critical communitarianism 
thus gave theoretical weight to the cultural formation of communitarian law, its 
propensity to mobilise, and its role in developing a resistant consciousness. For 
this thesis, it provides a powerful conceptual frame for interrogating the explicit 
links between community as a political form, legal practice, and with resistance to 
state domination. In an explicitly postcolonial context, the cultural turn of ‘critical 
communitarianism’ follows an established path of displacing Western meta-
narratives with heterogenous and complex cognitions of both community and law. 
At the same time, it recognises the structural domination of capital and the state, 
and explicitly articulates the effects of this domination on communal legal cultures. 
4.2. Critics and Sub-concepts 
Critics of the legal culture school have highlighted the potential for cultural 
concepts to usurp the ‘dirty work done by the idea of race’ in producing 
homogenised categories that obscure variety and difference.190 Cotterell, for 
example argued that broad descriptors of legal culture implied a holistic and 
reified quality to legal systems or institutions that masked heterogeneity to create a 
legal essentialism.191 Beckman similarly suggested that holistic views of culture 
obscured power differentials and economic inequalities, and in the case of legal 
culture obscured the very categories of the legal and the political.192 Rather than 
obscure these differentials, however, this thesis uses the interpretive tools of legal 
culture to expiate power and authority in the communitarian realm and suggest 
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that power is itself a formative element of legal culture. In a further conceptual 
move this thesis will assert that legal culture reinforces, even produces community 
as a resistant political form. This shift in focus toward understanding political 
identity as constituted through legal culture is particularly salient to a postcolonial 
context, given the role played by law in creating the political form of ‘tribe’ in the 
colonial era, and the survival of these forms to the present day.  
4.3. Mobilisation and Consciousness 
The legal culture school has also been charged with a problematic imprecision 
and a consequent and related disutility in deconstructing complex and layered 
legal ontologies. Merry countered this criticism by disaggregating legal culture 
into sub-concepts suitable for use as methodological tools, namely the analysis of 
attitudes toward law, legal mobilisation and legal consciousness, and it was these 
sub-concepts Barzilai borrowed to construct his critical methodology.193 This 
thesis explicitly utilises the sub-concepts of legal mobilisation and legal 
consciousness to structure the presentation of research results, so as to offer 
insight into the sometimes subtle differences occurring in ostensibly similar 
community systems. These sub-concepts are calibrated explicitly with the broader 
conceptual assertion of ‘critical communitarianism’ and offer a powerful frame for 
interrogating community as the cultural loci of resistance. This, it is argued, holds 
great practical utility in the task of identifying the effect of different state contexts 
and illuminating the relationship between fields in the context of power and 
politics.194 On this level of practicality, Merry promoted the disaggregation of 
legal culture into sub-concepts precisely because they were practically suited to 
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Tamanaha, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock (eds), Legal Pluralism 
and Development (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781139094597%23c
01940-298/type/book_part> accessed 12 August 2018. 
194 Ibid. 
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excavating the complex archaeology, multi-layered narratives and hybrid legal 
forms of postcolonial legal pluralism.195 In an environment of complex 
intersectionality between history, legal form and political identity, it is suggested 
that these sub-concepts, drawn together in the guiding frame of ‘critical 
communitarianism’ direct attention to many alternative and competing narratives 
that construct and frame communitarian law, and place its practice at the very 
heart of postcolonial notions of community.  
 Legal mobilisation refers to the extent to which individuals and groups turn to 
the law for help and that way that social movements rely on legal discourse as 
elements of strategy that helps to cement identities and ideologies, ergo in broad 
terms the way that law is deployed as a cultural resource.196 This sub-concept 
plays into one prominent aspect of Pahari life, which is the presence of multiple 
competing groups and ideologies existing within the communitarian arena, and 
the multifarious utilities of law as both a tool for community regulation and as a 
strategic deployment that produces the community of ‘Pahari’ and reinforces its 
boundaries. It is elaborated further in chapter four as a precursor to analysis of 
elite perspectives of customary law.  
Legal consciousness refers to the ‘the way individuals experience and understand 
the law and its relevance to their lives’, and is both inflected with each individual 
experience of the legal system and inextricably connected to local or national 
culture.197 Silbey refined this definition to mean; 
                                                        
195 Sally Engle Merry, ‘What Is Legal Culture: An Anthropological 
Perspective’, Using Legal Culture (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 
2012). Pg. 64 
196 Ibid. 
197 Sally Engle Merry, (n 195) Pg. 66 
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‘Participation in the construction of legality, where legality refers to the 
meanings, sources of authority and cultural practices that are commonly 
recognised as legal regardless of who employs them and to what ends’.198 
Employing legal consciousness placed law within a pattern of social practices 
through which the world was stabilised and objectified, and which, once the 
meanings attached to law have been institutionalised, limits or constrains the 
development of future meaning. With both observers of and participants in law 
partly responsible for its construction, the deployment of legal consciousness 
invited the employment of methodological approaches that located law in wider 
social contexts. Cowan divided the consciousness methodology into approaches 
that place law-first, that is approaches that radiate outward from those 
experiencing law to wider society, to broader socio-legal studies that survey legal 
participation as part of much broader studies of social attitudes.199 Ewick and 
Silbey provided an example of the latter, their study of welfare claimants 
demonstrating how differential access to legal resources, and variable cognitions 
of the codes and languages of law have the effect of limiting access to law and 
producing different understandings of its effects.200 In field research, this thesis 
broadly adopted a law-first methodology by focussing inquiries on the already 
defined customary arena, but mitigated against a possible failure to account for 
social context by collecting qualitative data from a broad sample of participants 
                                                        
198Susan S Silbey, ‘Legal Culture and Cultures of Legality’, Handbook of 
Cultural Sociology, eds. John r. Hall, Laura Grinstaff, and Ming-Cheng 
Lo (Routledge 2010). 
199 David Cowan, ‘Legal Consciousness; Some Observations’ (2004) 67 
Modern Law Review 928. 
200 Patricia Ewick and Susan S Silbey, ‘Conformity, Contestation and 
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness.’ (2004) 26 New England 
Law Review 731. 
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and interested parties, and by constructing interviews that initially focussed on the 
social, historical and economic context of customary practice.201 
The tools of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness will be put to work in 
excavating the narratives that surround the Chakma customary system in both 
Bangladesh and India, and the frame of critical communitarianism engaged to 
illuminate the different trajectories of a formerly unified system of social 
regulation, now serving Chakma communities in highly divergent state contexts. 
5. Conclusion 
The first section of this chapter explored the theoretical location of community as 
a site of resistance within progressive theories of rights. In liberal theory, even 
social constructivist approaches to recognising communitarian difference were 
shown to be grounded in a normative framework that privileged the state. Marxist 
theorisations of law and rights lifted the veil of state neutrality but nonetheless 
failed to account for the cultural and psychological effects of colonial domination. 
To address this lack, South Asian postcolonial theory was invoked to identify the 
possibility of resistance arising from the colonial politics of difference. Specifically, 
this chapter analysed the emergence of power relations constructed from the last 
vestiges of the governmentality of the east. The second section of this chapter 
engaged directly with the literature relating to legal pluralism and legal culture. 
The colonial roots of customary law were suggested as founding the 
contemporary alignment of communitarian law with community identity and 
resistance to the state. The concept of critical communitarianism was introduced 
to make explicit the many narratives that influenced the production of law in 
                                                        
201 Naomi Mezey, ‘Out of the Ordinary: Power, Culture, and the 
Commonplace’ (2001) 26 Law and Social Enquiry 145. Mezey argued the 
weakness of the law first school of legal consciousness was a failure to 
account for social context, whilst the socially orientated studies potentially 
found law in any situation, an echo of critics of the anti-pluralists discussed 
in section 3.3 
 
 
90 
community, and the sub-concepts of legal culture, consciousness and mobilisation 
introduced as appropriate tools for the analysis and comparison of Chakma 
communitarian sphere. Throughout this thesis these theoretical and conceptual 
reference points will be drawn upon to support the analysis and interpretation of 
research data, in the hope that this thesis will advance the study of legal pluralism 
and legal culture in the fragmented and conflict-ridden environment of the former 
hill territories.  
The next chapter moves to an analysis of the historical narratives that frame the 
contemporary practice of Chakma law in the CHT. The first part documents the 
development of a hybrid customary system in the colonial era, noting the effects of 
territorialisation and legal homogenisation on the ideation of community in the 
Hill Tracts. The second part traces and interprets the troubled and contradictory 
narratives accompanying the resurgence of customary law as central to a struggle 
for land, cultural recognition and survival in independent Bangladesh.  
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Chapter Three. Invention and Return 
1. Introduction 
Cover emphasised the cultural paraphernalia that always accompanied law, 
stating that;  
‘No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning’.202  
These narratives inform the condition of critical communitarianism in any given 
location by contextualising state/community relations, and the extent to which 
those relations generate resistance. With this in mind, this chapter explores the 
historical forces that link the colonial creation of communities as autonomous 
tribes to the legal transformations that accompanied the colonisation and 
decolonisation of Greater India. The intention is to ground field research in a 
historicised understanding of the salience of colonially constructed customary law 
to its more recent mobilisation in opposition to state violence and in support of re-
establishment of the CHT as an autonomous domain.  
The first section of the chapter turns attention more directly to the CHT, and the 
engagement between the Chakma and the British that foregrounded enactment 
of the CHT Regulations 1900. It argues this encounter created community as an 
antithetical political form by bounding previously mobile nations within a fixed 
territorial formation, by investing these territories with vestiges of autonomy and 
by aligning them with customary legal practices that included a common property 
frontier. It then recounts the most relevant provisions of the colonial Statute, the 
CHT Regulations 1900.  
                                                        
202 Cover, (n 187) Pg. 1 
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The second part of the chapter traces the evolution of the legal institutions of 
indirect rule into a situation of ‘classical legal pluralism’ in the postcolonial era. It 
positions the recent reformation of custom as an ‘act of return’, or an elite strategy 
that employed the CHT Regulations 1900 to legitimise claims for autonomy 
against the state, and hegemonize the fractured Pahari communities through 
appeals to an earlier source of shared consciousness. Through this strategy, 
customary law assumed totemic significance as a signifier of Pahari solidarity in a 
state context characterised by violence, dissembling tactics, and the interior 
fragmentation of community. Just as the state is multi-faceted, so the imaginary 
solidarity of the Pahari is shown to be buffeted by re-emergent nationalist loyalties 
and ideological divisions. The chapter concludes that whilst resurgent custom 
provides some stability to the boundaries of community, these fierce interior 
contestations are the narratives framing its local practice and are influential in 
determining legal culture. 
2. The Legal Construction of the Tribe 
Applying the notions of community and communitarianism in the hill territories 
requires an understanding of a constructed difference, that arose from the 
particular modes of domination adopted in the later phases of colonial conquest at 
the eastern borders of India. This section briefly outlines the racialised 
paraphernalia of indirect rule in India, demonstrating that the dualism of 
progressive liberalism set against community as ossified tradition infuses the 
historo-legal narrative of colonial domination in the hill territories. It describes 
how communities were essentialised through legal divisions drawn from 
exaggerated racial and ethnicised tropes expressly employed to neutralise 
indigenous resistance. In their new incarnation as ‘tribes’, the hill-based nations 
were coercively bound to particular territories, caricatured as child-like savages 
and legally defined by their anteriority to capitalism and Western law. This thesis 
argues that by forcing previously disparate nations into close proximity and 
attributing them with essentialised common features, the explicitly racialised 
governmentality applied to the hill territories created the foundation for a possible 
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solidarity drawn from an anterior status of communities considered beyond-
capitalism and beyond-law.  
2.1. Comparative Jurisprudence 
To the point of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, British colonial policy was 
characterised by a utilitarian liberalism which promoted the extension and 
transplant of British legal institutions to Indian territory, despite being thoroughly 
imbued with an entrenched belief in the normative chasm separating England and 
India. In the aftermath of rebellion, however, jurist Henry Maine203 successfully 
shifted imperial jurisprudence from its previously assimilationist trajectory toward 
a ‘comparative jurisprudence’ explicitly conceptualised around concepts of 
indigenous difference.204 Maine was profoundly anti-liberal in conceiving the 
legitimate role of imperial government as sustaining the deviation between settler 
and indigenous people rather than reducing it. Post-mutiny, he argued forcefully 
in the UK Parliament that the imposition of foreign law and land tenures had 
destroyed the functional coherence of Indian society with almost disastrous 
consequences for the Empire.205 According to Maine, the replacement of kinship-
based community and communal rights with private property and the evolution of 
status (feudalism) to contract (capitalism), should emerge naturally from the 
                                                        
203 Henry Maine (1822 – 1888) was a prominent jurist most famous for 
conceptualising legal development as the move from status to contract 
who drew much of this theory from his experiences as an administrator in 
India. Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of 
Liberal Imperialism (Princeton University Press 2010). 
204Ibid. Pg. 30-37. Mantena identifies how even liberal philosophers 
asserting humankind a universal character found ways to justify despotism 
in the colonies. J S Mill reverted to the common characterisation of the 
indigene as children in need of development, revealing the disjuncture 
between the foundations and actualisation of liberal theory. Maine was 
different only in proposing that colonial difference should be actualised in 
modes of rule. 
205 Partha Chatterjee, ‘The Curious Career of Liberalism in India’ (2011) 8 
Modern Intellectual History 687. 
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internal dynamics of rural Indian society.206 Maine envisaged a colonial 
government that would protect indigenous Indians from imposed, externalised 
change in order to maintain the functional coherence of their society. This would 
require robust indigenous institutions to be maintained within a state-dominated 
framework of unequal power.  
From the point of mutiny, therefore, a temporal and spatial difference in the type 
of domination imposed on the indigenous Indian population produced what 
Mamdani refers to as a ‘bifurcated state’.207 Urban elites experienced progress and 
to some extent embraced it, evidenced perhaps by the absorption of European 
concepts of modernity into the Indian independence movement despite the 
concomitant rejection of British sovereignty by its protagonists.208 Indians were 
co-opted into colonial bureaucracies, and encouraged to understand British rule 
as providing a progression towards independence.209 The rights of such 
cosmopolitan urbanites were protected by British civil power. Simultaneously, 
rural populations were characterised as static, unchanging and wild, and state 
institutions constructed so as to contain their wildness.210 Responsibility for rural 
government and justice was frequently delegated to indigenous elites through 
Panchayat based structures, cementing the exclusion of rural communities from 
                                                        
206 Ibid. Pg. 690 
207 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Historicising Power and Responses to Power: 
Indirect Rule and Its Reform’ (1999) 66, 3 Social Research. 
208 Chatterjee, (n 2). 
209 Such improvements included opening civil service appointments to 
Indian candidates in 1866, although only 84 of 2644 senior civil service 
appointments were allocated to Indian candidates due to the gearing of 
civil service examinations to Oxbridge candidates. Ariful Islam suggests 
that the cultivation of this elite group seeded the independence movement 
in Bengal. Sirajul Islam, Colonial Bureaucracy and Public Administration 
1765 – 1947 in Islam, Harun-or-Rashid and Asiatic Society of Bangladesh 
(n 35). 
210 Ajay Skaria, Hybrid Histories: Forests, Frontiers and Wildness in 
Western India (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
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participation in state institutions.211 Outside the cities, civil protections afforded 
the urban elite were deemed to have no utility; customary power became the 
means through which sometimes oppressive traditions were enforced.212 Maine’s 
jurisprudence thus predicated the close association of the customary domain with 
rural affairs and framed the common characterisation of customary law as timeless 
and immemorial.213  
A new form of governmentality accompanied this bi-lateral splitting. Fine racial 
and ethnic distinctions were imposed upon communities and materialised in a 
plethora of divergent modes of government and localised statutory instruments. 
This constant division, often justified by the responsibility to protect, expressed 
post-Mutiny neuroticism in its explicit purpose of neutralising the possibility of 
further revolt. Ethnographies of community transformed the indigenous 
population from a racialised Indian majority, with all its potentially dangerous 
homogenising tendencies, to ethnicised minorities unlikely to rise again to 
challenge the British state.214 The customary domain as currently understood was 
founded on a protective ideology explicitly designed to neutralise resistance; it 
                                                        
211 Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (1st 
edition, Harvard University Press 2012). 
212 Ibid. 
213 The full definition of customary law offered by the current Chakma 
chief calls upon this trope to define Chakma/Pahari customary law; 
‘Established by immemorial rules which had evolved from the way of 
life…which were retained in the memories of the chief and his counsellors, 
their sons and their son’s sons… coupled with precedents applying to 
special cases, which were retained in the memories of the chief and his 
counsellors, their sons and their son’s sons (sic), until forgotten, or until 
they became part of the immemorial rules.’ Roy, R D, Customary Legal 
Systems of Asia (2005), Pg. 6, Minority Rights Group, quoting Bekker, 
J.C., Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa, 5th edn. Cape Town, 
Juta & Co. Ltd, 1989, p. 11. 
214 Mamdani, (n 211). Pg. 53 A process described by Mamdani as the 
transformation of ‘reified cultural identity into an administratively driven 
political identity, or ethnicity into tribe’. 
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disguised technologies of rule ‘crucially shaped by the assessment of indigenous 
tendencies of collaboration and resistance’.215  
2.2. Inner Lines 
Maine’s policies of division temporally aligned with the physical annexation of the 
frontier territories of British India and were at their most influential in 
determining colonial strategy in the north east.216 The hill communities tended to 
be swidden cultivators, hunters and foragers, modes of production that, for the 
British, marked them as less developed than settled cultivators and vulnerable to 
exploitation.217 Archival sources suggest a dominant narrative of colonial power 
deployed to protect the primitive against unscrupulous merchants and traders 
who sought to ‘entangle the child-like tribal in webs of commerce, credit and 
marketable property’.218 The ‘governmentality of the east’ as described by 
Chatterjee enumerated and categorised ethnicity, and in so doing transformed a 
threatening generality of rebellious outsiders into numerous comprehensible 
minorities defined and divided by law.219  
It is important also to note that whilst statistical techniques provided the 
evidential foundation to the formation of community, the boundaries created 
                                                        
215 Chatterjee, (n 205) Pg. 692 
216 Defined in the colonial era as Assam and the North-East Frontier 
Agency, and now a grouping of the six states Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, 
Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh attached to the Republic of 
India by a narrow land corridor of West Bengal. Sanjib Baruah, Durable 
Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (Oxford 
University Press 2005). Pg.8. 
217 Beteille, (n 58). Beteille interrogates the difficulty of attaching any 
singular identity to tribe. See also James C Scott (n 7) 
218 Chatterjee, (n 205) Pg. 691 
219  Chowdhury,  (n 14). Chowdhury emphasises the close connection 
between the military drive for frontier security and the form of government 
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, an issue explored in more detail in chapter 
three. 
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between communities were simultaneously operationalised through law and 
reflected in legal practice. The statutory framework of the Bengal 
Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 constituted a series of internal borders, or inner 
lines, beyond which migration, settlement and commercial activity within any 
geographical area enclosed by their provisions was prohibited.220 Cultural 
diversity was reflected in the crude hierarchies introduced within the inner lines; 
territories were legally defined as partially backward, backward, or extremely 
backward; depending on the level of development observed by the British.221 
Degrees of exclusion corresponded with degrees of attributed backwardness, in a 
partially excluded area for example, trade with the resident tribes was regulated 
but permitted, whilst in a totally excluded area foreigners or indigenous outsiders 
could not enter without a permit, acquire land or settle, or develop any trade or 
agriculture projects.222 In totally excluded areas, all domestic legislation was 
suspended, and legal and social regulation delegated to tribal jurisdiction on the 
condition indigenous rulers complied with colonial revenue requirements and 
aligned with British security objectives. Thus, for the vast majority of hill dwellers, 
                                                        
220 The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation 1873 encircled the hill areas of 
Assam and the Naga. After the delegation of powers to the Governor of 
India in 1919, they were extended to the Garo, Jaintia, Mikir, North 
Cachar and Lushai Hills. Sanjib Baruah (n 216) Pg.8. The legislation was 
the model for governing the hill areas and highly influential in the 
construction of the administrative framework of the CHT. Roy suggests 
that of greater direct influence on the CHT regulations was the 1896 Chin 
Hills Regulation that governed upper Burma. Devasish Roy, ‘Devasish 
Roy, ‘Challenges for Judicial Pluralism and Customary Laws of 
Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ (2004) 21 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 113.  
221 The Government of India Act of 1919 determined the Hill Tracts as a 
Backward Area. The definition changed from ‘backward’ to ‘excluded’ in 
the Government of India Act 1935, which confirmed the CHT as a totally 
excluded area. Ibid. Pg. 118 
222 Bhaumik, (n 15) Pg.7  Bhaumik quotes Bodhisatthva Kar in describing 
the inner lines as providing a ‘territorial frame to capital’ that placed its 
residents outside the historical pace of development and progress. The hill 
peoples were in effect deemed to belong to a different time.  
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the inner lines legislation ensured their experience of regulation would be through 
indigenous institutions, albeit institutions adapted to reflect a condition of 
perpetual domination. The inner lines legislation aligned the hill territories more 
with the African experience of colonisation in that; 
‘Indirect rule was mediated rule. It meant that colonial rule was never 
experienced by the vast majority as rule directly by others. Rather the 
colonial experience of most natives was of rule mediated through one’s 
own’.223  
2.3. Land and Territory 
A final relevant point of legal division related to the effect of temporal difference 
and the enduring articulation between the racialised political form of ‘tribe’ and 
concomitant legal bifurcations in land administration in the excluded areas. 
Before discussing this particular aspect of indirect rule, it is worth recalling that 
the inter-connectedness of legal claims in a plural environment ensures that 
‘struggles over property are often struggles over power, and vice versa.224 Though 
land adjudications are currently effectively suspended in the CHT, political 
identity and claims for autonomy infuse legal discourse over forms of land 
ownership and territorial control. Struggles for power are thoroughly embedded 
in this discourse, making a historical narrative of property necessary to understand 
its contemporary relevance to concepts of community, indigeneity and identity. 
In wider Bengal, the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 established a state-centred 
framework in which permanent grants of land were made to an officially 
designated Landlord class (Zaminders) in return for a permanently fixed rate of 
revenue, non-payment of which would lead to the forfeiture of the land grant in its 
                                                        
223Mamdani, (n 207).  
224 Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘The Dynamics of Change 
and Continuity in Plural Legal Orders’ (2006) 53–53 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1. Pg. 30 
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entirety.225 Untitled or ‘Khas’ lands were reserved to the colonial state to be 
distributed through the Zaminders, meaning their class held extraordinary power 
over subsistence farmers.226 The legal concept of ‘Khas’ materialised the 
ideological notion of waste as a moral precept, its forfeiture justified by 
underutilisation regardless of prior claim.227 In contrast, the later annexation of 
parts of the hill territories consecrated their exclusion from the legal framework of 
the Permanent Settlement, in that ‘totally excluded’ status included the delegation 
of land administration to tribal jurisdiction in its entirety, albeit with residual 
power reserved to state bureaucrats. The territorially and temporally divergent 
legal framework of the totally excluded areas contained seeds of a recognition of 
land rights unrelated to their utility, and in so doing explicitly aligned alternate 
concepts of property with ethnic identity.228 Whilst all of the political forms 
imposed by indirect rule in the hill territories prevented capitalist expansion to 
                                                        
225Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal - An Essay on the Idea of a 
Permanent Settlement (Duke University Press, Durham and London 
1996). Guha attributes Cornwallis with a physiocratic drive to reform land, 
in other words believing that the wealth of nations derived from land 
rather than mercantilism. The structures of the permanent settlement were 
to transform the landed class of Bengal from feudal lords to improving 
landlords under the English model. The Act was transformative in 
producing a wealthy and educated elite that would ultimately provide 
much of the loci for the independence movement. Pg. 183.  
226 Ibid.  
227 Vinay K Gidwani, ‘“Waste” and the Permanent Settlement in Bengal’ 
(1992) 27 Economic and Political Weekly 39. 
228 Pauline Peters, ‘Inequality and Conflict over Land in Africa’ (2004) 4 
Journal of Agrarian Change Pg. 269. The delegation of land 
administration to tribal government was common in British Territories, 
Peters suggests that this form of rule tended to privilege both Western and 
Indigenous elites. Note also that there are suggestions in relation to other 
designated tribal areas in the hill territories there was dissension among 
indigenous people as to the best form of ownership with some favouring 
individual ownership or grants of land. See Bodhisattva Kar, ‘Nomadic 
Capital and Speculative Tribes: A Culture of Contracts in the 
Northeastern Frontier of British India’ (2016) 53 The Indian Economic & 
Social History Review 41. 
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some degree it was only in localities considered unrulable that this profound 
alterity in the relationships between human and territory was preserved. The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts were one such territory.  
3. The Chakma and the British 
3.1. Chakma Mobility  
The introduction to this thesis drew attention to the common characteristics of 
the hill peoples of South Asia, namely their shared histories of mobility and 
migration and the social practices that enabled frequent movement.229 Many 
aspects of Chakma life conformed broadly to this characterisation, notably their 
reliance on swidden agriculture as the mode of production and the common 
property frontier required for its practice, and a culture that depended largely on 
the oral transmission of knowledge, history and law.230 They were originally 
migrants, it being likely that the Chakma moved west into the Hill Tracts from 
Arakan no earlier than 600 years ago, though this is disputed by some 
representatives of the Bangladeshi state.231 Despite cultural similarities to the 
interior nations of the Zomia hills, however, it has been argued that the Chakma 
occupied a ‘zone of transition’ between plough cultivators of the plains and the 
                                                        
229 Scott (n 7) Before colonisation, the broad swathe of mountainous 
territory running from eastern Bengal to western China was understood to 
have been occupied by small, diverse and characteristically mobile social 
groups.  
230 Scott (n 7). Pg. 248. Scott provides a generic name for all the South-
East Asian hill communities as the ‘Zomia’, and explicitly includes the 
Chakma/Pahari in his definition. 
231 David E Sopher, ‘Population Dislocation in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts’ (1963) LIII the Geographical Review 338.Pg. 344. The Museum of 
Ethnography in Chittagong describes the Hill Peoples as having arrived 
in the CHT some 200 years ago, an evident falsehood given the existence 
of maps dating to the 16th century with Chakma settlements clearly 
marked.  
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swidden agriculturalists of the hills, their society exhibiting characteristics of 
mobility and of settled states.232  
Elements of a prior mobility included a clan structure consistent with similar hill-
based communities. Chakma society was sub-divided first into a number of wide 
community groups probably linked to area of residence (Gojhas), and then 
subdivided into clans or large family groups.233 Chakma laws formed an expansive 
and undifferentiated rule-set covering family, medicine, social organisation and 
resource allocation which maintained the Chakma as a strictly endogenous group, 
with personal laws containing detailed prescriptions for the marriage of blood 
relatives, and a strictly patrilineal line of inheritance. Roy suggested this ruleset 
was applied within a flexible system in which regulation tended toward dispute 
settlement through discourse and orally transmitted laws.234 Loosely 
characterised, it was these laws and this system of regulation that governed the 
Chakma before the gradual encroachment of colonial technologies of rule.  
It was, however, the state like facets of Chakma society that placed them at the 
apex of the first engagements between the hill peoples and the British East India 
Company (BEIC). Buchanan’s expedition in 1798 described a Chakma society 
intertwined with Moghul state, with settled cultivation amongst the Chakma 
predominant in the lowland clans occupying the Rangunia plains near 
Chittagong.235 Further, the Chakma paid tribute in kind to the Moghuls in the 
                                                        
232 Ibid.  
233 Sirajul Islam, Indigenous Communities (Asiatic Society of 
Bangladesh : Distributing agent, Academic Publishers 2007). J P Mills, 
annotated by Wolfgang Mey, J P Mills and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Tour Diary, Reports, Photographs 1926/27 (2009).Mills suggested that 
the proximity of the Chakma to the Moghuls might have eroded the 
traditional kinship ties.  
234 Pg. 131.  
235 Archival evidence suggests that while under Moghul influence, 
Chakma territory extended beyond the hill areas to parts of the plainlands 
surrounding the City of Chittagong See Francis Hamilton and Willem 
 
 
102 
form of cotton cultivated on the plainlands, and their chiefs adopted ‘Khan’ as a 
postfix to underscore their cultural proximity to the powerful Moghul rulers.236 
Even in the hill-based clans where swidden agriculture provided the main source 
of livelihood, the Chakma permanently settled in riparian valleys and shifted only 
temporarily to the slopes for the jum season.237 When the British East India 
Company entered East Bengal in 1750, therefore, the Chakma had adopted many 
characteristics of a settled state; were socially and politically organised under the 
aegis of a hereditary chief, defined themselves as a ‘jati’ or nation238, had an 
effective military capability and were integrated commercially with the Moghul 
Empire.239  
When the BIEC assumed the role of Diwan of Bengal in 1780, Chakma state-craft 
was tested by the authoritarian demands for cash payments from their chief, Juan 
Buax Khan, who, in response to British antagonisms, expressed his rejection of 
British rule by leading raiding parties against them for around five years.240 Whilst 
his guerrilla tactics were initially successful, the Chakma were by this time 
economically dependent on commerce with the plains, and were ultimately 
                                                        
van Schendel, Francis Buchanan in Southeast Bengal, 1798: His Journey 
to Chittagong, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali, and Comilla 
(University Press 1992). 
236 Tributes were not taxes but a payment for the right to trade in Moghul 
territories. AM Serajuddin, ‘The Origins of the Rajas of the Hill Tracts 
and Their Relations with the Mughuls and the East India Company in the 
Eighteeenth Century’ (1971) 19 Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 
51.  
237 Sopher (n 11). 
238 Note, however, the difficulties of distinguishing Jati/nation from 
Jani/state where tribal definitions are concerned. See Andre Beteille, The 
Concept of the Tribe with Special Reference to India, (n 58).  
239 Qanungo is keen to distinguish the Chakma from ‘tribals’, defining 
them as the fierce interior tribes which he identifies as responsible for the 
economic hardships experienced by the Chakma in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Qanungo, (n 12) Pg.6 
240 Ibid. 
 
 
103 
defeated by a British trade blockade. In defeat, they were entreated to allow 
British military presence in their territories in the hills in return for protection 
from attack from the fierce tribes of the interior.241 This early rapprochement 
required the Chakma chief to collect tributes to the British, but also restricted 
migration from the plains. Until the eventual annexation of the territory, the 
Treaty framed a tense and troubled relationship between the Chakma and the 
British, with frequent skirmishes over jurisdiction and power.242 Chowdhury 
recounts how, in this interregnum, the chief’s autonomy was gradually pared and 
an incipient British strategy to convert the hill peoples to plough cultivation 
introduced to the Hill Tracts as early as 1835.243  
In 1860, as Maine’s strategies of indirect rule gained traction in domestic 
government, full annexation of the CHT was signalled by its declaration as a 
district in Bengal in Act XXVII.244 Captain McGrath was named as first 
Superintendent of the territory, and charged with mapping, managing and 
exploring the territory. In a pivotal moment in the colonial history of the region, he 
was instructed to;  
‘Take cognisance of and settle any disputes that arise between chief and 
chief, or between chief and the people of other chiefs, but (you will) leave 
the chief and the people to settle all other disputes as much as possible in 
their own way. You will issue no orders except through the chiefs’245  
From 1860 to 1900, additional and sometimes contradictory legislative 
interventions extended control over the hill territories whilst materialising the 
                                                        
241 See section 3.2 of this chapter. 
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245 Letter of appointment of Superintendent Captain McGrath from A R 
Young 1860. Author’s copy. 
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protections of Maine’s comparative jurisprudence. The office of Superintendent 
was upgraded to that of Deputy Commissioner in 1867, with enhanced powers to 
collect revenue vested in colonial government.246 The CHT was brought within 
scope of the Bengal Frontier Regulation of 1873, which established inner lines 
between the north eastern border territories and the plains, and consolidated the 
eastern territories of Assam and the CHT under the rule of the Governor of 
Bengal.247 The regulations also excluded foreigners from settlement without the 
permission of the Superintendent, restricted the applicability of national 
legislation, and placed significant prohibition on development within the ascribed 
Inner Line boundaries.248 The extension of the Forest Act 1878 to the CHT 
restricted jumming, foraging and hunting in designated forests and precipitated 
the reservation of an estimated twenty percent of the CHT territory between 1880 
and 1883.249  
Howsoever couched in protective language, each new legal institution 
represented an exercise in Sovereign power and a denial of indigenous agency. 
For example, the protective boundaries introduced by the Frontier Regulation 
prevented settlement by foreigners or Bengalis in the Hill Tracts, but in doing so 
placed the hill peoples outside of new markets and placed the British in overall 
                                                        
246 W W Hunter, A Statistical Account of East Bengal VOLUME VI. 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Chittagong, Noakhali, Tipperah, Hill Tipperah 
(Trubner & Co, London 1876). 
247 ‘A Regulation for the security of certain districts on the Eastern 
Frontiers of Bengal, and for the better ordering of the trade with the 
hillmen living on the border of those districts". The Regulation was 
extended to the districts of Cachar, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Kamroop, 
Durrang, Nowgong, Seebsagur, Lukhimpoor, and to the Naga Hills, 
Khassiah (Khasi) and Jyeteah (Jaintia) Hills, and Garo Hills with effect 
from April 1, 1873. See note 219 and section 2.2. 
248 Singh, (n 21) Pg. 54 
249 Devasish Roy, ‘Sustainable Forest Management in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts’ (Chittagong Hill Tracts Watershed Co-Management Project 
(CWTWCA) 2016). Pg. 9 
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control of all trade.250 Similarly, the reservation of forests led to a massive loss of 
land to traditional modes of production, restricting jumming, foraging and 
hunting in a direct attack on the core livelihoods of the Pahari.251 Irrespective of 
Maines jurisprudential narrative of gradual evolution, and regardless of the 
ostensibly protective terminology of the protective legislation, the realities of 
indirect rule tilted toward direct subordination of the Pahari.  
Together these encroachments signalled a process of containment or 
‘territorialisation’ through which the unfixed and unbounded space of the CHT 
was ‘gradually reconstructed as a bounded territory during the long period of 
British rule.’252 In the bifurcated state of India, the inner lines legislation 
formalised the feudal status of the CHT communities, and institutionalised their 
geographical division from plain land Bengal. Their tribal designation forced the 
diverse hill nations into one leadership and administrative structure, imbuing their 
human diversity with the common colonial tropes of wildness and primitivism.253 
Law in effect corralled disparate and dispersed peoples into a single homogenised 
entity of tribe, thus producing a new community bounded by law and materialised 
by colonial policy.254 The next section examines how, in the particular context of 
the CHT region, policies applied ostensibly to protect tribal nations in fact 
produced a new legal architecture and a new iteration of community.  
                                                        
250 Ibid. Pg. 54 
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252 Chowdhury,  (n 14). Pg. 184. Chowdhury uses the concept of 
territorialisation to explain an expansion of rule that occupied physical, 
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253 A J Skaria, Hybrid Histories (n 210) Uday Chandra, ‘Liberalism and Its 
Other: The Politics of Primitivism in Colonial and Postcolonial India’ 47 
Law and Society Review 135.  
254 Whilst the law provided legitimacy to the government of the Hill 
Tracts, military operations to secure the borders continued throughout the 
19th century, particularly in relation to the interior nations known then as 
the ‘khukis’ (now Mizo). Chowdhury (n 14). 
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3.2. Territorialisation and the Circle System 
Under the precolonial system of tribute, the Chakma chiefs levied a capitation tax 
on clan members through the male household head, with the tax having an 
indirect territorial basis in being levelled on jum outputs, and elements of 
flexibility in that payments were suspended or reduced in times of hardship.255 
After their capitulation to the British in 1785, the main conduits through which 
taxes were collected and influence exercised over the CHT was through the 
Chakma chief in the northern area of the Hill Tracts and the Marma Bohmong 
chief256 in the south.257 Following annexation in 1860, however, the still powerful 
chiefs were increasingly perceived as a hurdle to the extension of sovereign rule. In 
1873, the internal administrative boundaries of the CHT were amended to include 
a third administrative Circle ruled by a newly created Mong Raja, halving the 
territory of the Chakma chief and dispersing the power of both the Chakma and 
Bohmong chiefs.258 In 1876 the hitherto informal relationships between the 
British and the chiefs were consolidated into formal Revenue Circles, defined as 
administrative areas in which the appointed chief assumed formal responsibility 
for collecting taxes on behalf of the colonial state but continued to rule the tribal 
population directly.259 When an interior community succumbed either to military 
                                                        
255 Rajkumari Chandra Kalindi Roy, Land Rights of the Indigenous 
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domination or material inducement, they were absorbed and partially 
subordinated to the Circle system, and their leaders deemed subservient to the 
Circle chiefs in matters of taxation and government.260 By these measures the 
Circle system imposed a territorial locus on the elite leadership structure of the 
Pahari communities, and precipitated the homogenisation of pre-existing systems 
of law and government.261  
The political rationale of the Circle system was directly traceable to Maine’s 
ideology of indirect rule in its brazen objective of dividing the chiefs and 
neutralising their capacity to generate resistance. Nevertheless, this organisational 
structure could not remove entirely the perceived obstacles to fiscal and 
commercial optimisation associated with the still-mobile agricultural practices of 
the Pahari. These ends were served by a persistent British campaign to shift the 
mode of production to settled agriculture from the long-standing practice of 
swidden agriculture, or jum. Land was perceived as a resource to be enhanced 
and made efficient through scientific rationality, the desire to make wastelands 
productive discernible in colonial records of the CHT.262 In 1865, for example, the 
CHT Annual Report celebrated the disposal of ‘waste lands’ amid discussion of 
                                                        
260 Pacification of the interior effectively paralleled the extension of legal 
controls over the three dominant chiefs. In the Annual Report on the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts 1865. G C Kilby Esq. Officiating Superintendent, 
Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division discussed 
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Syloo too have never come down; they seem to dread treachery on our part 
should they render themselves to our power’. 
261 Roy, (n 220).  Chowdhury (n 14). 
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the abundant opportunities in the development of tea, coffee, rubber and timber 
plantations and the need for adventurous capitalists.263  
The obdurate nature of colonial policy on jum was also at least partly attributable 
to another recurring trope in the colonial archive, that is the requirement for wage 
labour. Imported Bengali labourers were ‘as good as useless’ in delivering British 
requirements due to their unfamiliarity with the hill territories, and susceptibility 
to the climate borne diseases.264 In this light, jum agriculture was seen as the 
reason for Pahari antipathy to wage labour, one exasperated official observed;  
‘when a joomah (sic) has a sufficient crop, he leads a life of indolence for 
six months, drinking and shooting, and no amount of remuneration can 
induce him to leave his home’265.  
In offering the possibility of flight and apparently also providing an adequate 
livelihood, jum thus constrained British commercial ambitions, rendering land 
‘likely to remain uncultivated for some years to come.’266 Attempts to introduce 
plough cultivation also contained a fiscal rationale; colonial authorities sought to 
bypass the chiefs own revenue systems through inducing Jummas into plough 
cultivation, even going so far as to make land available outside of the chiefs 
territory for any Jumma wishing to convert.267 Yet Hunter reported the surprising 
attachment of the Pahari to jum agriculture, very few households succumbed to 
                                                        
263 Annual Report on the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of 
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Chittagong Division.  
264 Hunter (n 246). Pg. 77 
265Administrative Report for Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bengal Archive. 
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the considerable inducement of zero tax and free land.268 Even at this early stage in 
the transformation of the hill communities, the Pahari exhibited a cultural 
resistance to the imposition of alien practices, suggesting that their community 
was produced by an iteration between its legal construction by colonial authorities 
and the agency exercised by its denizens in rejecting the inevitability of their 
exploitation. 
Agency aside, the Circle system contained an inherent contradiction in being 
primarily designed to restrain indigenous power, whilst simultaneously rendering 
colonial administrators dependent on the chiefs and dewans to collect revenue and 
maintain order.269 Ultimately this contradiction doomed attempts to bypass the 
chiefs to failure and eventually precipitated a new strategy of co-opting the 
anointed tribal rulers more directly into the structures of colonial rule, despite 
frequent and forcefully expressed reservations about their leadership and loyalty. A 
change in strategy was required because; 
‘If the substitution of plough for Jum cultivation is ever going to take root 
and… eventually to change the whole system of cultivation and mode of 
life amongst the Hill People, we must… try and devise some scheme for 
its extension which is not so entirely antagonistic to the chiefs’.270 
The British strategy of co-option created a co-dependence that enriched the chiefs 
and their acolytes and impoverished the hill farmers, materialising a social system 
as reminiscent of English feudalism as of the indigenous system that preceded 
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it.271 By 1880, the composite effect of commercial sales, British settlement and 
extension of the Forests Act of 1878 had already severely restricted lands available 
for plough cultivation;272 jum was in reality the only  viable means of subsistence 
for most hill dwellers, but still the drive to end mobile agriculture appeared 
unabated.273 Whilst the colonial government interposed itself as protector of the 
people against the chiefs, its administrators remained oddly blind to their own role 
in creating a customary system that, as a direct result of their interventions, 
extracted tax for commercial gain without the customary provision for relief, 
determining by their actions that famine became a constant and ghoulish 
handmaiden to British rule in the hills.  
3.3. Law in the Hill Tracts 
Similar uncertainties and contradictions emerged in relation to legal 
administration. Whilst indirect rule maintained a distance between British 
administrators and the day-to-day regulation of the hill peoples, a mode of 
domination that delegated land administration to the magisterial offices of the 
chiefs lay uncomfortably with an economic strategy that sought to reduce Pahari 
dependence on jumming. As a result, one notable effect of indirect rule on legal 
conduct was to create an arena in which power struggles between the coloniser 
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and local elites were performed. In Bengal, the ‘superior’ nature of state 
adjudication was recognised by indigenous actors themselves, who even then, 
indulged in forum shopping between the diverse sources of religious, informal and 
state law.274 In the Hill Tracts, a similar legal dance occurred as indigenous actors 
sought remedies in formal law against customary injustice. Although the bulk of 
cases were ‘still decided by ancient custom’, the British appeared convinced that 
customary magisterial powers were used to thwart the grant of leases for plough 
cultivation for which the chiefs received no tax revenue.275 Colonial administrators 
frequently reverted to the language of protection as justification for the 
acceleration of leasehold grants, their contempt shown in an 1874 report that 
‘gauged public feeling’ and noted the increasing frequency of appeals to British 
justice due to ‘the waning power and influence of the tribal chiefs, attributable to 
their weakness, selfishness and their incapacity’.276  
In other areas the ideology of protection appeared to augment the powers of the 
chiefs and maintain their exclusive jurisdiction. One area of direct judicial 
challenge to the scope of indirect rule arose in relation to the disputed jurisdiction 
over bond cases lodged with state Courts by Bengali money lenders seeking to 
enforce against the hill peoples. As early as 1862, a Captain J Graham, wrote that 
heavy debts borne by a large proportion of the population created conditions akin 
to slavery. The Commissioner responded that:  
‘‘One of the chief objects of the constitution of your appointment is to 
administer justice to the Hill People in your jurisdiction, and to prevent 
that oppression and plunder of poor and ignorant savages by the crafty 
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Bengallee money lender which may lead, as in the case of the Sonthals, to 
violence and bloodshed’.277 
In a material representation of their self-attributed protective role, the Chittagong 
based administration strongly resisted the enforcement of contracts between 
Bengali and hill peoples in the formal British courts.278 Arguing that such 
petitions should not be a matter of formal legal account, one Officer Hanky refers 
to the matter as ‘conflict between common sense on one side and strict laws on 
another’,279 due to the poor understanding tribal people had of the money 
economy. Yet the protective stance adopted by colonial rulers contained the same 
contradictory characteristics as their agricultural policy. Allowing an alternative 
route to justice through the formal courts undermined the chief’s authority, and 
thus, paradoxically, the ability of the coloniser to rule through them. The matter 
was decided in favour of local resolution, and the continuation of the policy of 
referring cases to the CHT Deputy Commissioner, on the grounds that:  
‘The people are not yet fit for regulation, nor are their circumstances 
suited to it, and I would do everything in my power to administer the 
district on non-regulation principles as long as this may be possible.’ 280 
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Up to 1900, uncertainty continued to infuse discourse over the jurisdiction of 
wider Indian state law to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The brief, highly general 
letter of 1860, along with the Bengal Frontier Regulation of 1873 formed the 
primary statutory instrument for the administration of the Hill Tracts until 1900, 
but the imprecision of its drafting created considerable legal ambiguity and 
contestation over the application of national legislation. A stream of British Indian 
legislation had been promulgated since the initial annexation of the Hill Tracts, 
including the Indian Forests Act, Anti-Slavery Act, the Excise and Stamp Duty 
Act, and the Indian Penal Code. The state judiciary favoured the equal 
application of these laws to the territory, an assimilationist construct that would 
provide equality before the law, at least insofar as experienced on the Indian plains 
in key civil and criminal matters. Although central government had directed that 
law in the Hill Tracts be conducted in the spirit of Indian civil and penal codes, 
their direct applicability was resisted by successive local administrators, who 
argued that; 
‘The justification for this legislative barrier is that ‘the procedure followed 
in such a peculiar circumstance locally as the Chittagong Hill Tracts...is 
hardly to be expected to be defined by hard and fast rules’ 281 
The Hill Tracts demanded a more flexible approach to the delivery of justice, in 
the light of their exceptional, or ‘backward’ nature’, an attitude that betrayed the 
frequency with which colonial administrators rationalised their limited 
understanding of the indigenous population by reference to primitive tropes.282 
This might also explain why, at the same time, colonial rulers engaged in a fierce 
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battle with the indigenous elite in their attempts to change fundamentally the 
lifestyle of the peasantry. Even when observing this struggle through the inevitably 
partial archival accounts of the period, it is possible to read the Pahari, not as 
passive recipients of British regulation but as exhibiting a recalcitrance that 
directly influenced the particular form of CHT Regulations in the creation of a 
legislative boundary around the hill communities that partially reflected an 
indigenous construction of the limits of the state.283 In the last preserved report to 
the Commissioner before the promulgation of the CHT Regulations, it was 
recognised that;  
‘Whatever the defects of tribal jurisdiction I am strongly inclined to the 
view that it is the only system that works in the Hill Tracts at present’.284  
3.4. The CHT Regulations 1900285 
This brief history of the events leading to the enactment of the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Regulation 1900 has suggested that the institutions of indirect rule, and 
the legally plural system it created were riven with ambiguities and contradictions. 
The ostensible preservation of indigenous institutions was accompanied by 
strategies of settlement and territorialisation that radically altered indigenous 
society, just as the ideology of protection was destabilised by the commercial and 
political objectives that had driven annexation. Despite the many uncertainties of 
colonial rule, however, it was Maine’s vision that triumphed when the 
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geographically specific manual of colonial rule was finally produced in 1900. The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 consolidated all previous legislation, 
enshrined both the political autonomy of the area under the chiefs and the 
territorial basis of that autonomy, and finally clarified the institutional structures of 
self-regulation.  
This geographically specific extension of the inner lines confirmed the chiefs as 
Revenue Collectors and Judges, and the status of the CHT as a backward and 
totally excluded area. It defined not only the borders of the Hill Tracts with 
Tripura, Burma and Assam, but the territorial borders of each village, Mauza286, 
and Circle. The three most established chiefs, Bhomong (Bandarban District), 
Chakma (Rangamati District) and Mong (Khagrachari District), were confirmed 
as leaders of the three administrative circles, with overarching responsibility for 
land administration, forestry (except in reserved forests), taxation, civil law and 
limited responsibility for penal matters. The chiefs were granted the inducement 
felt necessary to encourage settled agriculture in that tax levels for plough 
cultivation were set at a lower level than that for jum.  
In addition to confirming the geographical limitations of each chief’s area of rule, 
the regulations created a strict legal hierarchy, with the chief at the apex. The next 
level of hierarchy placed the headmen in charge of defined Mauzas, or grouping of 
villages. The headmen took over the revenue collection function of the Raja’s 
dewans and khisas, being vested with statutory powers to collect tax on Jum 
lands, rents on leased lands, and taxes accruing for grazing rights and Khola 
(grass) lands.287 Like the dewans and khisas, the headman’s position was 
hereditary and carried with its substantial powers, and like the chief, the headmen 
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were substantially enriched by these positions.288 Under the headmen each village 
had a karbari, who functioned as a support to the headmen in collecting tax, 
resolved disputes at a village level and undertook a variety of social and welfare 
functions to maintain the prosperity and harmony of the village. Whilst the roles of 
chief and headmen were minutely defined in the CHT Regulation, the karbari are 
recognised without a detailed exposition of their functions and responsibilities.  
The Regulation contained a limited recognition of a common property frontier in 
its confirmation of jum taxation and of the headmen’s role in land mutation, 
though technical ‘ownership’ was vested in the Deputy Commissioner as a 
representative of the colonial state. The chiefs, through their headmen, were 
delegated sole responsibility for land allocation and transfer within limitations 
prescribed according to its size and type. Leases would be granted by the 
Assistant Commissioner, but only on the advice of the headman. The grant of 
usufruct and homesteading land was delegated to the indigenous headmen of the 
respective Circle Offices, albeit with their powers curtailed by each grant being 
phrased as only a recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner, and the legal 
concept of ‘khas’ or empty land excluded by implication from the Regulation. 
Recognition of a Jum cultivators’ usufruct rights over hilly areas also implied 
broad acceptance of the resting cycle of the shifting cultivator, and thus created a 
legal basis for arguing the existence of collective ownership.289 
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The CHT Manual thus encapsulated the inconsistencies in policy present at the 
time of enactment; some rights were expressly protected, as in grazing and 
grasslands whilst recognition of others was only implied by the framework, as in 
the case of jum.290 It circumscribed the chief’s powers, but also legally enshrined 
continuation of the capitation tax and through it, indirectly recognised jum 
agriculture and the necessary existence of the commons. Yet this ambivalence 
distinguished between ownership, expressly delegated to colonial institutions, and 
ambiguous and inconsistently framed usufruct rights had the legal effect of 
underscoring state sovereignty over the region.291 Curiously, the composite effect 
of the Regulation was to privilege both usufruct rights and state ownership over 
individual tenure in the hill areas, suggesting that in regard to land ownership the 
CHT Regulation merely reflected the material reality of a small landed class and 
majority population still reliant on the commons for livelihoods. In effect, short-
term tactics triumphed over long-term strategy to create the enduring legal 
paradox of the CHT Regulation; in protecting collective rights they also provided 
a statutory mechanism for their usurpation by the state. 
The final section of the Regulation is equally salient to the current constitutional 
debate over political autonomy for the region and the applicability of indigenous 
custom as it related to land. The ‘excluded’ status of the Hill Tracts was captured 
in provisions under Section 52, which prevented settlement by foreigners or 
Bengalis without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, 
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and the Region remained outside civil jurisdiction of the Indian courts.292 In 
criminal matters, headmen were charged with the delivery of justice in line with 
existing customs, except in the case of serious crimes in which case they were 
required to apprehend criminals and handover miscreants to appointed 
magistrates. Tribal jurisdiction was preserved in civil matters, however, so as to 
accentuate the state/customary binary created by the Statute. In civil litigation, the 
regulation accentuated the informal basis of the customary system by prohibiting 
the use of lawyers or attorneys within its jurisdiction.  
3.5. Summary 
It might be argued that the CHT Regulation represented the struggle for power 
over territory and custody of legal rule that Croce sees in all instances of legal 
pluralism.293 In seeking resolution to this struggle, however, the British produced 
as much as they preserved, by constituting a new form of government and law, 
introducing a less flexible and more hierarchical political structure, and delegating 
responsibility for land administration in ways that accelerated class stratification. 
In any case, the Manual as drafted suggested that by 1900 pre-existing customs 
had been so substantially altered by preceding decades of British domination that 
customary law was already a hybrid of indigenous practice and state imposition 
developed within a colonial power relation that oppressed and disempowered. 
Yet, paradoxically, the CHT Regulation was also a transformative legal 
milestone, in its recognition of the Pahari as a territorially defined community, and 
in its formal ensconcing of communitarian legal culture in the legal technologies of 
the state. Inside the Circles, political structures, revenue systems and land tenures 
were both hybridised and homogenised, with only the personal regulations of each 
nation sustained as markers of identity. From this point, therefore, the CHT 
                                                        
292 Section 52. This section was amended in the 1962 constitutional reforms 
introduced under the martial government of Pakistan to enable Bengali 
settlement. 
293Croce (n 140). 
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nations formed one community of Pahari which was defined externally by its 
common exclusion and internally by a combination of radical difference and an 
attributed political form, that of tribe, which was inextricably connected to the 
practice of law. In this way, the CHT Regulations paved the way for the form of 
communitarianism in the contemporary CHT, establishing the wider Pahari 
community as the cultural foci of resistance against the state.  
4. Courts, Continuity and Change 
The remainder of this chapter traces the lineage between the legal consignment of 
the Pahari to the anterior and alien political form of tribe and the existence of 
critical communitarianism in the contemporary Hill Tracts. This lineage emerges 
from the redeployment of Pahari customary law in Bangladesh as a symbol and 
material instrument of indigenous agency, and the valediction of customary 
institutions as emblems of community identity. In documenting the phenomenon 
of resurgent custom in Africa, Comaroff noted that; 
‘This resurgence is itself part of an ur-process increasingly dubbed 
retraditionalization…the referential ‘re’; It points away from a linear 
history in favour of a different temporality, a re-cursive one: a history of 
repetition and reproduction in which the past returns in hyperbolic 
intensified form’294 
The following analysis follows Comaroff in confronting the myth of customary 
continuity in Bangladesh, arguing that the legal deployment of custom 
accentuates an essentialised and homogenised Pahari identity to strengthen elite 
claims to territorial and political autonomy. It documents, in effect, the tortuous 
process through which the Pahari communitarian system not only became the foci 
                                                        
294 John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (eds), The Politics of Custom: 
Chiefship, Capital, and the state in Contemporary Africa (The University 
of Chicago Press 2018). 
 
 
120 
of mobilisation against the state, but also the gradual re-consolidation of 
customary law as a practice of a highly contested and unstable political identity.295 
It argues that though the boundaries of community are reinforced through this 
instance of legal mobilisation, community so defined remains imbued with an 
inherent instability bearing directly on legal consciousness, and forming the 
subject of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
4.1. Custom Redux 
In this thesis, the state/society relations that produce the hill people’s 
communitarianism are interrogated through the medium of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Bangladesh. As a precursor, therefore, this section considers 
South Asian constitutionalism, and the shared instabilities that appear in the 
polities of the nations of former British India regardless of the constitutional form 
adopted after Partition. Constitutionalism indicates the shared normative 
assumptions that ground meaning and purpose of national government, and frame 
legal discourse and constitutional law.296 Tushnet and Khosla suggested all South 
Asian states experience an ‘unstable constitutionalism’, defined as; 
‘A phenomenon in which all participants in national politics appear to be 
reasonably committed to the idea of constitutionalism…yet they struggle 
to settle on a stable institutional structure embodying a form of 
constitutionalism appropriate to their nation’ 297 
The five states of South Asia shared difficulties in absorbing and harmonising 
features of the nation’s experience derived from the divisive tactics of a colonial 
                                                        
295 Barzilai, (n 5) 
296 Laura Cata Backer, ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A 
Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems’ 113 Penn state 
Law Review 671. Pg. 679 
297 Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla, Unstable Constitutionalism: Law 
and Politics in South Asia (2015). Pg. 5 
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past, those difficulties often manifesting in situations of ‘ethnic conflict, social 
disorder and profound diversity’.298 In these conditions, constitutions became the 
foci of mobilisation and dissent, due to the co-existence of competing and 
conflicting visions of nation. In effect, there was shared agreement about the 
centrality of the Constitution to the state, but dissent over its meaning and 
purpose. This resulted in a prevailing instability as the accentuated, essentialised 
difference of a bygone era returned to unsettle state hegemonies. It is with this 
understanding of both the centrality of constitutionalism to the Republic of 
Bangladesh, and the inherent instability in its construction that the following 
analysis of its contents should be considered.  
Chapter One introduced the Chakma by describing briefly the cataclysmic events 
that had accompanied decolonisation, namely the mass displacement of Chakma 
following the damming of the Karnaphuli River, and the ways in which nation 
building in the revolutionary state of Bangladesh caused further tectonic shifts in 
the lifeworld of a once protected region. It opined that since Partition, regardless 
of whether government was democratic or autocratic in composition, there was an 
unwavering tendency toward a unitary government form and a centralised state. 
The new democratic Republic of Bangladesh continued the centralising and 
majoritarian tendency of its precursors in a constitution that created a highly 
centralised state architecture, and defined a nationalism expressed through the 
language and cultural signifiers of the ethnic Bengali, making it almost a polar 
opposite to the detailed federalism and integrationism that founded its powerful 
neighbour, India.299 From the inception of Bangladesh, these constitutional 
characteristics weighed heavily against the consensual integration of minority 
communities into its technologies.  
                                                        
298 Ibid. Pg. 5 
299 Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. 
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367  
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The Constitution contained a strong expression of fundamental rights(part one), 
economic rights(part two),300 and fundamental freedoms(part three),301 against 
which the culture and alterity of minorities were hardly recognised. Article 9 
stated;  
The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which, deriving its identity 
form its language and culture...shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism. 
With Bengali-ness an ethnic categorisation, and with a number of the smaller 
communities speaking different languages and practising different cultures, the 
Constitution as drafted appeared to perpetuate the exclusion of minorities.302 
Limited recognition of minorities related only to special provisions or reservations 
to be made for ‘backward sections of citizens’ used in Articles 28(4) and 29 in the 
case of government employment.303 The colonial trope of ‘backward races’ was 
adopted to identify peoples outside of the mainstream culture, but unlike the 
Constitution of India, the definition of backward was not aligned with protective 
institutional arrangements.304 Additionally, the organs of local government were 
minimal and muted; sections 59 and 60 determine only that the constitutional 
right to elected local bodies may include administration of public works, the 
maintenance of public order and the preparation of plans for economic 
                                                        
300 Ibid. Article 11 - The Republic shall be a democracy in which 
fundamental rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of 
the human person will be guaranteed. 
301 Ibid. Articles 26 to 47 Those freedoms included secularism, freedom to 
practice religion, rights to property, and freedom of movement,. 
302 M N Larma, the MP for Rangamati in the early years of the Republic 
protested the Bengali elements of the Constitution for their ethno-
centrism. Chakma (n 39) 
303Constitution of Bangladesh (n 297) Article 29(1) There shall be equality 
of opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment or office in the 
service of the Republic. 
304 Tribal Rights are recognised in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution 
of India, and discussed in more detail in chapter six of this thesis. 
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development, a situation that reflects the authoritarian Basic Democracies Order 
enshrined in the 1962 Constitution.305 Whilst the constitutional commitment to 
democracy and rights represented a departure from the previous oppressions of 
Pakistani rule, the almost centrifugal construction of the state continued a 
trajectory that played to a relatively homogenous population of Muslim Bengalis, 
and reflected the fevered ethno-centric nationalism around which rebellion against 
West Pakistan had first coalesced.306 
It is in the light of these movements on the national stage that the emergence of 
the Jumma/Pahari as a Chakma-led political force must be considered. As valley 
people, the Chakma were most affected by the largescale environmental 
displacement caused by the loss of cultivable lands through the damming of the 
Karnaphuli River, and it was after this cataclysmic event that political activism 
amongst the Chakma accelerated exponentially.307 Chakma activist M N Larma 
was elected to Parliament in 1969 to represent the Rangamati constituency, and 
took up his seat after the new revolutionary government took power in 1971. In 
1971 he created and led the first common Pahari political party, the Jana Samhati 
Samiti (JSS), expressly to represent the increasingly marginalised Hill Tracts 
communities in the new Republic.308 The JSS leadership was largely Chakma, 
but positioned the party explicitly as representing all indigenous communities 
                                                        
305 Schendel (n 20). Pg. 119. The Basic Democracies Order was introduced 
on the transition to martial government in 1958 and enshrined in the 1962 
constitution. Under the BDO local elections were permitted but their 
representatives subject to unelected bureaucrats who controlled resources. 
In this the BDO resembled colonial government and was reproduced in 
the 1972 constitution. 
306 Raghavan (n 24). 
307 Harikishore Chakma and Centre for Sustainable Development (n 21) 
308The United Peoples Party. Before the JSS Larma was a member of the 
Rangamati Communist Party; Marxism was one element of his Jumma 
nationalist ideology. JSS changed its name post conflict to PCJSS or 
United Peoples Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
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against the state, creating a ‘new nationalism’ symbolised by and grounded in the 
obvious commonality of jum or swidden agriculture.309 ‘Jumma nationalism’ thus 
called into existence a new political identity based partly on the common mode of 
production and a shared history of colonisation and oppression, and partly on a 
Marxist-derived ideology that was expressly modern and expressly ‘anti-feudal’.310 
From the birth of the new nation, therefore, JSS claims for exceptional treatment 
for the Chakma/Pahari were entirely at odds with the vision of state emerging 
from the post-war coalition and depicted by the Republic’s first Constitution.311  
The struggle between state and the Pahari as represented by JSS/Santi Bahini 
was at its apotheosis in the long interregnum of martial government that began in 
1975 with the assassination of Sheikh Mujib. It was a period in which 
constitutional government was suspended and a campaign of almost spectacular 
oppression waged against the hill minorities.312 Ergo, constitutional 
marginalisation did not, of itself, generate the conflict between the state and the 
Pahari, nevertheless it established a frame in which future attempts to 
accommodate difference within the state were subject to interpretation as attacks 
on its fundamental nature. From the early dismissal of Chakma overtures toward 
                                                        
309 Described by Biltu Chakma as using the mode of production as a 
source of solidarity, it was ‘not cut and paste Marxism, we used some of his 
ideas and some of our own’. Interview 6 March 2016 
310 An attempt at nation-building according to Willem Van Schendel, (n 
63) 
311 Huq (n 26). The Constitution was drafted by a conference drawn from 
the political parties who had supported the revolution. 
312 There are many accounts of the conflict. Various amnesty reports 
recount the gross human rights violations on the part of the army. Amnesty 
International (ed.), Bangladesh: Unlawful Killings and Torture in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amnesty International 1986). Adnan gives a 
historical account of the conflict to explain the continuing marginalisation 
and poverty of the hill dwellers in 2004. Shapan Adnan, Migration, Land 
Alienation, and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts of Bangladesh (n 41).29/05/2019 01:21:00 
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Mujib’s revolutionary government, to later attempts to resolve the insurgency 
through limited concessions to autonomy, the lopsided nature of a much-revered 
Constitution provided grist to proponents of a uni-cultural state and opponents of 
formal recognition for the Pahari peoples. Thus, when the Santi Bahini and the 
newly elected Awami League government signed a formal peace accord in 1997, 
claims for constitutional legitimacy derived solely from revitalised custom. The 
unitary and centralised Constitution of Bangladesh and the unstable 
constitutionalism that accompanied it framed and partially explained the return to 
prominence of customary law in the Hill Tracts. It is to this exposition that 
discussion now turns. 
4.2. The Act of Return 
Exploring the recursive nature of custom in Africa, Alexander discussed the 
complex backdrop to the still present binary of traditional, ethnic and informal 
nature of customary legality set against the modern, civic and formal state law. She 
wrote:  
While the act of “return” is often authorised as a step back in time, 
tapping into something ancient and resilient, at its core are struggles over 
resources, rights, and institution-making are very much of the present.313 
In the case of the CHT, this thesis argues that the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord 1997 (CHTPA) marked a pivotal moment in the narratives surrounding a 
customary legal system weakened by decades of atrophy and decline.314 In the first 
of many visible ‘acts of return’, sections of the Chakma elite mobilised customary 
                                                        
313 Jocelyn Alexander, The Politics of states and Chiefs in Zimbabwe, Pg. 
134 in John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff , The Politics of Custom: 
Chiefship, Capital, and the state in Contemporary Africa (n 294). 
314 The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1997 full terms are available 
at this link. 
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Chittagong_Hill_
Tracts_Peace_Accord.pdf 
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law to augment their power in relation to the state, running the risk of essentialism 
in deploying a colonially rooted conceptualisation of the Pahari as a homogenised 
‘tribe’, and a myth of de-historicised and continuous customary governance.315 
Ostensibly intended to provide a template for the orderly integration of the Hill 
Tracts into the mainstream polity, the CHTPA also marked the point at which 
the dichotomous conflict between the state and the Chakma-led Santi Bahini 
fragmented to internecine and decentralised warfare. This led to the dissolution of 
customary legal holism and its replacement by a condition of internal legal 
plurality.316  
Central to this thesis is the idea that this fragmentation and plurality created 
competition over legal meaning, facilitated legal transformations and in so doing 
produced a more open and dynamic legal culture. Indeed, chapter four will show 
that at the level of strategy, each mobilisation of customary law recreated the 
customary system as a practice of identity, and chapter five will show that at a local 
level, each mobilisation of law was dialogic, contested, and formative of new levels 
of legal consciousness. Under the banner of critical communitarianism therefore, 
the state’s failure to attain a lasting peaceful settlement to previous conflicts 
confirmed the Pahari community as the culture foci of resistance.  
The following discussion both elaborates on the role played by the CHTPA in 
mobilising customary law as emblemic of Pahari identity, and explains why its 
limitations returned the customary arena as a site of contestation. The ‘act of 
return’ followed a prolonged period of decline in a customary system already 
unsettled by the displacements of Kaptai and the disruptions of the war of 
independence. Later, during the intense early phases of insurgency, customary law 
was ill-suited to maintaining order in the face of the mass displacement and 
                                                        
315 Namely the PCJSS and the Chakma chief 
316 The Constitution’s objective was stated in its preamble as ‘to elevate 
political, social, cultural, educational and financial rights and to expedite 
socio-economic development process of all citizens in CHT’ (n 299) 
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containment,317 and government sponsored illegality.318 Anecdotal evidence 
collected during fieldwork suggested that in many areas of the Hill Tracts the 
customary system either fell into abeyance or was subsumed into alternative 
methods of adjudication during the years of conflict.319 In areas of Santi Bahini 
control, a new and more democratic system of village governance replaced the 
traditional system with elected village committees and judicial Gram Panchayats 
that were backed by military force.320 Headmen and karbari retained an honorific 
role within their Gram Panchayat system, but greater power lay with the selected 
members and Santi Bahini commanders.321 In fieldwork, one of those former 
commanders recounted that the new system of village governance and dispute 
                                                        
317 Around 70,000 Chakmas were fled army and settler violence at the 
height of the conflict, most finding their way to large refugee camps in 
South Tripura. See Sumanta Sen, India Today, 31 July 1981, 
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story/19810731-
bangladesh-army-lets-loose-reign-of-terror-against-tribal-groups-residing-
in-chittagong-hill-tracts  
Indian Pressure for a solution to the refugee problem is thought to have 
driven the Government of Bangladesh to negotiate the peace accord. The 
refugees began their return in 1997. See BSCAL, Business Standard, 29 
March 1997. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/first-batch-of-chakma-refugees-return-home-197032901118_1.html  
318 For a full account of the transmigration programme and its effects on 
land alienation and the demographics of the Hill Tracts see Adnan (n 41 
and n 312). 
319 For example, in the fieldwork site of Heretaba, the entire village was 
moved to an army cluster village at some point during the late seventies 
until 1986, during which time the customary system could not operate. Any 
village system was seen as potentially seditious. Before that, the older 
residents recalled Santi Bahini holding Panchayats in concert with the 
customary system.  
320 S Mahmud Ali, (n 43)  Adnan (n 41). Both authors describe the internal 
organisational structures of the Santi Bahini and their system of village 
governance. 
321 Rupayan Dewan, CHT Citizens Committee, interviewed 17 March 
2016. Rupayan Dewan had been the Santi Bahini commander responsible 
for the implementation of the system,  
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resolution was designed and implemented with the express intention of 
supplanting the supposedly ‘feudal’ structures of the circle system; Santi Bahini 
wanted to both unite and organise the Pahari, and to this end wanted ‘an 
enlightened and intellectual system of justice’.  
The mobilisation of the customary system in the terms of the Peace Accord 
therefore represented an ideological volte face by a weakened Santi Bahini, 
precipitated by the disintegration of both internal discipline and external support 
in the later phases of the insurgency. They had been profoundly divided even 
before the architect of Jumma nationalism, M N Larma, was murdered in 1982 by 
Indian backed secessionists from within his own party.322 The internecine 
struggle that followed led to fragmentation within the movement, a much wider 
disaffection with the Santi Bahini, and the rise of alternative sources of political 
power in the civilian arena.323 Thus, when the GOB shifted toward a strategy of 
negotiation, the JSS represented only one of the Chakma-led political groupings 
in the Hill Tracts. The powerful symbolism of Jumma nationalism ultimately 
failed to engender a common political consciousness even within the Chakma 
community, and resurgent customary law filled the space left by its splintering 
with a more neutral indicator of Pahari solidarity.  
                                                        
322 The long faction, headed by M N Larma favoured a long drawn out 
guerrilla struggle, and sought autonomy for the CHT. The short faction, 
headed by Priti Chakma favoured a quick and violent conflict, and were 
apparently close enough to the Indian government to believe they would 
have their support. Ahmed, (n 38) 
323 The government of General Ershad offered an amnesty to all returning 
fighters after the split in 1982, and started to work towards political 
solutions. This included establishing the first Hill District Councils in 
1989. The first elected leader of Rangamati District Council, Gautam 
Dewan, remains a highly respected leader of civil society through the non-
aligned CHT Citizens Committee. Interview with Gautam Dewan and 
Mongshau Chowdhury, CHT Citizens Committee, 2016 
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Further, JSS hegemony had never been complete in relation to the other 
communities of the Hill Tracts, one source of internal discord and external 
disaffection with Santi Bahini being its failure to expand the leadership much 
beyond the Chakma nation.324 Less dominant communities expressed their 
marginalised position in rejecting the JSS, if not the concept of the Jumma. From 
them emerged alternative sources of political power, the Mro, for example, 
established their own Bahini in opposition both to the state and the Chakma,325 
whilst the Khumi gave vent to desire for a better life by absorbing urban Bengali 
influences into their rural community.326 Set against the cultural and political 
fragmentation of the Pahari group, the homogenised customary system provided a 
relatively neutral and depoliticised character to community solidarity as defined 
through shared rights to the commons, whilst simultaneously encapsulating 
precolonial traces of the unique cultures and personal laws of the separate Pahari 
nations.327 It could be argued that customary law provided an alternative source of 
Pahari solidary; when the imaginary of the ‘Jumma’ lost its lustre, custom became 
a neutral antidote to the bitter political contestations over the guardianship of 
Pahari nationalism.  
General Ershads government commenced peace negotiations directly with Santi 
Bahini in 1985. During fieldwork, conflicting accounts were offered of the 
                                                        
324 Ahmed, (n 38) 
325 Matthew Wilkinson, ‘Negotiating with the Other: Centre-Periphery 
Perceptions, Peacemaking Policies and Pervasive Conflict in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’ (2015) 5 International Review of 
Social Research 179. 
326 Nasir Uddin, ‘Paradigm of “Better Life”: “Development” among the 
Khumi in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ (2014) 15 Asian Ethnicity 62. 
327 One area of fieldwork was Taunchyangya rather than Chakma. 
Respondents confirmed that their village governance was Taunchyangya 
run, and Taunchyangya laws were used to resolve personal disputes. In the 
case of an appeal within the customary system, the Raja would convene a 
panel that would include Taunchyangya community members. In their 
view, the customary system was able to encompass their difference.  
 
 
130 
emergence of custom in those negotiations, Binoy Chakma, for example, claiming 
responsibility as a government negotiator for persuading Ershad to consider 
including customary law in the final settlement with Santi Bahini. Former JSS 
participants were more prosaic, stating that their re-appropriation of customary 
law was a strategic act that deployed de-historicised custom as source of ‘extra 
power’. 328 When Bangladesh returned to democratic government in 1992, 
intermediaries between the state and the insurgents were drawn from the new 
generation of civil society leaders, and were joined by the Chakma chief.329 As the 
insurgency crumbled, and the possibilities of victory receded, the inclusion of the 
customary system in the terms of the CHTPA reflected a gradual shift toward a 
constitutional and legal consolidation of Pahari power within the by-then 
inevitable confines of the Bangladeshi state. For the Santi Bahini/JSS, the 
customary system legitimised claims of territorial autonomy, and offered a means 
of hegemonising the diverse and increasingly fractious Hill Tracts communities. 
This thesis asserts that the mobilisation of custom on a strategic level through the 
CHTPA was successful in reinforcing the boundaries of community around the 
Pahari and their territorial circles against the state, but failed to ameliorate the 
erosion of confidence in the JSS and their nationalist ideology amongst the wider 
population. 
4.3. After Peace 
When the CHTPA was signed in 1997 its limitations were, even then, to the fore. 
Majoritarian objections to its institutional features were captured by 
Rashiduzziman as a public foreboding at the;  
                                                        
328 Personal accounts of the negotiations were provided by Binoy Chakma, 
a member of Ershad’s government, but also a sitting headman in the 
Rangamati Circle, and Rupayan Dewan who was one of the Santi Bahini 
Commanders leading negotiations for the insurgents.  
329 Roy, (n 62) Pg. 70  
 
 
131 
‘assumed constitutional impropriety of the pact, the infringement of Bangladeshi 
sovereignty, and discrimination against Bengali settlers in the CHT.’330  
His analysis also highlighted the potentially instability of the new local 
government bodies in that larger communities generally and the Chakma 
community particularly were favoured in the allocation of seats, leading some 
opponents to refer to the arrangements as creating ‘a new Chakma Raj’.331The 
most salient criticisms emanated from within the Pahari community, however. 
Primary amongst them was the absence of concrete provisions on the most visible 
and intractable consequence of the conflict, that of illegal land alienation and 
settlement.332 Further, the CHTPA lacked a clear timetable for implementation 
so that successive governments were under no clear commitment to action any 
particular provision of the Accord.333 Finally, being a political accommodation 
rather than a document of legal standing, the document’s lack of constitutional 
status meant even its limited provisions were subordinated to the tumult of 
Bangladeshi national politics. Roy opined this failure demonstrated the bad faith 
                                                        
330 M Rashiduzziman, ‘Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns’ (1998) 38 South 
Asian Survey 653.Pg. 654 
331 Ibid.Pg. 656. He finds the justification for this departure from unitary 
constitutionalism in geo-political pressure from India to end both the 
conflict and the refugee crisis in Tripura, not in any emic desire to 
recognise minority communities.  
332 Identified by Roy (n 62) as the major hurdle. During fieldwork, PCJSS 
respondents insisted that the GOB had promised further measures to 
address the settlement issue, it is perhaps a reflection of their relatively 
weak hand that these were not formally include in the CHTPA. It has 
been suggested that by ignoring the structural roots of the violence the 
CHTPA consecrated its continuation. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Bound to Be 
Failed? The 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord’, The Politics of 
Peace (Institute of Culture and Development Research 2012). Pg. 132 
333 Pranab Kumar Panday and Ishtiaq Jamil, ‘Conflict in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: An Unimplemented Accord and Continued 
Violence’ (2009) 49 Asian Survey 1052. 
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of the GOB at the time of the settlement, and suggested military hands were 
instrumental in seeking rebel disarmament without a concomitant commitment 
from the state.334  
Opaque, imperfect and contested, the limitations of the CHTPA radically 
affected the internal dynamics of the Pahari community, not only failing to 
generate hegemony for the PCJSS but causing a major split in Pahari 
representation. The main Chakma led opposition, the United Peoples 
Democratic Front|(UPDF), opposed the CHTPA and resisted disarmament at 
the time of signing. UPDF leader Rabi Shankar Kumar claimed during fieldwork 
that UPDF fears of government dissembling had been more than realised;  
 ‘If you read the accord, you realise that the PCJSS had to fulfil all their 
obligations before the government completed any of its obligations. They 
(the PCJSS) came above ground for the Accord and now they have no 
more leverage, so why should the government implement it?’ 335 
As implementation stalled, internecine violence erupted between the UPDF and 
the PCJSS who then re-armed to mark their power and territory against each 
other rather than the state. Rather than heralding peace, the CHTPA thus 
appeared to precipitate a more complex phase of conflict, characterised by 
factionalism, and conducted amid constant rumours of insidious Army 
culpability.336 In a mirror to the constant splitting of community and political 
                                                        
334 Roy, ( n 62) Pg. 70 
335 A separate political party that grew from disaffected members of the 
Hill Women’s Federation, the Hill Peoples Committee and the Hill 
Students Council, all of which were civil society organisations whilst the 
JSS/Santi Bahini were still proscribed, and were excluded from 
negotiations. It has always been and remains resolutely anti-Accord. 
Interview with Rabi Shankar Kumar 3rd April 2016 and 26 May 2016.  
336 Bhumitra Chakma, Bound to Be Failed? The 1997 Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Peace Accord’, (n 330). Pg. 139. In terms of Army culpability, the 
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allegiance so characteristic of the Indian north-east, both the PCJSS and the 
UPDF subsequently divided again into rival factions, with the death toll from 
internecine struggles between Chakma-led cadres rising exponentially in 2018.337 
Divisions between the Chakma and various Pahari nations similarly destabilised 
an Accord containing a notable lack of safeguards for the smaller communities 
given their extreme vulnerability.338 Turning attention of its ontological failings. 
Wilkinson observed that:  
 ‘The tendency to create ‘Others’ at the state’s periphery involves 
anachronistic and Orientalist simplifications of often complex and 
heterogeneous groups and situations.339 
The GOB oversimplified the conflict as unifocal, or as ‘a case of the modern 
Islamic Bangladeshi state contesting and taming a primitive and savage 
periphery340’, and in so doing left the UPDF, representatives of smaller 
communities, and civil society activists without a political outlet. In this difficult 
context, the political strategy of re-traditionalisation was deployed by a certain 
sector of the Pahari elite to remedy the lack of constitutional space for recognition. 
The ‘act of return’ in the CHT thus marked the transformation of military conflict 
                                                        
recent split in the UPDF with its violent consequences has been publicly 
attributed to Army intervention in indigenous internal party politics.  
337 Roy, (n 62).  Baruah defines this a ‘durable disorder’. Baruah (n 
216).More than 10 UPDF activists have been killed in the Khagrachari 
area in 2018 by this splinter group, suspected of being funded by military 
intelligence. Seven people were killed on 18th August 2018, with the latest 
killing of 2 activists in the surveyed area of Sebakhon. 
https://www.thedailystar.net/country/news/2-updf-members-shot-dead-
rangamati-1636942  
338 Wilkinson M, ‘Negotiating with the Other: Centre-Periphery Perceptions, 
Peacemaking Policies and Pervasive Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Bangladesh’ (2015) 5 International Review of Social Research 179 
339 Ibid. Pg.181 
340 Ibid. Pg. 188 
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to political and legal discourse, in that only a customary system exhibiting the 
nomenclature, structures, and legal institutions of its colonial heritage could 
provide a legal foundation for future claims to political autonomy and land rights, 
At the same time, the CHTPA structured a new phase of internecine conflict that 
ensured day-to-day customary practice drew from the localised and immediate 
context of a contested and fragmented post conflict arena.  
4.4. Re-formed Boundaries  
The CHTPA was given statutory force by a series of statutory instruments after 
1997. The three Hill District Council Acts of 1998 constituted an elected Council 
within each circle area to be composed of tribal and non-tribal residents in the 
proportions of two to one.341 The Regional Council Act of 1998, created an 
overarching Regional Authority for the CHT with members drawn from each of 
the Hill District Councils to oversee all delegated HDC functions. Their dual 
enactment expressed the state’s intention to transfer responsibility for policing, 
tribal justice and land management, the maintenance of law and order, education, 
agriculture and forests, social welfare and various economic development 
functions such as fisheries, and cooperatives to autonomous democratic 
institutions.342 Below, it is argued that these enactments represented a re-
assertion of the Pahari community as a political form drawing legitimacy from 
customary constructs, but also envisaged a transformation occurring in the nature 
of that community. 
                                                        
341 Rangamati Hill District Council Act (1998) 
http://rhdcbd.org/old/_act/RHDC%20Act%201989.pdf. Non-tribal 
residents are more explicitly defined in section 4(aa) as those with a 
permanent address within the CHT territories, and as legally holding rights 
to land. The exact proportions of representatives from each community is 
also specified, with the Chakma dominating in the Rangamati Circle. 
(Section 4(b)). 
342 RHDC Act (1998 ) Sections 1 to 21. 
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A critical distinction between the colonial Circles and the re-formed customary 
system was the transfer of appellate and controlling power from state bureaucrats 
to elected bodies with relatively autonomous control over local government. The 
headmen and karbari were explicitly recognised in section 66 of the HDC Acts as 
holding delegated power to settle disputes that were ‘social, cultural or tribal’ in 
accordance with the customs of the tribe. Similarly, chiefs were explicitly 
recognised as the appellate court within the customary justice system in Section 
66(2), and vested with the right to sit on the local Councils should they so wish in 
Section 26. The insertion of democratic structures was intended to alter the 
power relations between chiefs, political leaders and lay people. The second 
distinction was the creation of the Regional Council(RC), which established the 
CHT as a discrete region, and the Pahari as a single homogenised legal 
community across the three circle areas. This counterbalance to executive power 
was unique in Bangladesh, exciting the Jamat-Y-Islam(JIB) accusation that the 
Regional Council Act 1998 undermined the unitary, majoritarian, nature of the 
Bangladeshi state.343 
Custom was also explicitly deployed in the Acts to maintain the legal distinction 
between plain land Bangladesh and the CHT in relation to land administration. 
Section 64 of the HDC Acts brought responsibility for land transfers under 
democratic control, stating that: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in law for the time being in force – 
(a) no land including the khas-land suitable for settlement within the 
jurisdiction of (Rangamati) Hill District 344shall be leased out, settled 
                                                        
343 JIB was the foremost Islamist party in Bangladesh and are now 
proscribed as a terrorist organisation. JIB made this claim as parties to the 
constitutional challenge in the Badiuzzaman v Bangladesh case, which 
they funded. Discussed in Section 4.5 below.  
344 Each Act inserted one circle area, e.g. Khagrachari, Rangamati and 
Bandarban. 
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with, purchased, sold out or transferred otherwise without the prior 
approval of the Council. 
Together, the HDC legislation and customary governance created a land system 
in which communal rights were expressly recognised. It was subsequently 
underscored by the Land Dispute Settlement Commission Act 2001, which 
created a mechanism to resolve land disputes caused by the return of the mainly 
Chakma refugees from Tripura.345 Section D (4 and 5) of the 1997 Peace Accord 
recommended a Land Commission composed of a retired justice and the relevant 
Circle chief, to settle land disputes according ‘to the existing rules, customs and 
usages of the Chittagong Hill Tracts’. Under the Land Dispute Settlement 
Commission Act 2001, possession would be returned to the lawful owner in the 
case of any settlement made against the existing laws of the CHT so that the 
lawful owner was evicted from this land.346 The combined operation of the Land 
Commission Act and the HDC Acts thus enshrined recognition of communal 
land tenures, transformed state control into local control, and as long as separate 
provisions on voter registration were abided by, guaranteed a Pahari majority on 
the Councils. The deployment of custom in post-conflict legislation explicitly 
endorsed progressive notions of community in the hills and reinforced their 
continuing divergence from the plains insofar as the jurisdiction of communitarian 
law and the nature of legal pluralism.347  
                                                        
345 During the conflict, nearly half a million Chakma people were displaced 
by the conflict to the refugee camps of Tripura. Their return is believed to 
have been an express condition placed by India on the Bangladeshi 
government in return for their support in resolving the conflict. In 2002, 
however, returning refugees found their land occupied by Bengali settlers, 
most of whom were incentivised with financial and material support and 
unquestioning Army protection to settle in the CHT as part of the 
transmigration policy.  Singh, (n 21). Adnan (n 41) 
346 (Section D 6(1) Land Commission Act 
347 Displacement and land-grabbing in rural plainland communities is also 
common, but the barriers to formal justice for the more marginalised 
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After enactment, the potentially transformative nature of the new autonomous 
bodies became mired in GOB delay, thus contributing to rather than alleviating 
tensions in the Hill Tracts. At the time of fieldwork, the new District and 
Regional Councils remained unelected interim bodies due to a bitter dispute over 
what determined permanent residence of the CHT.348 In short, Pahari 
representatives refused to participate in elections until agreement was reached on 
the status of recent Bengali settlers, and the Regional Council under PCJSS 
leadership deferred elections until this point of definition was settled.349 
Meanwhile, settler organisations, supported by right-leaning and Islamic parties 
insisted on their constitutionally enshrined equal right to vote. The 
marginalisation of these democratic bodies was keenly felt even by those co-opted 
into their membership, for example the current members of the Rangamati Hill 
District Council, all Awami League 1members appointed by the government in 
the proportions set out in the legislation.350Despite receiving their seats through 
patronage, they attributed the failure to hold elections to the government; 
                                                        
groups in society, women, Adivasi, and the poor generally are so great that 
for large tracts of the nation, the informal Salish, religious and community 
specific legal orders are the only source of justice available.. When 
addressing the 25th Conference of Family Law Courts in 2001, Justice 
Hassan stated that ‘The causes of backlog and delay in our country are 
systemic and profound… As a result, the current backlog and delay 
problem in our country has reached such a proportion that it effectively 
deny the rights of citizens to redress their grievance ’. Justice K. Hasan, ‘A 
Report on Mediation in the Family Courts: Bangladesh Experience’ 
(2001).  
348 Shahid Hossain, UNDP cluster leader, interviewed 8 October 2015. 
The government continues to argue that functions have been transferred 
to the HDCS but central government retains control of all financial 
management and key service such as policing. 
349 Ushaton Talukder, MP for CHT, confirmed this refusal personally at 
interview. 
350 Rangamati Hill District Council Workshop held on 15 March 2016 
with Brisa Keta Chakma, Rangamati HDC leader and four Council 
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‘Only when they (the RC Electoral College) are elected will the Regional 
Council be effective… at present, we are the men of the government, we 
are rewarded by the government, we can’t speak against the government. 
If this type of interim council runs for two or three more terms then 
political unrest will explode in the CHT.351  
In conversation, Councillors also alluded to the ways in which regional autonomy 
had been undermined subtly, by reducing the hierarchical status of the CHT 
Minister and the leader of the HDCS within the labyrinthine bureaucracies of the 
Bangladeshi government.352  
Similarly, the newly convened Land Commission became rapidly embroiled in a 
political dispute over composition and membership after its first highly partisan 
and inflexible Chairman made clear his sympathies with the settlers.353 The 
Commission was promptly boycotted by the Circle chiefs and was never convened 
successfully. An Amendment Bill presented in 2013 tackled criticisms of its 
statutory composition, but initially failed to assuage Pahari concerns over the 
efficacy of the Commission. In 2013, the PCJSS presented a 13-point amendment 
proposal to government, focussing on the lack of explicit provision for fringe land 
                                                        
members, Striti Bikash Tripura, Salin Kumar Chakma, Remi Liara 
Pankhya, Charimoni Taunchyangya. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Justice Khadimul Islam, the former Chairman of CHT Land 
Commission, made clear his opposition was to its status in relation to 
formal state law. He still campaigns against the CHTPA and for the 
rights of settlers, stating in 2015 ‘It was unnecessary to bring the 
Amendment because the laws of the country were enough to solve the 
disputes. In truth, the Amendment has created serious misunderstanding 
between the tribal people and the Bengalese” Quoted in Reza Mahmud, 
‘Bangalees Fear Evacuations: Tribal Men Rapidly Grabbing Lands: 
Mutual Understanding between Bangalees and Tribes Disappears’ 
Parbatta News (9 January 2017). 
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disputes354 and the limitation of consideration to lands ‘occupied’ rather than 
‘settled’ in the Commissions’ jurisdiction.355 The Amendment Act finally passed 
into law in 2017, with the three-year enactment delay widely attributed to 
interventions by the Army who opposed resolution of outstanding land cases on 
grounds of public disorder.356  
The labyrinthine process followed to implement the CHTPA illustrates how a 
lack of constitutional grounding for a recognition of Pahari exceptionalism placed 
the community of colonial construction in a precarious position. Whilst the 
promulgation of legislation suggested a new era of community autonomy, in 
reality settlement and land alienation continued, and demilitarisation barely 
progressed. The predictions of Peace Accord opponents proved remarkably 
prescient as its implementation was constantly subverted by instabilities on the 
national stage. And, throughout the post-conflict period, factionalism and division 
have characterised the political leadership of the Pahari, investing the customary 
arena with an inherent but creative instability.  
                                                        
354 Fringe lands surround Rangamati Lake and appear when the water 
levels are low. These lands offer 1 or 2 crops a year and were awarded to 
many Chakma people after the valley was flooded in 1962. 
355 (Point 5) of the 13 Point Amendment. Copy of the proposal provided by 
Mangal Kumar Chakma, Press Secretary of the PCJSS. 
356Shahid Hossain of the UNDP confirmed the role of the Army in 
delaying the Land Commission Amendment.MP Ushatan Talukder 
stated that ‘…some politicians within the Awami League think that if the 
Land Commission is executed then the Bengali settlers will be 
victimised…even after agreement no point is taken forward, it is left in the 
hands of the civilian/military bureaucrats…we have de facto military rule.’ 
Political opposition to the Land Commission from the political right and 
Islamist parties highlighted the threat to sovereignty, for example, Retired 
Major General Syed Muhammad Ibrahim represented the known army 
position in stating that; “The Land Commission Amendment Act 
diminishes the government’s authority on the sovereignty of Bangladesh. If 
the government implements the Act, then the country might lose one tenth 
of land.” http://parbattanews.com/en/land-commission-amend-act-
challenges-govt-control-on-cht/ 
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4.5. Constitutional Recognition 
In the more recent period of turbulence arising from the authoritarian activities of 
the Awami League (AL) government, constitutionalism has proved central to 
their legitimising strategy. After winning the first fair election in seven years, the 
AL used their incumbent status to secure constitutional changes that shifted the 
Republic closer toward its originary ideals, but with significant concessions 
toward the rise of popular Islamist sentiment. The 15th amendment of 2011 
illustrates this aporia, in that it reinserted secularism into the preamble, but 
married its apparent nod toward inclusivity with the confirmation of Islam as the 
official religion of the Bangladeshi state in Article 2, thus anointing the state as 
secular and Islamic.357 The same complex iteration of political and legal spheres 
framed the treatment of minorities, as illustrated by the insertion of a more specific 
protection of minorities for the first time in Article 23A of the 15th Amendment: 
‘The state shall take steps to protect and develop the unique local culture 
and tradition of the tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and communities’ 
An apparently strong clause left open the question of how protection should be 
delivered, and did not extend any specific political concessions to minority groups. 
Thus, the first positive constitutional recognition of minorities confirmed a weak 
approach to diversity that acknowledged minority ‘culture’ but not their political 
agency. A grudging admission of diversity into the primary legal institution of the 
state lionised the nebulous concept of culture, while offering no concomitant 
                                                        
357 Article 2 now reads ‘The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the 
state shall give equal status and equal right in the practice of the Hindu, 
Buddhist, Christian and other religions.’ 
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remedy to the structural inequalities between majority and minority 
communities.358  
The most recent act of return involved the Pahari-led legal mobilisation to achieve 
constitutional recognition of the exceptional status of the CHT in the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh. This was achieved through an articulation of current 
constitutional provisions and the CHT Regulations 1900 in a series of seminal 
cases.359 Wagachara Tea Estates (2014) is selected for analysis due to the more 
revealing nature of its judgement, and for the explicit articulation of legal 
mobilisation with political and constitutional discourse in the judgment. In this 
case, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the Deputy 
Commissioner (DC) or the Land Commissioner had jurisdiction over land 
disputes, a case again turning on whether the DC’s primary jurisdiction as 
conferred by the CHT Regulations still had legal force. Parties to the case had 
gained opposing judgements from the DC and the Land Commissioner, the first 
being empowered to authorised land mutations under the CHT Regulations, the 
latter drawing his authority from Act of state. The explicitly political frame of 
reference was underscored by PCJSS support for the primary jurisdiction of the 
colonial Regulations, and the appointment of Raja Devashish Roy as chief 
Advocate to defend this position. The opposing party was funded by the now 
proscribed Islamist Jamat-Y-Islam Bangladesh (JIB), who hoped for a rejection of 
the CHT’s special status as an autonomous region and the re-assertion of an 
absolutely unitary constitutional frame. The case rested on the articulation of the 
CHT Regulations 1900 and the default interpretation of Article 149 of the 
                                                        
358 Bearing out Hale’s argument that recognition of indigenous cultural 
rights is a neo-liberal strategy to neutralise opposition to development 
whilst continuing to marginalise economically. Hale (n 128). 
359 The cases are Wagachara Tea Estate Ltd v Muhammad Taher and 
Others (2014) Supreme Court of Bangladesh Civil Appeal No. 147 of 
2007. Rangamati Foods Ltd (2014) confirmed the jurisdiction of custom 
over national VAT regulations. Badiuzzaman v Bangladesh, 7 LG (2010) 
HCD dealt with the constitutional legality of the RC and HDC Acts. 
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Constitution that denoted any law valid unless explicitly repealed. The Court 
recognised the CHT Regulations 1900 as having the full force of law under the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, and signalled a distinct shift in jurisprudence toward 
legally validating the Pahari community as a unit of social and administrative 
organisation, and as a political form existing within the state.  
In the course of their judgement, the Supreme Court analysed both the legal 
foundation of customary exceptionalism and the political context of the legal 
debate, to conclude resolutely that the CHT Regulations remained in force 
throughout the period of Pakistani rule.360 They drew attention to the explicit 
invocation of the CHT Regulations in various legislative instruments by state of 
Bangladesh since 1997,361 and argued that the sessions courts established in the 
CHT in 2008 supported rather than undermined the specific form of CHT legal 
pluralism because it required judges to try civil cases in accordance with the 
existing laws, customs and usages of the district. The Judges felt this amounted to 
the implicit recognition of;  
‘a wide body of customary laws on land, forests and other natural 
resources that are crucial safeguards for the indigenous people and other 
residents of the area.’  
In seeking a historicised version of custom, however, the judges moved toward a 
remarkable parody of colonial mores; their essentialising tendencies most 
                                                        
360 Regardless of the re-designation of the Hill Tracts as a tribal rather 
than excluded area in the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, and of the 
subsequent removal of tribal Status by the Constitution (First 
Amendment) Act, 1963 
361 The Judgement confirms that the actions of previous Pakistani 
governments in removing the ‘excluded’ status of the CHT in the 1962 
Constitution of Pakistan, and the subsequent removal of tribal Status by 
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 had not repealed the 
Regulations. Further that the CHT Land Commission Dispute 
Settlement Act of 2003 confirmed that land disputes were still to be 
determined by reference to the custom and practice in the Hill Tracts.  
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apparent in the utilisation of precedents from the Supreme Court of India to 
define tribal peoples according to the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, 
itself a product of the protective ideologies of colonial rule:  
‘Tribals are historically weaker sections of the society. They need the 
protection of the laws as they are gullible and fall prey to the tactics of 
unscrupulous people, and are susceptible to exploitation on account of 
their innocence, poverty and backwardness extending over centuries.362  
In this way, the boundaries of community were explicitly drawn around the 
territorialised administrative circles and their indigenous residents, whilst 
customary law was conceptualised as an already and always existing reality 
protected by the 1972 Constitution. A customary system expressly defined by 
continuity and stasis was uncomfortably juxtaposed with a de-historicised 
narrative of the turbulent relationship between state and community. Prima facie, 
Wagachara underscored the exclusion of community from the linear temporality 
of the West, representing custom in the ‘hyperbolic, intensified form’ noted by 
Comaroff.363 The shift in judicial tendencies toward recognition betrayed the 
dynamism of the customary field even as it sanitised it, exposed the complexity of 
the narratives surrounding customary law, and provided a rationale for its 
strategic co-option as the legal and constitutional route to indigenous power. As 
the prime example of legal mobilisation as a strategy of resistance, Wagachara 
expressed the governmentality of the colonial era retooled as an expression of 
autonomy, and resurrected customary law as an identity practice that bound the 
Chakma to their indigenous neighbours in a restated and resurgent community of 
the oppressed.  
                                                        
362 Quoted by the SC from Armendra Pratap Singh v. Taj Bahadur 
Prajapati, AIR 2004, SC, 3782.  
363 Comaroff and Comaroff , (n 294) 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on a historo-legal analysis of the role of law in demarcating 
the communitarian boundaries of the Pahari, and marking both peoples and 
territory as exceptional in legal and constitutional terms. It showed that 
community in Bangladesh has retained elements of its exteriority to Capital, but 
as a political form can no longer be considered stable given the maelstrom of 
political, constitutional and legal controversy that surrounds its survival in the 
contemporary state. It explored the links between community, identity and law 
through the linked processes of ‘territorialisation’ in the colonial era, and ‘re-
traditionalisation’ in the more recent past. By tracing the birth and rebirth of the 
communitarian field, it connected the historical narratives of the Chakma/Pahari 
to the legal form of ‘classical pluralism’, and aligned the political community of the 
Pahari with the practice of customary law. It demonstrated that the customary 
legal system was substantially reproduced in the latter stages of the state/Pahari as 
source of hegemonic and legitimising power for the Pahari elites. Finally, it 
suggested that custom was mobilised specifically to stabilise the borders of 
community and state in a situation of considerable fragmentation within both. In 
utilising the conceptual frame of ‘critical communitarianism’, this thesis thus 
suggests that the strategic mobilisation of customary law established the 
reconstructed Pahari community as the foci of both culture and resistance. 
Comaroff similarly understood the resurgence of custom as a consequence of the 
reification of difference emerging from the waning of universalism, stating that: 
Ours, it seems, is an age that essentialises and valorises identity, above all 
racialised cultural identity; an age in which the right to difference is both 
legally (if unevenly) protected and convertible (if unevenly) in im/material 
property.364  
                                                        
364 Comaroff and Comaroff, (n 294) 
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The narrative of the birth, decline and return of custom in this chapter exposed 
the intricately constructed connections between the customary legal domain and a 
‘valorised’ Pahari identity. Yet throughout, Pahari identity has been shown to be a 
fragile and mutable, and culture itself a site of contestation. Internal fragmentation 
and its effects form the object of the next chapter, which uses the sub-concepts of 
legal mobilisation and legal culture to illuminate the effect of these irresolvable 
tensions on the customary/communitarian sphere in the Chakma dominated 
Rangamati area of the Hill Tracts. Specifically, and within the conceptual frame 
of ‘critical communitarianism’ , the next chapter draws on elite perspectives of 
customary law to understand the relationship between these historical narratives, 
the practice of communitarian law and the legal culture generated by the chaotic 
iteration of a fragmented, unstable state and a constantly splintering community.  
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Chapter Four. The Curators of Culture 
1. Legal Culture and Methodology 
The previous chapter illuminated the territorial, legal and identitarian boundaries 
of community in the CHT context, tracing the construction of those boundaries 
to the composite effects of colonial territorialisation and its consequent 
balkanisation of the Hill Tracts, and the resurgence of custom as a critical tool in 
the decades-long struggle against state dominance. This chapter explores the 
instability these measures created from the interior of community, with the 
ultimate goal of understanding the effect on the distribution of power within the 
Chakma community and the potential for ‘critical communitarianism’ to be 
produced.  
 ‘Critical communitarianism’ was invoked in chapter two to position community as 
the ‘cultural foci of mobilization for, or resistance to, state law’, and legal culture 
was placed as ‘practices of those identities that have become embodied in legal 
consciousness’.365 In summary the theoretical discussion proposed that the 
collective identities of non-ruling communities were expressed in law and through 
the practices of communal legal culture. An explicitly critical frame placed 
state/community relations as a formative element of legal culture, and the sub-
concepts of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness as disaggregates of legal 
culture. In the next three chapters, these sub-concepts are employed as analytical 
tools in a qualitative analysis of legal culture in Bangladesh and Tripura. The 
intention is to ascertain whether ‘critical communitarianism’, that is a resistant 
form of communitarian law, can be identified in either or both research sites. As 
the focus turns toward presentation of field data, this section first deals briefly 
                                                        
365 Barzilai, (n 5) Pg. 1 
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with the methodological critiques of the legal culture school advanced in chapter 
two.  
The concept of legal culture has been criticised as too slippery and imprecise to 
have analytical value, a valid enough challenge given the broad categories of social 
behaviours categorised under the banner of culture. Merry recommended that this 
criticism could be ameliorated by disaggregating different aspects of legal culture, 
thus minimising the risks of over-generalisation and honing the utility of the wider 
concept as a comparative and analytical tool. This thesis addresses this 
methodological problematic by following Merry’s technique, and Barzilai’s frame 
in employing analytical tools from a disaggregation of legal culture into the 
dimensions of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness.366 Disaggregation 
facilitates the identification and comparison between different elements of legal 
culture, in the expectation that these sub-concepts can be reconstructed to 
demonstrate the existence, or otherwise, of ‘critical communitarianism’.  
The second critique related to the potential risks of essentialism; concepts of legal 
culture were so broad they masked legal heterogeneity, effectively absorbing the 
pejorative and essentialising connotations of culture generally.367 This critique 
suggested a particular view of culture already discredited by legal pluralists who 
identified culture as highly mutable, fluid, and intimately connected to relations of 
power.368 Merry argued that postcolonial cultures were already marked by 
hybridisation and creolisation rather than uniformity, suggesting a ‘dynamic, 
agentic and historicised understanding of culture’ entirely appropriate to the 
current context of a legal culture effectively remade by the contested narratives 
                                                        
366 These concepts were not mutually exclusive, but allowed different 
perspectives to be garnered as the conduct of law within the overarching 
concept of legal culture.  
367 Nelken, (n 190), Pg. 1-57  
368 Merry, (n 195). Pg. 55 
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surrounding it.369 During fieldwork this critique was directly addressed by 
engaging explicitly with questions of leadership and power in discussions, and in 
so doing offering a potential to identify and theorise power relations within and 
around the customary systems under scrutiny.  
This chapter uses qualitative data collected during fieldwork to ascertain what 
Nelken referred to as the ‘more nebulous aspects of culture’,, that is the ideas, 
values, aspirations and mentalities that motivate its influencers and 
practitioners.370 It starts with a brief account of the state perspective on custom in 
the CHT, which reveals the aporia between the states formal support for the 
customary system, and the contradictory effects of the state’s desire to extend 
formal justice. The second section uses field data to illustrate the contribution of 
actors on the borders of the communitarian arena to a legal culture distinguished 
by the febrile and creative nature of its practices.371 The final section turns more 
explicitly to the dimensions of legal mobilisation and consciousness to commence 
an exploration of subject positions adopted by elite customary practitioners, 
political and civil society activists and interested community members. The 
chapter concludes by ascertaining whether the community envisioned from this 
analysis of attitudes to and mobilisation of customary law supports the notion that 
the communitarian domain is the cultural foci of resistance to state law, and thus 
whether the first elements of a state of ‘critical communitarianism’ exists in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
2. The State and Customary Law 
At this point it is perhaps useful to recall Shahar’s assertion that the state itself is 
non-monolithic, multi-faceted and internally plural, and to understand the state in 
                                                        
369 Merry, (n 193) Pg. 55 
370 Nelken (n 2). 
371 This includes a state representative, development actors, the state legal 
profession, and the wider social movement. 
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Bangladesh as both fragmented and fragile.372 Indeed, the problem of accounting 
for the presence and counter-intuitive positioning of the military against 
democratic representatives of the state emerged as one of the greatest challenges 
to the project. The formal state perspective offered by the CHT Secretary, Naba 
Kishore Bikram (NBK) Tripura should be read with this limitation in mind.373 At 
the time of fieldwork, NBK Tripura was the most senior official in the CHT 
Ministry created to oversee implementation of the Peace Accord with 
responsibility for coordinating the policy responses of all other government 
Departments to the commitments made in 1997.  
NBK Tripura confirmed that the government’s current position on the issue of 
settlement was to preserve this status quo, he could not envisage the return to a 
majority Pahari demography. Consequently, the government was committed to a 
form of legal pluralism that recognised the rights of both Pahari and settler 
communities. In his view, state support for the communitarian system reflected 
the ruling party’s pragmatic desire to maintain access to justice for the indigenous 
people, but was accompanied by a concomitant desire to serve the settler Bengali 
community by strengthening the institutions of the formal system. Government 
support for traditional Pahari institutions were thus structured so as to 
‘consolidate their role within their own communities’, as a source of justice for the 
hill peoples ‘while alternative routes to justice were constructed’. Material state 
support for the communitarian system reflected a pragmatic desire to maintain 
                                                        
372 Shahar, (n 173) Bangladesh is ranked 29th from bottom in the 2018 index 
of fragile states, its position dropping due to recent unrest and the attacks 
on democratic rule by the incumbent AL government. 
https://fundforpeace.org/fsi/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/951181805-
Fragile-states-Index-Annual-Report-2018.pdf  
373 When fieldwork was conducted Naba Bikram Kishore Tripura held 
the posts of Secretary to the CHT Ministry, and Chair of the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts Development Forum (CHTDF) simultaneously, holding the 
main administrative responsibility for implementing the CHTPA and 
coordinating state approaches to the CHT across the 58 ministries of 
government. 
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access to justice for the indigenous people, all the while serving the settler-Bengali 
community by strengthening the institutions of the formal system.  
The government was committed to reviewing headmen’s remuneration, then held 
at pre-1971 levels, and to training headmen on land and property issues in order to 
improve the quality of customary justice.374 However, these reforms were 
designed solely to consolidate their role within their own communities given that 
no action was being considered to reduce the settler population. Having 
confirmed that the demographic status quo would be maintained, Tripura 
asserted that delays in transferring the customary system to the democratic control 
of the autonomous councils were largely attributable to the reluctance of the chiefs 
to accept democratic authority over social disputes. This chimed with his 
expressed view that the authority of the customary system had ‘eroded over time’.  
‘Customary law used to be very strong and very powerful, but at that time 
there were no other institutions, and no formal codes. The practice has 
weakened as these codes have become more established. The Peace 
Accord contains provisions to pass authority for social disputes to the 
HDCS, and this was reflected in the HDC Act. The Circle chiefs are 
opposed to this, as it is felt to undermine traditional institutions.’ 375 
State policies toward extending formal justice mechanisms would increase the 
routes to justice available to the Pahari and by implication would weaken the 
identitarian aspects of communitarian law and strengthen the role of the state in 
community governance. It seemed the policy toward legal pluralism as expressed 
by NBK Tripura perceived customary recognition as a pragmatic and temporary 
accommodation only whilst the state strengthened its power, and betrayed an 
ambiguous commitment to autonomous rule. His account of the state approach to 
                                                        
374 A function previously funded by the UNDP-CHT Development 
Programme. 
375 Interview with Naba Bikram Kishore Tripura, 18 October 2015 
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customary law confirmed that though the Courts had apparently consecrated the 
Pahari community as a still-stable political form, the boundaries that the 
community elites sought to re-erect between state and Pahari minority remained 
‘blurred and open to social construction and negotiation’, adding another layer of 
considerable complexity to the narrative surrounding communitarian legal 
culture.376  
3. Legal Culture from the Borders 
In chapter two, Fitzpatrick’s conceptualisation of legal pluralism raised the 
possibility of a separate legal sphere being structured with the state-in-dominance 
but retaining its apartness within that structure. The concept of ‘critical 
communitarianism’ was then employed to position non-state law as the focus of 
identitarian, and potentially subversive legal practices within this state-in-
dominance structure. A different conceptualisation of legal pluralism emerged in 
which even a constitutionally legitimised and thus formally subordinate customary 
legal system could potentially provide the foci of mobilisation against the state. 
The work of post-structuralists like Santos suggested that even the most discretely 
bounded non-state system contained a potential for concepts and ideas to be 
admitted, for inter-legality.  
The previous chapter’s description of the highly political resurrection of customary 
law suggested a communitarian environment characterised by contestation and 
rapid change, and the concept of inter-legality appears particularly well suited to 
assist in understanding the porous nature of community borders in the CHT. The 
next section explores these contestations through analysis of the attitudes and 
aspirations of key influencers. It groups the interviews held with social movement 
representatives directly engaged in the resurrection of custom but from a position 
of exteriority. The necessary qualification to that statement is that exteriority is as 
                                                        
376 Shahar, (n 173) Pg. 433 
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mutable as community boundaries, participants played many roles simultaneously, 
operating both within and without customary legal system and were fluid in the 
positions they represented. Nonetheless, the term ‘exterior’, with this qualification, 
best illuminated the exceptionally rich network of actors and organisations that 
surround the Chakma with particular and often conflicting perspectives on the 
meaning and utility of customary law.377  
3.1. Donors and Development 
The first exposition of attitudes and influences toward the customary system 
relates to those organisations and actors who have participated directly in 
initiatives related to legal pluralism and the practice of dispute resolution. The 
influx of international development organisations and actors after 1997 was part of 
an explicitly post-conflict programme of social development that referenced and 
supported each provision of the CHTPA.378 The largest of these initiatives was 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) CHT Project initiated 
in 2001, which saw a €20 million investment in post-conflict capacity-building 
activities directed at improving the lives of the most marginalised CHT 
communities.379 From 2008 to 2014, resources were provided to traditional 
                                                        
377 In respect of state systems, distinctions made by Friedman as to the 
internal and external dimensions of legal systems were critiqued by 
Cotterell as unworkable due to the embeddedness of law within complex 
and broadly spun webs of social meaning. The problems are present in this 
research also and the use of exterior in this thesis refers explicitly to parties 
who wish to impose change on the customary system from outside the 
boundaries of community, whether they are members of that community 
or not. Friedman (n 179). Pg. 33 
378 International development in the CHT practically ceased during the 
years of conflict after the kidnap of two Shell Executives in 1984. Anti-
Slavery Society Report Number 2, The Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Militarization, Oppression and Hill Tribes (n 19). 
379 Details of the project are available on the UNDP website. 
http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/operations/project
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leaders for training headmen and karbari, logistics and small-scale projects. 
Investment in logistical and revenue support for customary personnel was at such 
low levels, however, that most initiatives were confined to the chief’s offices and 
not dispersed to lower levels of the circle hierarchy.380 Research participants who 
worked with the chiefs on the programme offered a jaded perception of the Circle 
system as an organ of empowerment. Take for example, the current Project 
Director, Shahid Hossein. 
‘The three chiefs do not co-ordinate and so traditional government is not 
emerging as a powerful institution. It is hard to balance without strong 
leadership within these institutions. There needs to be a wider dialogue, 
that covers both the higher-level parties and the grass roots’.  
Perhaps due to this frustration and despite their commitment to augmenting the 
customary system, UNDP funds also supported initiatives that produced 
alternative governance mechanisms and potentially increased the level of local 
pluralism. Village committees were established to distribute small amounts of 
seed capital, usually with women officiating as part of the gender workstream. 
This part of the UNDP programme also sought to train headmen on women’s 
rights with a view to changing the patriarchal elements of customary law, but with 
the subtle difference of dispute resolution being targeted as one of many village 
governance mechanisms.  
Development interventions outside of the UNDP umbrella also suggest a 
willingness to circumvent the customary system in the pursuit of the perceived 
                                                        
s/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/chittagong-hill-tracts-development-
facility/chtdf-home.html  
380 Funding through the CHTDF was channelled through the chief’s 
offices, and included an allowance of around 30% to be spent on ‘logistics’ 
or capital investment. Given the low level of funding this tended to be 
invested in office equipment and enhancements for the chiefs only. The 
Author designed the capacity building programme for the Mong Circle in 
2011. 
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advantages of human rights for villagers, indeed, a proliferation of rights-based 
organisations have intervened with the explicit agenda of changing the historically 
connected, and communitarian aspects of customary law by harnessing it to 
various development initiatives. As an example, the Centre for Integration 
Programme and Development (CIPD), a local NGO, developed a model-village 
approach whereby customary officials sat with the villagers as equals to plan their 
future development, with the aim of fostering an explicitly indigenous approach to 
development that encapsulated territorial identity, self-governance, cultural 
regeneration and ownership of land and natural resources. The model, as 
explained by the Programme Director, drew from the category-driven frames of 
‘indigenous’ values and human rights: 
‘We have a development goal, that every village in the CHT will prosper, 
they think of society, where all are equal, there is gender equality, they 
have the humanitarian moral value’. (Lisa Chakma) 
Nonetheless, the customary system remained the favoured option of villagers in 
terms of dispute resolution because of its familiarity and a value set not easily 
translated into the language of development.  
‘You can’t really describe this thing to the modern world, through the 
actions of the person, you need to understand the cooperation, the 
sincerity of the people, you have to understand the unity and 
togetherness, they have a communal understanding’. (Lisa Chakma) 
Like the UNDP, the CIPD openly supported the customary law even as their 
activities underscored and accentuated its weaknesses.  
A similar aporia occurred in relation to the explicitly legal interventions 
undertaken by the Green Hill organisation, a Chakma-led NGO working on 
programmes specifically seeking the codification of customary law, and the 
introduction of written records and standard procedures. Director Rupan 
Chakma noted; 
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‘Human life and society are not static…society is changing and customary 
law also needs to improve, to make changes in line with globalisation and 
the local socio-economic environment’. 
Rupan saw certain aspects of the customary system as targets for legitimate 
intervention, examples were hereditary appointments, the lack of resource and 
environmental knowledge of customary officials, and the gender-bias inherent in 
the rule base of most if not all indigenous communities.381 He thought the rule-set 
of the various Pahari communities should take a written form so that legal 
practices could be monitored and its ethical base sustained in the face of 
development.382 In both NGOs, a well-intentioned developmental approach to 
already re-substantiated customary institutions effected a weakening of their 
ontological difference from state law. By providing alternatives or limiting its 
jurisdiction, they invited a mercenary approach to dispute resolution that 
promoted forum shopping, increased the level of pluralism within the 
communitarian arena and weakened the identitarian aspect of the customary 
system. Development interventions thus not only inserted a rights basis into the 
customary system, but also fragmented legal choices by the introduction of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  
These externally powerful actors undoubtedly influenced behaviours within the 
customary system, but on a relatively small scale. The CIPD, for example, 
established a handful of model villages out of the 1300 villages across the 
Rangamati Circle district. The UNDP project was of greater duration and more 
generously funded, but still targeted only the most marginalised areas, and was 
thus unlikely to engender comprehensive and consistent transformations. These 
                                                        
381 Of the eleven hill communities, only the Mro nation is matrilineal.  
382 A consistent theme would emerge around corruption, that is the 
capacity of the headmen to administer the customary system ethically and 
to avoid graft. Rupan noted that he had experienced headman corruption 
and felt that codification would reduce poor practice and extortion. 
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limitations were acknowledged by research participants, who were pragmatic 
about customary institutions remaining the only source of justice for many Pahari 
in rural areas.383 At the same time, they recognised the system as rooted in values 
other than those introduced by development, expressing their feeling that 
customary law reflected Pahari culture, albeit that culture was ambiguously 
expressed.  
3.2. Advocates in Formal Courts 
Advocates of any sort have been statutorily debarred from representing parties in 
dispute resolution in the Circle system since the enactment of the CHT 
Regulations 1900. However, a strong cohort of Pahari legal advocates has 
developed mainly to represent indigenous people in the Sessions courts both in 
the circle districts and beyond.384 In Rangamati, advocates operated as lawyers 
within the state Court but were also on the borders of the customary system, 
being able to refer cases either to the customary system or advance them within 
the state system.385 Their views offered a window on the extent to which the 
                                                        
383 The largest development driven study of legal access in the CHT was 
conducted by an NGO, and confirmed the high level of usage in village 
areas. Debashish Kundu and others, ‘State of Justice in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts: Exploring Formal and Informal Justice Institutions of the 
Indigenous Communities.’ (Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC 
2011) 44. 
384 Sessions Courts were set up in the three circle districts in 2007 after a 
campaign by the Bangladesh Legal Aid Services Trust. Before that, 
applications to formal courts were made to the Chittagong District 
Sessions Court. Indigenous advocates worked both locally and in other 
District and Dhaka court. The Rangamati Bar has been operating since 
the 1970s. 
385 Many advocates were involved in community activities in others ways, 
one was actually a headman in the customary system and was working 
with the PCJSS to take a formal land claim through the state Courts.  
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Pahari were availing themselves of formal justice routes and the perceived benefits 
and barriers to doing so.386  
The advocates suggested the number of Pahari people seeking formal resolution 
of legal claims was rising, but still formed a small proportion of the overall number 
of formal lawsuits in the relatively recently convened Sessions Courts. Further, 
despite the greater availability of legal remedy in state courts, only one of the 
fifteen advocates questioned felt that the diminution of the customary system was 
desirable. The majority felt elements of the customary system needed to be 
changed, but its legal institutions still held a central symbolic and emotional value 
for the Pahari communities. Protim Roy felt that; 
 ‘ The circle system is a symbol of a civilised nation…our King is not a 
monarch, he is only the social head (or) a symbol of the community’.  
Another legal elder, Gynandra Chakma, argued that customary legal practice 
reinforced the identity of small communities of indigenous people in particular, 
maintaining the integrity of those communities and keeping the peace. Some of 
the elder advocates were, however, able to confirm that the customary system had 
undergone a renaissance since the Peace Accord having fallen into abeyance even 
before the conflict, a matter expressed by Protim Roy as a collapse of the 
customary system during the time of conflict, with it returning ‘day-by-day’ after 
the peace accord. Sushmita Chakma attributed its more recent revival first to 
attempts by the Chakma Raja to make it relevant and then to the ongoing 
involvement of NGOs in its reform.  
The advocates were first hand witnesses to the practical utility of customary 
institutions. This was expressed in terms of the accessibility of customary law, the 
                                                        
386 In the absence of formal statistics on usage. I was advised by advocates 
that though they thought some statistics were collected by the Court they 
were not made public, and they did not think that ethnic backgrounds were 
recorded.  
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speed of dispute resolution and the level of comfort felt by Pahari complainants in 
the formal courts. For villagers the cost and time spent travelling to a formal court 
was considerable, and for more vulnerable complainants such as women, the act of 
travelling itself was considered to invoke risks. The lack of formality in customary 
law, and the minimal cost of customary justice and the familiarity between 
complainants and their local representatives all made the customary system a more 
attractive option in rural disputes, to the point that most respondents would 
recommend the customary over the formal system if there was equal jurisdiction 
over a case. The Pahari had a residual fear of law enforcement and formal courts 
were perceived as hostile environments with cases conducted in Bengali rather 
than local languages.  
That said, system limitations relating to gender relations and formality were 
legitimately the subject of ongoing reform. Further, the consensual nature of the 
customary system made it ineffective in the many land disputes that had arisen 
between indigenous residents and settler residents. Though the customary system 
was formally empowered to adjudicate all land issues, and the headmen were 
meant to approve all land transfers, it could not extend to the settlers because of 
the racially charged context of land settlement. In other words, the fact that 
customary law aligned so closely with community identity placed the settler 
outside its jurisdiction. As explanation, Projon Chakma told of the many 
indigenous people who had tried to register land during the settlement crisis of 
the 1970s and 1980s, but without knowledge of the system had often done so using 
easily disputable physical markers such as trees and streams, whilst government 
forces had registered land using the formalities and language of state law. This 
had led to a common situation of overlapping registrations and settlements which 
were highly charged politically and could not be resolved in a customary court 
where only a mediated solution was viable. Even so, Pahari villagers were so 
reluctant to attend court that Projon produced an example of a villager who gifted 
five acres of land to an illegal Bengali settler just to avoid a court battle.  
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The second limitation related to the remedies available within a customary court 
and in particular, the lack of any available mechanism to enforce judgements. The 
headmen could do nothing to enforce their judgement whilst a government officer 
could implement. Sushmita Chakma felt that customary leaders had no jail so 
people could easily avoid the consequences of customary decisions, and now a 
guilty party could move abroad or to a city to avoid customary judgements. As a 
result, many headmen invited political parties into customary hearings to enforce 
their decisions. The solution for this fundamental failure in the customary system 
was perceived to be codification of customary laws.387 Hla Dhwa Prue Marma, 
the current Chair of the Rangamati Bar, highlighted the issues arising from the 
inconsistency in the way laws were applied by the chiefs, broadly ]the Chakma 
chief was progressive but the other chiefs were not.388 All of the Advocates felt 
that codification needed to be authorised through democratic rather than 
customary offices to give statutory force and consistency to customary laws.  
The third aspect of the customary system that troubled formal advocates was the 
position of women within the customary system. All but one of the eleven hill 
communities were to some extent patriarchal and patrilineal in nature, and only 
Marma community laws allowed women to inherit property formally. In addition 
to gender discriminatory personal laws, the practices and procedures within the 
customary system were prejudicial towards women. Tuku Talukder, a Chakma 
woman advocate felt that the customary system was incompatible with human 
rights and needed to be changed to bring its adjudications up to a modern 
standard. She pointed to the hereditary nature of appointments as a problem to be 
                                                        
387 Protim Roy had produced informally a codified version of the laws of all 
eleven communities with support from local NGOs. These had been 
circulated widely but the codes had not been adopted by the chiefs. Protim 
Roy is both an advocate and cousin to the Chakma chief but holds 
radically different views on codification. 
388 The example given was the difference in inheritance laws applied to the 
Marma communities in the Bohmong and Mong Circles.  
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solved, but also noted the efforts of the current Chakma chief to address the 
procedural unfairness that arose within the customary system, and to appoint a 
woman karbari in every village. Women were becoming more educated and 
demanded change, and she felt that customary officials were now more responsive 
to their needs and demands. This meant a rights-based customary system was not 
a tautology, but reform needed to be centrally driven and consistently rolled out. 
Similarly, Sushmita Chakma was optimistic about the initiatives rolled out by the 
Chakma chief in terms of gender, and felt that women were far more likely to get a 
fair settlement in the customary system now. Both women were members of the 
Women’s Resource Network, which had been working for a greater female 
representation on all local bodies, and had been closely involved in designing the 
gender-based reforms of the Chakma chief. 
The advocates appeared to support the incorporation of customary law into local 
statutory bodies, to manage better the more complex legal problems that arose in 
the CHT now its borders were effectively open for development. Paradoxically, 
the alignment of custom with democracy was perceived as a way of sustaining 
custom against other sources of justice as pluralism strengthened with the advent 
of new courts. Further, the system was perceived as being infinitely adaptable in 
ways that the state system was not, and better suited to advancing human rights as 
long as the people within it understood custom as mutable and responsive. Legal 
mobilisation of customary law was perceived clearly as an identity practice, whilst 
legal culture was seen as closely connected to the creativity and innovation of its 
practitioners, and thus dynamic and adaptable. 
3.3. Social Movements, Indigeneity and Human Rights 
In her study of the Pahari community as a social movement, Gerharz illuminated 
the alignment of indigeneity with a much broader liberal coalition of political and 
civil society influencers on the national stage, all driven by a wish to engender 
fundamental change to the centralised and majoritarian formation of the 
Bangladeshi state. She wrote that; 
 
 
161 
‘By arguing that inequality based on culture and ethnic-religious 
belonging characterises nationalism in Bangladesh, the demands 
articulated by the activists highlight models of a more democratic, 
diverse and plural society.’ 389  
Chapter three demonstrated that Jumma nationalism formed the ideological basis 
for the Pahari armed struggle before the indigenous movement was active in 
Bangladesh, and only after military action faltered were concepts of indigeneity 
strategically assimilated into the ideology of both political and customary Pahari 
activists. During the conflict, it was also the case that human rights abuses 
inflicted on the Pahari were brought to the attention of global human rights 
activists and used to exert pressure on the Bangladeshi state to desist.390 In the 
post conflict arena, as Gerharz recounts, indigeneity provided a shorthand for 
campaigns for limited self-determination and land rights that transcended the 
CHT region and the particular struggle of the Pahari. Through the strategic 
alignment of wider liberal causes with the Pahari, the discursive strands of human 
rights and indigeneity were ‘vernacularised’ for digestion in a local context.391 The 
explicit question posed in this discussion of legal culture is how or whether global 
concepts of human rights and indigeneity find explicit expression as adaptations to 
customary law. 
To describe or analyse the hugely complex social movement that has grown 
around indigenous communities in Bangladesh is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
                                                        
389 Eva Gerharz, ‘Indigenous Activism in Bangladesh: Translocal Spaces 
and Shifting Constellations of Belonging’ (2014) 15 Asian Ethnicity 552. 
390 Notably, the work by Amnesty International in publicising human 
rights abuses by the military were instrumental in causing Ershad’s 
government to negotiate with Santi Bahini. See note 45. 
391 Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), 'The Practice of Human 
Rights: Tracking Law between the Global and the Local' (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights 
and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 108 American 
Anthropologist 38. 
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but the following examples are offered as illustrations of its reach at national and 
global levels, and thus its potential impact on legal culture. The Indigenous 
Peoples Parliamentary Caucus was composed of sympathetic members of 
parliament, and since 2011 has lobbied specifically for constitutional change and 
legal recognition of indigenous people through adoption of ILO 169 and the 
UNDRIP (2012).392 The International Day of Indigenous People has been 
celebrated annually since 2008, and unites plains-land indigenous communities 
with the Pahari to raise the profile of land issues and recognition within the state 
and internationally.393 Close links between these institutions and Pahari regional 
organisations are manifold; research bodies such as the PCJSS-managed Maleya 
Foundation have been formed explicitly to connect with international indigenous 
movements. Raja Devasish Roy is a member of the United Nations International 
Working Group on Indigenous People. The environmental vulnerability of 
Bangladesh has become closely associated with indigeneity through the work of 
high-profile research groups such as the Society for Environment and Human 
Development.394 The Association of Land and Development is a federating body 
for 278 NGOs working in the field of land rights, and has paid special attention to 
the ongoing alienation of land from the Pahari people, its chief executive Samsul 
Huda noting the CHT situation as complicated by the concentration of strategic 
                                                        
392 Kamal (n 59). 
393 Eva Gerharz, ‘Indigenous Activism in Bangladesh: Translocal Spaces 
and Shifting Constellations of Belonging’ (2014) 15 Asian Ethnicity 552. 
Gerharz identifies this event and surrounding initiatives as being one of 
the primary mechanisms for generating indigenous solidarity. The author 
attended the event in 2012 and 2015, noting the presence of most major 
research bodies, a wide range of NGOs, and representation by the PCJSS 
and national Awami League politicians. 
394 SEHD has published extensively on the environmental degradation 
caused by settlement and uncontrolled development in the Hill Tracts. 
See Roy, Gain and Society for Environment and Human Development (n 
10). Philip Gain and Society for Environment and Human Development 
(Dhaka, Bangladesh) (eds), 'The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Man-Nature 
Nexus Torn' (Society for Environment and Human Development 2013). 
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and commercial army interests in the region. That the Awami League was acting 
in concert with the military made this time an unfortunate moment in history that 
necessitated a common resistance. Through the work of these organisations, 
issues of land, environment, human rights and minority recognition became 
embedded in a much wider discourse on the nature of the Bangladeshi state and 
inextricably connected to the global indigenous movement.  
An expanded example has been chosen to illustrate the transference of legal 
concepts from global to local and the possible effects of the vernacularisation of 
global discourse on the legal culture of the customary system. The CHT 
Commission was a European Union funded organisation created to monitor the 
progress the CHTPA and was peopled by international, national and Pahari 
Members. Since 1999 it conducted missions and investigations in the CHT, and 
used its international influence to draw attention to implementation failures and 
ongoing abuses of state power.395 For Commission members, the articulation 
between identity, indigeneity and human rights was elemental to securing Pahari 
rights to equal citizenship. Two of its senior Members, Khushi Kubir and Ifteqar 
Zahman,396 drew attention to the dissonance between the Awami League’s stated 
policy of CHTPA implementation and the material reality of continued 
settlement and political stasis, feeling it attributable to their shift from a 
democratic to military source of legitimacy. Commission member Shapan Adnan 
                                                        
395 The CHT Commission is funded mainly through EU funds to monitor 
the implementation of the Peace Accord. Since an attack on Commission 
members in 2014 on a mission to Rangamati, no further missions have 
been undertaken. The view of the three Commission Members 
interviewed, that is Khushi Kubir, Shapan Adnan and Iftekar Zaman, was 
the attack by a group of Bengali Settlers was commissioned by the Army, 
who then failed to offer any protection to the delegation.  
396 Khushi Kubir was a human rights activist of substantial renown, having 
working national rights-based organisations since the 1980s in the fields of 
rural development. Ifteqar Zahman is the Director of Transparency 
International Bangladesh, and has placed himself under great personal 
risk by openly challenging corruption in the state government. 
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noted that the degradation of the state experienced in the last decade explained 
the prevailing atmosphere of illegality in the CHT, contributing to the erosion of 
traditional values and the rise of marketised responses such as corruption amongst 
the Pahari communities.397  
In this difficult context, the customary system was viewed sympathetically, as a 
means to establishing a moral alternative to state disfunction. Kubir felt that 
allowing indigenous people to practice customary and personal laws was a form of 
recognition of their distinct identity. In relation to customary property and land, 
she noted that; ‘the exploitation of resources could be stopped if the customary 
laws were reinforced’, whilst acknowledging that the customary system contained 
elements that needed to be changed; ‘some part of the customary rituals, also have 
to be looked at, to ensure that is egalitarian and friendly to women’. Custom 
featured in discourse as a necessary signifier of identity and alterity but was also 
perceived as flawed by the limitations placed on its scope by the state, or more 
specifically the ongoing failure to incorporate the system into democratic 
mechanisms.398 Nirupa Dewan confirmed this aporia to an extent, but was more 
effusive about the value of customary law to communities and highlighted changes 
already being made by the Chakma Raja to addressed inherent inequalities in the 
customary system.399 Perceptions of the customary system in the context of the 
social movement were, therefore, of a system that was both elementally 
representative of a better life, and simultaneously, the target of legitimate reform.  
3.4. Summary 
Some broad tendencies at least can be drawn from this review of attitudes and 
perceptions of the customary system from those working at its borders. First, 
                                                        
397 Shapan Adnan is an independent academic specialising in land rights. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Nirupa Dewan is a Rangamati based educationalist, teacher and 
human rights activist.  
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external actors perceived the customary system as the legitimate object of etic 
change, as a domain over which influence and power could and should be 
exercised. That said, the nature of and source of that change, and the potential 
impact on legal culture differed considerably. Development driven reforms tended 
to contribute to a stronger legal pluralism by providing alternative routes to law 
and dispute resolution, and a consequent weakening of the links between 
territory, identity and law. The effects on legal culture might be the dissolution of 
customary alterity in the hope that the boundaries between community and state 
might also become less defined. A paradox therefore emerged in that stronger 
pluralism weakened the identitarian aspects of the customary system, and 
consequently increased instability and contention within the communitarian 
domain.  
There was broad support amongst the lawyers and civil society activists surveyed 
for the maintenance of strong borders to the customary system, set against state 
law. Referring again to the concept of critical communitarianism, amongst these 
latter groups, law appeared the cultural foci of mobilisation both in terms of its 
strategic utilisation to support the wider cause of Pahari autonomy within the 
state, and in terms of driving reforms and adaptations necessary to position the 
Pahari as falling with the international category of ‘indigenous’. Further, the 
utilisation of human rights discourse to throw light on the nefarious activities of 
the state was embedded in the construction of Pahari identity and legal culture. 
Influencers perceived the customary domain as highly labile, and capable of 
community-led adaptation, but all the same supported adaptations such as 
codification, and incorporation into the local councils that would introduce state 
controls over the communitarian domain. Nonetheless these reforms were clearly 
perceived as linked to democratisation and the redistribution of power away from 
the appointed custodians of the customary legal system, and were not seen as 
inconsistent with the uniquely accessible and community led customary system.  
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4. Elite Mobilisation and Consciousness 
4.1. Customary Mobilisation 
The next stage of analysis turns toward the interior of the Chakma/Pahari 
community to present the results of discussions with the elite custodians of 
customary justice, namely Chakma customary and political leaders from the 
Rangamati area. They were questioned on their perceptions of community 
leadership, the role and function of customary law particularly in relation to 
notions of community, and the theories of change applied by them to the 
customary system. Their responses reveal both commonalities and inconsistencies 
in cognitions of legal culture emanating from the Chakma leadership, but a 
surprising confluence of opinion over the necessity of mobilising customary law in 
pursuit of community autonomy, or in other words the development of law as an 
identity practice. 
4.2. The Chakma Chief 
Through historical happenstance and contemporary endeavour, the current 
Chakma chief remains the most visible and prominent of the three Circle chiefs. 
Raja Devasish Roy was head of Chakma Circle office and clan chief of the 
Chakma people, and also an international indigenous activist, academician, and 
Advocate at the Dhaka Bar. Whilst cognisant of the effects of colonial 
intervention, Roy believed in the alterity of customary legal practices, their 
necessary independence from the state and propensity for both gradual and rapid 
adaptation to material contexts. He identified the evolutionary and socially rooted 
aspects of the customary system as its major strength; 
‘Customary law I always say is like a path. If it is practised it is a custom. 
If it is not practised it is not accepted. If there is no consensus it ceases to 
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be a custom. And that I think is the positive side of customary law vis-a-
vis statutory law… customs have always evolved’. 400  
As a noted international spokesperson for indigenous rights, in both principle and 
practice Roy steered the Chakma Circle’s iteration of customary law toward 
alignment with the global indigenous peoples’ movement. He had introduced 
procedural changes to the Rangamati Circle that recognised the disadvantage of 
women seeking justice in their marital village, women’s participation in hearings, 
and children’s rights in reflection of the UNDRIP commitment to human 
rights.401 Nonetheless, Roy calibrated the inequalities experienced between 
individuals within the Customary system, with the inequalities experienced 
between the majority Bengali and the Pahari communities. Where there was a 
conflict, such as in CHT adjudications on land and inheritance, he believed the 
position of the Pahari vis-à-vis the majority/state should take precedence over the 
individual rights, and an alternative method of recognising any individual injustice 
found within the customary system. Roy might be said to represent the strongest 
perspective on the necessity and desirability of emic change to the customary 
system. He identified a legal culture in which law was absolutely embedded in 
society and indicated that changes in society must precede changes in the law. 
Reforms were carefully designed to maintain system continuity and neither 
disrupt extant legal practices, nor cause dissent amongst customary personnel, 
rather, they were intended to engender changes in legal consciousness amongst 
customary officials that would indirectly reform customary practice. In adopting 
this approach to causality, Roy articulated a legal culture imbued with an 
                                                        
400 This description was taken from a previous 2012 interview with Raja 
Devasish Roy. 
401 The reforms included a range of measures, such as requiring panels to 
include representatives of a woman’s home village, women becoming 
involved in investigations, strengthened protections against domestic 
abuse and changes to rules on child custody that emphasised the rights of 
the child. 
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anteriority to the state and the democratic institutions of the CHTPA, placing 
him at odds not only with the dominant political leaders but with most of his own 
customary personnel.  
The inherent adaptability of the customary system caused Roy to believe that a 
reformed customary system could encapsulate multiple community-based 
concepts of justice within the current territorial framework, and move all 
communities toward a common reflection of rights. He stated; 
‘Why not a customary court for everyone, including Bengalis? The formal 
courts are conducted using the adversarial system of the British, the 
judges a neutral umpire of a clash between two advocates. But the 
parties are not equal, their equality is fictive. There is no reason why (a 
customary) notion of justice would not work for all residents of the 
CHT’.  
Roy envisioned an expanded customary system offering access to justice for all the 
marginalised communities of the CHT, including Bengali settlers. This belief was 
perhaps linked to a strong opposition to the increased legal pluralism at a local 
level; for example, Roy has opposed the active campaign by the Bangladesh Legal 
Aid Services Trust (BLAST) to establish a consistent and uniform family court 
system in the CHT, precisely because he felt increased legal pluralism weakened 
customary jurisdiction.402 In this, his views as to how to serve the Bengali settler 
communities diverged from both the official state position and that of many high 
profile human right activists.403 
                                                        
402 Family Ordinance 1984 determines that all districts should have family 
courts in addition to customary arrangements. The CHT was exempt. 
Maimuna Ahmed and Sathi Muktasree Chakma, ‘Family Courts in the 
CHT: At the Intersection of Gender and Ethnic Identity’ (BLAST 2011). 
403 Most research participants felt that the divide between settler and 
Pahari was too great and too bitter to be bridged through the customary 
legal system, amongst them Shaheed Hossain of the UNDP, CHT 
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His strong belief in the bounded nature of the customary system also militated 
against reform of the system through the autonomous HDC bodies, Roy stated; 
‘My hunch would be not to go through any such formal attempts to 
reform the customary law through the district and regional councils, 
because these bodies, although two thirds of members are indigenous 
people, they are not tribal institutions, they are state institutions. They 
are not above party politics, or above electioneering. It is not very clever 
to surrender your self-determination to an institution over which you 
have no control’. 404  
Thus, Roy presented a jurisprudential interpretation of the customary system as 
already complete in terms of its structures, laws, and theory of change. He 
advocated the customary system be preserved as independent of the formal legal 
system, showing a distrust of state institutions that led him to oppose the 
subordination of the customary systems to the autonomous HDCs. His 
mobilisation of the customary system was against the state but was also a 
mobilisation for a Pahari identity that was de-historicised to the extent that it 
referenced an imaginary continuity. His legal consciousness was constructed 
around a view of the Pahari as indigenous, diverse and internally harmonious. 
Roy’s characterisation of the customary system clearly represented the legal 
consciousness of a specifically indigenous/Chakma/Pahari ‘we’. 
4.3. The Headmen 
The Chakma chief was almost universally respected as the customary leader, but 
his approach to leadership and reform of the customary system was not universally 
shared even amongst his direct henchmen. Even at this senior level of customary 
                                                        
Secretary NBK Tripura, and the PCJSS Chief Operating Officer, Shapti 
Padhu Tripura. 
404 In the Indian state of Mizoram, Chakma law has been codified under 
the auspices of the Chakma Tribal Autonomous District Council. 
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leadership, the political imperatives of customary resurgence displaced and 
frustrated the de-historicised customary domain conceptualised by the chief. A 
broad consensus on core elements of legal culture splintered in respect of the 
necessity and type of reforms needed to the system.  
The headmen have occupied a pivotal position in the customary system since 
assuming revenue collecting duties from their dewan/khisas predecessors under 
British colonial administrations. In the CHT Regulations, their duties were 
designated as collecting jum taxes and operating the appellant function of the 
customary legal system with all its attendant duties.405 They are formally 
appointed to leadership of one Mauza, a territory that will usually include about 
five villages and their appointed karbari. Positions are hereditary and patrilineal, 
though all appointments have to be approved by the Deputy Commissioner.406 
From the colonial era to the 1960s, the position of headman carried with it a 
promise of personal wealth and localised power through their entitlement to one 
third of the annual tax revenue collected on behalf of the Raja.407 Further, their 
primary responsibility for allocating Jum land and effecting all other land transfers, 
allowed them to retain the most valuable lands for personal use.408 Older research 
participants recalled a time when the headmen/dewan were wealthy, elevated and 
distant, often requiring performative acts of subordination from the villagers.  
                                                        
405 The headmen collect taxes, have sole responsibility for land mutation, 
are responsible for community leadership and fulfil the appellate function 
within the legal system, as well as locating miscreants on behalf of the state 
police in felony cases. 
406 This was considered a formality but anecdotally there have been recent 
instances of headmen’s appointments being turned down. 
407 Tax was divided into thirds, one third to the headmen, on third to the 
Raja and one third to the state. 
408 Advocate Jewel Chakma suggested land was still a source of wealth by 
some respondents, as was the ability to make (illegitimate) charges for land 
transfers.  
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The headmen’s status and income reduced drastically in the years following 
Partition; the state refused to raise levels of capitation tax to the point that it was 
so depleted by inflation that collection was purely ceremonial.409 Payment for land 
transactions has never been permitted, though there were persistent rumours 
expressed during field-work that some headmen charged for this service, and 
would alienate land to Bengali settlers at the right price.410 The headman’s 
government salary was a negligible 1000 BDT a month, far less than personnel in 
the HDCS and state village Porishad, and in spite of their necessary role in 
supplementing state police and civil jurisdictions in Pahari majority areas. Of the 
twenty-one headmen of the Rangamati Circle interviewed during field research, 
all except one combined their customary duties with other business interests or 
professions out of necessity. Many saw little benefit to their children inheriting 
their customary office. 
In self-defining their role, the headmen named their appellate function in the 
customary system as most importance, followed by their role in preserving the 
cultures and customs of the Hill Tracts. These customary roles are often 
articulated explicitly in terms of the positioning of the Chakma as an indigenous 
community in global discourse. Their expertise in land allocation was also 
mentioned frequently; whilst the headmen could not settle land disputes between 
settlers and indigenous people they could still affect transfers between indigenous 
people and also allocate jum lands for cyclical cultivation. Their social welfare 
function was defined as making sure that the landless or poor amongst the 
community were offered some sustenance in the absence of government support. 
                                                        
409 The completion of the Tax Collection cycle used to be an Annual 
Rajpunna Festival, where the headmen would present the Raja with his 
share of the monies, and would often bring gifts from the villages. When 
festivals are held now they tend to be celebrations of culture, though they 
are no longer annual events in any of the Circle areas. 
410 This perception was common amongst development actors, and 
strongly expressed by Advocate Jewel Dewan, who shared the schedule of 
fees charged by some headmen for land mutations. 
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They were also highly influential in being a conduit for information passing 
between the Raja, political leaders, development organisations and the karbari of 
the villages.  
The headmen frequently conceptualised the customary system as providing 
continuity with a prior way of life, though not always in such nuanced tones as 
their customary leader. They highlighted its role in underscoring the unique 
identities of indigenous communities, and upholding national traditions in 
personal and land laws. Customary law, in the words of one headman ‘holds 
society together’, in both a spiritual and pragmatic sense; 
‘We are different from the majority Bengali people, we have different 
cultures custom and tradition, so having customary law is important for 
that reason. There are also some things that don’t exist in national law, 
the national laws don’t recognise our laws, for example in national law 
there is a document to claim land, in the CHT there are often no 
documents, it is inherited from their parents’. (Iti Dewan) 
The social elements of the customary role were also considered elementary to the 
customary system, headmen ensured that rituals relating to birth, marriage and 
death were observed according to Chakma tradition. The customary system was 
identified as a means of managing relationships amongst the young, particularly in 
the relationships between younger boys and girls. 
‘Customary law is based on traditions that started from the beginning of 
civilisation, it’s good for us, it’s good for society…relationships must be 
recognised by society, must be endorsed by custom and tradition’. 
(Manindralal Chakma) 
This idea of society being structured by custom recurred frequently, and was 
expressly identitarian in positioning the Pahari community as antithetical to the 
unstructured, disordered nature of Bengali society. Traditions were married with 
more recent solidarities, for example, the fact that all Pahari communities could 
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practise their own customs within the customary framework was offered as 
evidence of a common indigenous identity;  
‘Every indigenous community has its own customs and traditions, the 
Taunchyangya have their own customs and the Marma have their own 
customs and traditions...it’s the customs that are defining us as 
indigenous communities, our variety’. (Sujit Dewan)  
Tradition was thus expressly presented as an assertion of the value of diversity as 
opposed to the majoritarian homogeneity associated with Bengali society and 
state law. 
Amongst headmen respondents, the efficiency of the customary approach in terms 
of the length of time taken, the cost and the practical hurdles of formal justice was 
identified as its major appeal. One example advanced was of a land case that a 
Pahari had chosen to take to a formal court. The case took six years to resolve and 
the plaintiff had to sell much of his land just to fund the action, according to 
Mrinoy Chakma, ‘formal court cases take a long time to have a verdict, in 
customary court they are very quick’. There was still no alternative to the 
customary system in many CHT areas given the relative poverty and geographical 
isolation of many villages, and the customary system was both necessary to meet 
the practical requirements of policing and dispute resolution, and valued as a 
symbolic representation of difference and independence.  
The majority of headmen did not hark back to the kind of ossified tradition 
invoked by Maine and his counterparts in the Victorian judiciary, rather they 
represented an iteration of customary law that existed in an anterior space, 
developed according to the lived practices of the Pahari and allowed cultural 
differences to be celebrated rather than homogenised. Law was mobilised in 
opposition to the state, to retain the separation of the community, and legal 
consciousness drew on both history and pragmatism to understand law as an 
arbitrative and discursive practice. Yet there was also an understanding of 
problems occurring due to the inherent inconsistency in law as practised between 
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communities, across the different geographies of the CHT and between different 
social classes. This was seen as a weakness by the more educated headmen in 
relation to karbari justice.  
‘They can all give different solutions, they can give different punishments, 
they can be partial, for example if there is a theft, the karbari can give 
three different decisions on the same set of facts’. (Babatosh Chakma) 
Thus, the very adaptability of tradition, valorised by the Chakma chief, was 
perceived as damaging to the credibility of the system due to the numerous 
versions of customary practice, both liberal and illiberal, that emerged from it. 
Despite the best efforts of the Chakma chief and the more articulate advocates of 
traditional justice, the headmen perceived these inconsistencies as garnering 
contempt from powerful state and political actors, and inviting reformist attention 
from the development players and activists who had supported previous stages of 
the struggle. The majority of the headmen, therefore, dissented from the views of 
the Chakma chief in believing greater formality was of practical benefit to the 
customary system. Opinions were divided over whether the customary system 
should be codified, but the majority of headmen supported the integration of the 
customary system with the HDCs, and the assumption of control over the system 
by the political leadership. Even whilst broadly supporting the chief’s 
conceptualisation of the customary legal culture, they saw no conflict between a 
legal culture drawn from a historical practice and indigenous identity, and the 
democratic institutions conjured into being through the highly political CHTPA. 
Indeed, integration into these structures was a legal mobilisation necessary to 
provide statutory sanction for the customary system, and reinforce the boundaries 
of community against the state. Their legal consciousness was formed from an 
understanding of precolonial Chakma tradition hybridised with the ideologies of 
nationalism and democracy formed through the insurgency. 
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4.4. The Karbari 
In the CHT Regulations, the roles of the chief and headmen were clearly 
designated as regards their revenue raising and land mutation functions whilst the 
role of the village karbari role remained mysteriously under-defined. The karbari 
was a hereditary appointed village leader who managed and policed each village, 
and supported the headmen in land management and tax collection. During 
fieldwork, karbari described a full and expansive role that is summarised below by 
Buddha Chakma, who inherited the karbari office on the death of his Father in 
2014; 
‘Amongst my duties is to change the ownership of a piece of land, I have 
to make a recommendation to the headmen. Then the headman will 
activate the registration of the land or the mutation. I also help the 
headman to collect the taxes in my village. There are also disputes in my 
village, internal disputes, in relation to land and family. There are 
problems, women related, guest relations,411sometimes there are family 
disputes, husband and wives quarrelling and beating wives, and some 
people occupy other peoples’ lands’. (Buddha Chakma) 
Buddha Chakma’s analysis of the karbari role was fulsome in covering the social, 
development and dispute resolution functions described by most karbari 
participants in research, and reflecting the headmen’s definition of their role as it 
should be practised. In his judicial role, Buddha was clear that land cases were 
dealt with by headman and karbari, but personal cases were heard by him in 
public and he was solely responsible for arbitrating a settlement. In individual 
disputes law was mobilised to maintain the autonomy of the village and legal 
consciousness perceived law as a means of returning the village to equilibrium;  
                                                        
411 Guest Relations is a translation of ‘Gorba Hudum’, a ceremony that 
checks family trees for conformity with Chakma Law prior to a Chakma 
marriage.  
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‘Obviously in a prosecution there is a loser but I try to make an 
agreement, not the win or lose thing but a settlement’. (Buddha Chakma) 
Variety, however, characterised the karbari’s perception of their role.  Within each 
locality it appeared highly dependent on the relative power of the karbari to other 
sources of community leadership, be that the headman or local political activists.  
The hereditary route to the karbari position was no longer the sole route into 
office. In 2015, Rani Yan-Yan, a respected civil rights activist in addition to her 
formal duties, drove a fundamental change to the customary system with the 
introduction of female karbari chosen by their community for their competency 
alone.412 The longer-term objective of the initiative was having a female karbari in 
every village, at the time of field research over one hundred appointments had 
been made. The process described by Rani Yan-Yan in bringing about this 
fundamental reform was instructive in demonstrating the different approaches to 
mobilisation within the customary system, even when the objective, this time of 
gender equality, was shared. Her initial approach had been to change the rules of 
the customary system to allow women to inherit the office of karbari, but this had 
been opposed by chief Devashish Roy, not because he opposed women’s full and 
equal participation in the customary system, but because he felt such wholesale 
change would be experienced as sudden and unwelcome amongst the majority of 
customary practitioners given the slow and incremental progress being made 
toward gender parity in rural areas. Rani Yan-Yan’s narrative of this reform is 
worth recounting in detail; 
‘We both understood that ensuring women participation in the justice 
system would warrant women’s voices being heard, but would not 
necessarily guarantee that women’s assessment /resolution would be 
taken on board while placing the verdict; unless women hold leadership 
                                                        
412 Rani Yan-Yan is Queen of the Chakma peoples and of the Chakma 
Circle. 
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position in the customary system. Since there was no wide consensus 
among general people (especially among the karbari) that women should 
inherit karbari-ship in the existing customary system, we had to come up 
with an alternative way by which we could see women playing leadership 
roles in the society. It would not only empower women in our society 
(not only the women leaders but also women, in general) but also would 
pave the way to naturalise the idea that women can be traditional 
leaders’. 
The introduction of women karbari to the customary system represented a form of 
legal mobilisation that synthesised external influences, in this case human and 
gender rights, with the foundational structures of the customary system to effect 
change in law and society. The effect of one such appointment, Rini Chakma, on 
the women in her village usefully illustrated the effects of such mobilisation. 
Whilst not strictly legal, the existence of a leadership structure in which women 
were expressly recognised and involved instigated changes in consciousness that 
would inevitably affect the conduct of customary law. In Rini’s case, the CIPD 
development organisation had supported the village in setting up a Woman’s 
Samiti (committee), and identifying candidates for karbari. Their story continues 
below. 
‘Before the Women’s Samiti, we had to struggle, that is our history, we 
were alone, but we were not together. When the CIPD came we were 
shy, some of the women were in teaching posts, so they were asked to put 
together a platform so they could tell their stories. Rina was told she was 
a natural, so she was made karbari. (CIPD) gave advice and support in 
setting up the Samiti. Before that, we only knew each other by their 
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children’s names, but now we know our personal names. We have 
become friends’. 413 
The solidarity expressed by the women villagers was reflected in numerous 
practical initiatives led by Rini Chakma in her karbari role, which included a 
savings club, collective cultivation, practising the art of conversation, learning to 
write and even learning the Chakma alphabet. Now the women reported that; 
‘We are very much happy they made the karbari through the Samiti, we 
can now talk without hesitation…When we face problems or need money 
we can go to the karbari or to the Samiti for help. If we get to the karbari 
quickly they can solve these problems, if the karbari is a lady we feel a lot 
better’.  
Giving sustenance to the chief’s argument for emic change, Rini Chakma and her 
woman colleagues argued strongly that their empowerment through customary 
reform had irrevocably changed the balance of power in their local community. In 
the village, customary institutions were mobilised expressly to challenge male 
power and develop female solidarity. 
4.5. Political Mobilisation  
At the time of field research, the PCJSS remained the most powerful regional 
political force, with the former insurgent leader, Santu Larma ensconced as the 
appointed leader of the Regional Council, and the PCJSS party dominating 
urban and rural politics in the Rangamati Circle. To the north their main 
opposition, the anti-peace accord UDPF dominated the Khagrachari Circle area, 
                                                        
413 A meeting was held with approximately forty women at Rini’s village, 
located around an hour’s boat ride from Rangamati. Though some men 
attended they were told to sit at the back and not participate in 
discussions. 
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and held power in the Sebakkon Mouza area of the Rangamati Circle.414 Though 
both parties are Chakma-dominated, their political perspectives represented 
ostensibly oppositional narratives of the efficacy of customary law and captured an 
essence of the splintering ideological positions of elite political protagonists. The 
following section explores their respective perspectives on customary law, their 
formal policies in respect of its mobilisation, and concludes by theorising their 
impact on legal consciousness.415 
4.6. PCJSS 
Chapter three demonstrated that recognition of Pahari rights to land and territory 
lay at the intersection of Constitution, legislation and customary provisions, with 
customary law central to proposals for settling land claims arising from the 
conflict, and aligned through the CHTPA with the administrative arrangements 
for ceding regional territorial autonomy.416 Customary law was mobilised in 
support of these central elements of PCJSS policy, their joining of the Wagachara 
                                                        
414 A Reformist wing of the PCJSS is also gaining political strength in the 
Rangamati and Khagrachari Circle areas, and its leaders were interviewed 
during field research. Few were prepared to be open about the reasons for 
the split in the party, but informal conversations suggest that they objected 
mainly to the highly centralised and undemocratic leadership of Santu 
Larma. Their policy positions in relation to the customary system 
remained very similar to the PCJSS, however, believing it to be the 
necessary object of external reform. Similar splinters have occurred within 
the UPDF but again appear driven not by ideological differences but by 
struggles for power. 
415 This summary of the attitudes toward customary law and legal 
mobilisation was constructed largely from discussions with Ushatan 
Talukder MP, Shapti Padhu Tripura, PCJSS Chief Operating Officer, 
Mangal Kumar Chakma, Chief Press Officer, and Youth leader Trinijon 
Chakma. A number of other PCJSS activists were interviewed during 
fieldwork, but their views followed this expression of PCJSS policy. 
416 See chapter three, section 4.4. The CHTPA provided for a Land 
Commission to resolve outstanding land claims by reference to custom, 
meaning that customary land allocations would take precedence over 
government sponsored registrations made in the period of conflict.  
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Supreme Court case, for example, and their support for the Giptoli Mouza 
headman in suing the Forest Department. At the time of research however, the 
Land Commission Amendment Act was still awaiting enactment, HDC elections 
had not taken place and there had been no political movement on the issues of 
Bengali settlement. These political setbacks not only rendered ineffective the local 
mobilisation of customary law to support outstanding issues of land settlement, 
but contributed to a wider disaffection by some participants with both customary 
leaders and political representatives.  
Nevertheless, the historical connection between customary laws and land 
settlement were explicitly invoked in conversations with the PCJSS about legal 
culture. Shapti Tripura conceptualised the originality of the system as being its 
role in regulating jum cultivation and technology. Customary land laws were 
important for the protection of the forests in that cultivation cycles were managed 
so as to steward the natural world rather than displace it. Additionally, he found it 
difficult to imagine an alternative system for enforcing social norms, customary 
law was; 
‘Closely related to the life and culture of the indigenous people, there is 
an importance of customary leadership, in development, in protection of 
culture, and in the livelihoods of the indigenous people, in justice, and in 
our belief systems’. (Shapti Tripura)  
Nonetheless, PCJSS leadership clearly distinguished the traditional/customary 
system in its precolonial form from the ‘feudal’ system of British invention, Mangal 
Kumar arguing that ‘the feudal system was not democratic so the feudal system 
and the traditional system are not the same’. Colonial dominance produced rigid 
class structures absent from precolonial governance, which in turn spawned 
grandiose and oppressive behaviours amongst some customary officials.417 PCJSS 
                                                        
417 Examples offered included the colonial requirement for all male CHT 
residents to provide free labour to the chiefs for 8 days a year, and the 
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leadership confirmed that during the insurgency, the anti-feudal elements of Santi 
Bahini ideology were directed at addressing these ostensibly British inventions, 
democratising the customary system, and recovering the unifying elements of its 
precolonial form.  
PCJSS discussants were consistent in their belief that the system needed 
democratisation, even whilst accepting its vital role in maintaining order and 
preserving unique indigenous cultures. They recognised the Circle system only 
insofar as it sustained autonomous regulation of social conduct, and so 
underscored community independence from the state. When control over the 
system was transferred to the HDCs, however, reforms would be directed at 
homogenising legal practices between the customary system, local democratic 
bodies, and with the prevailing democratic structures of the state. 
‘The traditional system is traditional, it is an old system …so opinion 
should be adjusted according to the democratic system, with the HDC, 
with the reality of society, the structure of the state, and the reality of this 
structure of the world…(it) has so many limitations, so we say you must 
change those things that are not suitable for a democracy’ . (Shapti 
Tripura)  
They commonly perceived its main weaknesses to be the hereditary appointment 
of headmen, a failure to empower women, a lack of democracy and a failure to 
adhere to human rights doctrines within the system. Its future was communitarian 
in being located in the immediate and the local, but with its laws and practices 
moulded and shaped to fit the contemporary social mores. Customary officials at 
all levels were also perceived as problematic; 
                                                        
behaviours of chiefs and headmen in requiring acts of supplication, such as 
taking off shoes when walking past them. 
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‘Many headmen are not aware of their powers or their functions, some 
are illiterate. In Nakanchari Upazilla they gave lands to outsiders, 
depriving local people of their rights. The PCJSS is addressing the 
matter with the Circle chiefs. The Chakma Raja is very cooperative, the 
Bohmong and Mong Raja are not so cooperative’ .(Mangal Kumar 
Chakma)  
The slow progress on CHTPA implementation, and the political activist’s 
perception of low capacity in the customary system appeared to have strained 
relations between the political parties and the three Circle chiefs. PCJSS leaders 
also resented that failure of the state to invest in the customary system despite its 
critical role in maintaining social order in rural settings. Elsewhere in Bangladesh, 
the state funded village councils (Porishad), but in the CHT the customary 
system was subject to continuing neglect.418  
‘If you go to the plain land, the Toxillar 419has an office and a salary of 
20000, but the headman receives only 1000 taka, they have no office. It is 
quite impossible.  The customary governance system has an important 
role to keep stability and protect their culture and heritage’. (Shapti 
Tripura) 
Previously the complexities surrounding the customary system have been alluded 
to, in that political and customary actors are often one and the same, occupying 
positions within their respective parties and holding official customary positions. 
A large number of Chakma headmen were closely associated with the PCJSS, 
                                                        
418 On the plains the village Porishad was equivalent to a parish council. In 
Pahari villages, the karbari took on the same role. In this sense the state 
relied on the customary system to discharge mainstream administrative 
functions. Similarly, the state remained reliant on customary officials to 
police the villages, a system very similar to the colonial in the expectation 
that headmen would apprehend and hand over those suspected of serious 
criminal offences. 
419 Land Agent. 
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and even if not, most would take part in activities organised by the headmen’s 
Association, an informal grass roots association of headmen chaired by Shapti 
Tripura, and heavily sponsored by the PCJSS. Headmen interviewed for this 
project were for the most part members of the Association, many offering similar 
views of the customary system insofar as the respective failures of the state to 
invest in their offices, and the chiefs to provide the necessary support and influence 
in government. Headmen’s Association members expressed common concerns 
over the apparent inability of the chiefs either to offer a united front to 
government, or to engage directly with their political concerns.420  
Amongst headman respondents, however, despite their expressly political 
affiliations and interests, law was still perceived to be a separate system governed 
by a normative framework rooted in common community values. Formally, the 
PCJSS leadership also professed support for the customary system in its entirety, 
and expressed a commitment to work with the customary leadership to 
democratise the system internally. Further, they supported the initiatives of the 
Chakma Raja in addressing the issues of women’s rights and human rights in the 
discharge of justice. Nevertheless, the Party maintained a presence in most 
villages within a highly centralised chain of command, describing their relation to 
local governance as follows: 
‘There is a branch of the PCJSS in every village and every Thana. The 
form is to have a branch structure that has a forum at Thana Level and at 
Upazilla level. It’s not an alternative government, that was before the 
Peace Accord. After the Peace Accord we formed new organisations 
both centrally and at village level’. ( Mangal Kumar Chakma) 
                                                        
420 Vocal criticism at the Headman’s Conference in 2016 were mainly 
levelled at the Bohmong and Mong chiefs for failing to engage. The 
Chakma chief and the Chakma Rani both attended the Conference. Note 
that in previous conversations with the Mong chief, his refusal to attend 
related to Chakma dominance of the Conference.  
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The new village committees, sometimes referred to as peace committees, did not 
have any formal judicial function and were conceived as local democratic 
organisations. They were usually supported by a youth committee, attributed with 
a social and political purpose in engaging constructively with local youth. Trinijon 
Chakma, the current PCJSS youth leader, described their approach to 
engagement with the customary legal practice; 
‘Our policy is always to try to refer cases to the headmen and karbari to 
resolve. If they do not resolve then it is a failure, then they try to resolve 
through the headmen and karbari by giving advice in this way. We 
recognise customary law because our national identity and our traditional 
systems need to be preserved’. (Trinijon Chakma) 
Locally, however, the modus operandi of local PCJSS committees was influenced 
by the Mouza and village location, local demography, and the capacity and 
inclinations of local customary officials. Where there were serious concerns about 
the capacity of customary leaders, these manifested in political interventions in 
both judicial hearings and community leadership. Further, the Party faced its own 
problems in maintaining control over local party organisation in the face of the 
difficult terrain and poor communication links that still characterised the Hill 
Tracts. Shapti Tripura accepted that conflicts arose between local party 
operatives and customary functionaries on the ground, but justified a protective 
role for his cadres.  
‘Relationship between activists, sometimes (it) is not good, there are so 
many causes of that. But consider that the PCJSS is acting in the 
interests of the people… the PCJSS is seen as the leader, (the people) 
depend on the PCJSS for all matters. If the captain of the army beats a 
citizen and the citizen goes to the headman, the headman replies that he 
has no power, because he has no courage. If he goes to the leader of the 
PCJSS, we would arrange a protest and a rally, so people will relate to 
the leaders of PCJSS’. (Shapti PadhuTripura) 
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He noted that the ideal of customary enforcement based on cohesion, equilibrium 
and consent was highly problematic in a society now more mobile, educated and 
informed than ever before. The legal culture described by the chief and his 
headmen appeared both idealistic and highly suspect in this light, insofar as they 
conceptualised a harmony and completeness to the customary system that 
appeared illusory in the context of rapid development and continuous post-conflict 
violence. The realpolitik expressed by the PCJSS, however, encompassed these 
realities in a view of indigenous legal culture as both historically situated and 
entirely mutable. Their legal consciousness was expressly political, demonstrating 
a constant calibration of the strategic efficacy of support for and intervention in the 
customary system. 
4.7. United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) 421 
The main regional opposition in Rangamati is the UPDF, which holds power in 
the northern Sebakkon area bordering its Mong Circle stronghold. Though a 
democratic force in these areas, the UPDFs fundamental opposition to the Peace 
Accord, its open refusal to disarm, and its continued participation in sectarian 
violence has garnered frequent calls for its proscription as terrorist organisation by 
state and military sources. Its continuing hold on power suggests that opposition 
to the Peace Accord, or at least despair at its failures, elicits substantial popular 
support.  
UPDF leadership adopted an explicitly Marxist ideological stance in relation to 
the contemporary relevance of the customary system and were more explicitly 
                                                        
421 This summary of UPDF policy toward the customary system was 
drawn from two discussions with Chairman Rabi Sankar Kumar, and 
from a workshop with customary officials from the Sebakkon area. They 
were keen to point out that the UPDF grew from the civil society 
organisation of the Hill Peoples Federation in the 1990s and had never 
been affiliated with either the JSS or its successor party the PCJSS. 
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critical of its practices than the PCJSS. According to Chairman Rabi Sankar 
Kumar;  
‘Headmen and karbari are part of…feudal institutions. They are 
outdated, they had a role in the past in maintaining law and order in 
society, not many people care about them now. They need our help, 
nobody goes to the karbari court anymore because they cannot enforce 
their decisions’. (Rabi Sankar Kumar)  
The re-assertion of the customary system before the Peace Accord, and the 
accommodation reached between the Chakma chief and the PCJSS was a 
‘compromise with feudalism’. As non-signatories to the Peace Accord they 
believed this accommodation was not only unnecessary but undesirable in that 
claims for usufruct rights were ineffectual in the context of the pro-development 
Bangladeshi state. Rabi Shankar Kumar confronted the paradox of the circle 
system openly, highlighting the contradictions of customary institutions that were 
both; 
 ‘Protective but …also representing a lower stage of development. If we 
had land ownership the Bengalis would not have been able to take our 
land away. The government thinks that all lands are owned by (them) but 
we still think of them as community land’. (Rabi Sankar Kumar)  
In attributing a culpability to the customary system for the loss of Pahari lands, 
they conveyed an assessment of communal rights as of lesser value than individual 
rights, drawing specific attention to the marginalising effect of colonial 
protections on the Pahari, and conceptualising customary law as a form of 
arrested development. At the level of strategy at least, the UDPF expressed an 
outright rejection of the customary system and the desire to supplant it with a 
more contemporary and accountable structure. 
The UPDF also differed from the PCJSS considerably in its internal 
organisation. They had a leader and central organisation to design and implement 
policy, one example offered was their recent attempts to increase political 
 
 
187 
representation of indigenous women, both in the Hill Tracts and in the migrant 
community of Chittagong where many women worked in the garment industry. 
Yet the UPDF chose not to emulate the ‘cult of personality’ they saw in high 
profile leaders such as Santu Larma and Sheikh Hasina, and preferred a 
decentralised model of local party organisation which delegated considerable 
flexibility to local activists to decide on appropriate local structures. Rabi Sankar 
Kumar reported that as regards their village committees; 
‘We have own organisations in villages…in some villages the election (of 
officials) is almost a festival…Often the villages get together amongst 
themselves and decide, it’s not a formal election, the membership is not 
imposed by the party…In some areas and cases, the karbari are included 
in these committees’. (Rabi Sankar Kumar) 
Their rejection of the customary system was founded on severe doubts as to the 
efficacy and reliability of customary law in delivering justice, and, as with the 
PCJSS, these doubts coalesced around concerns about the honesty and capacity 
of customary functionaries.  
‘We are ambiguous about the headmen and karbari – they are responsible 
for land alienation, we know they take bribes, and they give land to 
settlers, and there are many cases where they have taken money from 
settlers’. (Rabi Sankar Kumar)  
Nevertheless, they placed local democracy above their ideological position, and 
still pragmatically incorporated customary functionaries into their local committee 
system if the villagers felt it appropriate, Their involvement was contingent on the 
locality, the nature of the karbari and headmen, and local activists’ approach to the 
customary system. Rabi Sankar noted that: 
‘We would be happier if we didn’t have to get involved, if you get involved 
in disputes you cannot pacify both parties to the case, you have to give a 
decision in favour of one person …but we have to, because there is no 
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alternative, there is no law…so whatever way there is a human rights 
issue’.  
The positions of the two main political parties therefore suggested a marked 
ideological difference in the extent to which the existing customary legal system 
was mobilised as a focus of resistance to the state and as a practice of identity. 
Ostensibly the PCJSS recognised both its pragmatic utility and cultural 
resonance; the boundaries of the customary system aligned with the Pahari 
community and the territorial borders of the CHT. They strategically deployed a 
vision of a precolonial legal culture to support the ideology of Jumma nationalism; 
customary law was mobilised to support recognition of land rights and the 
consecration of community difference. Meanwhile, the UPDF rejected wholesale 
a conceptualisation of local law based on a feudal system, and admitted a 
preference for creating democratic systems to govern villages. Ideologies aside, 
however, both party responses suggested a similarly ambiguous and contingent 
approach to village justice, a disregard for the completeness of the customary 
system as posited by customary protagonists, and a willingness to incorporate or 
supplant the customary system if requested or required by shortcomings in the 
local legal constellations at a village level. Legal mobilisation at highly local village 
sites appeared explicitly aimed at strengthening local party bases by linking 
dispute resolution to political power and the use of force. Law was experienced by 
the PCJSS as a practice of identity, but on the basis that identity itself had been 
transformed by the conflict. Custom had no place in the legal consciousness of the 
UPDF leadership, who saw local law as an essential function but one that should 
be experienced as part of a democratic process, marking a sharp divide between 
the feudalism of the colonial past, and the possible egalitarianism of a Chakma 
future.  
5. Imperfect Law 
This concluding section contains observations on this recantation of elite attitudes 
toward CHT customary law, drawing on the conceptual lens of critical 
communitarianism to surmise how legal mobilisation against the state contributes 
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to practices of identity and legal consciousness. The aspect of legal mobilisation 
most relevant being the notion that legal discourse can be deployed to cement 
identities and ideologies, and legal consciousness being the way people participate 
in the construction of legality, and understand the relevance of law to their lives.  
5.1. Legal mobilisation and Identity 
The views of external and internal actors appeared to cohere over the core 
elements of legal culture, many of which were emotive symbols of indigenous 
identity. The first was the custodianship of communal land rights offered by the 
customary system, and the articulation between these rights and the territorial 
integrity of the Hill Tracts. Though invoked in support of a material claim to land, 
the cultural aspect was still present in the connections made by respondents 
between communal ownership and Jumma nationalism. The second aspect was 
less easily definable, but was nonetheless mentioned by most Pahari respondents, 
and related to the alterity of the customary system, the role it played in regulating 
Pahari society, and providing a space for the diversity of indigenous nations to 
flourish. These more nebulous aspects of the customary system were recognisably 
cultural in being connected to its relatively accessible and informal nature, and 
communitarian in reflecting a desire for a form of law that was rooted in the 
immediate and the local of community rather than in the power of the state. Both 
aspects of legal culture appeared in articulation with the category of indigenous 
contained in the UNDRIP, suggesting that through connection with external 
actors and involvement in the wider social movement nationally and globally, the 
legal culture of the Pahari peoples had been shaped by the transport of ideas 
between local, national and global sites. The views of elite Pahari representatives 
appeared to cohere as to the legal mobilisation of customary institutions against 
the state, in support of broad claims to territory, and even broader understandings 
of culture. 
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5.2. Legal Consciousness and Change 
Both state and Pahari representatives understood the environment as legally 
plural in the sense that the customary legal system existed alongside state law. 
However, the idea of customary law being subordinated within a state hierarchy 
was more difficult to sustain. Within village locations state law did not impinge on 
localised dispute resolution and state courts were reported as out of reach to the 
majority of indigenous citizens. In terms of future development there was a split in 
opinion over whether access to state law should be improved. The state 
representative advocated for an extension of sessions courts to serve settlers and to 
open legal choices to the Pahari, positing law as a possible source of inclusion for 
the indigenous people. Rights-based organisations, such as BLAST and the 
UNDP, sought stronger pluralism to ameliorate the patriarchy of customary law. 
For customary and political leaders, however, greater legal choice was perceived 
as diluting Pahari autonomy and subverting the identitarian role played by law in 
underscoring Jumma/Pahari identity.  
This introduced a tension into the customary arena which contributed to the 
reconstruction of customary legal institutions as a mirror opposite to their static, 
timeless characterisation. This thesis concludes that in order to defend against the 
encroachment of state law, notions of rights and gender equality were absorbed 
into customary institutions. The capacity for emic change was integral to the 
resurgence of custom and its positioning as the foci of resistance to the state by 
both customary leaders and the PCJSS, and formative of customary legal 
consciousness amongst the PCJSS and customary actors. The UPDF 
distinguished their policies towards localised justice by reference to the same 
concepts, calling for a new and separate system to be created that encapsulated 
modernity, but still viewed their preferred reconstruction as closely aligned with 
the struggle for territorial integrity and cultural recognition, There appeared, 
therefore a relationship between the pressure to increase legal choice and 
strengthen legal pluralism, and the response of customary actors in terms of 
theories of change. In effect, the positioning of state law as superior, either by 
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government representatives or human rights activists caused those with power in 
customary institutions to address the imperfections in those institutions. The 
result was a synthesis between the customary system’s arbitrated community-
focused approach to legal adjudication and a new consciousness of rights.  
5.3. Critical communitarianism 
In conclusion it appeared that the forces that conjured revitalised custom from the 
wreckage of conflict and displacement found expression in a legal culture 
characterised by internal plurality, dynamism and constant reinvention. Resisting 
pressure from state and development actors to increase Pahari routes to law 
necessitated internal reform and adaptation to the revitalised customary system. 
Power struggles between elites appeared to accelerate their respective 
commitment to internal reform, effecting a redistribution or diffusion of power 
within the communitarian realm, from hereditary male leaders to women in the 
case of the chiefs reforms, from customary to democratic institutions in the case of 
the PCJSS and the social movement, and from hereditary and unaccountable 
customary custodians to ostensibly democratic village committees in the case of 
the unofficial reforms hinted at by politician participants. This thesis concludes 
that power struggles within the Chakma/Pahari had the effect of destabilising 
traditional elites and decentring power, creating scrutiny of every facet of 
customary law, inviting institutional reform from below and translating concepts 
of indigeneity and human rights from national and global discourse to augment 
law in its localised form. 
Communitarian law in the CHT was the cultural foci of resistance to state law, 
and was mobilised by the elite to sustain the integrity of the communitarian 
domain, ergo the characteristics of critical communitarianism were present in the 
broad commonalities reported by research participants. At the same time, the 
fracturing of Pahari solidary was noticeably present, their perspectives combined 
to paint, in broad strokes, a legal culture defined by communitarian values which 
were themselves unstable and often in conflict, and by a constant decentring and 
distribution of power within community. The next chapter tests these findings in a 
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closer analysis of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness in village locations in 
the Rangamati area. From this complex and paradoxical pluralism, it presents an 
observation of the effects of the mobilisation of customary law as the locus of 
opposition to the state on legal culture in its most localised manifestation, that of 
the village court. 
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Chapter Five. CHT Village Practice  
1. Outline 
1.1. Diversity and Method 
So far, this thesis has used a broad cultural inquiry into attitudes and mobilisation 
to demonstrate the postcolonial legal form of classical pluralism has created an 
arena in which a critical communitarianism has developed. Strategies of legal 
mobilisation by Pahari leaders and influencers have been shown, perhaps 
paradoxically, to support a structure of the state-in-dominance; precisely because 
state recognition is understood to strengthen community autonomy. Customary 
law has been mobilised against state law, and Pahari participants have 
participated in the construction of a legality that draws from historical narratives, 
local and universal ideologies and global and national movements. Finally, it has 
been suggested that multiple and competing legal mobilisations generate a 
dispersal of power within the boundaries of the Pahari community. This chapter 
connects these complex narratives to village level legal culture, mobilisation and 
consciousness, already defined to some extent by their raucous diversity.  
This diversity was and is inextricably connected to the hilly topography. From the 
gradual, radiating pacification of the colonial era to the later military stalemate of 
the insurgency, the hills themselves framed Pahari experiences of war, politics, 
justice and development, producing material differences depending on variables of 
proximity to the centres of political, legal and administrative power. Geography, 
nationality and culture correlated to some extent in that smaller communities 
favoured the most inaccessible places, such as the high mountain settlements 
rather than the valleys and cultivable agrarian lands of the Chakma.422 In the 
                                                        
422 Roy, Gain and Society for Environment and Human Development 
(Dhaka, Bangladesh) (n 10). 
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previous chapter, it was shown that whether in relation to state strategies to 
increase access to formal justice, the rights-based reforms of the Chakma raj, or 
the stated policies of the PCJSS toward customary justice, participants 
recognised that centrally defined ideologies and imperatives did not always hold at 
the periphery. Field research confirmed that messages dispersed from elites in the 
centres of power travelled slowly to their representatives, used circuitous routes 
and arrived at their destinations diluted, and even transformed by the process of 
translation.  
This variegation in experience created further methodological problems in 
researching legal mobilisation and consciousness in the CHT. Accounts of law 
and political activism provided solely by elite community members were, by their 
own accounts, unlikely to reflect fully ground level legal practice particularly in 
those areas where communications with the centre were less than reliable. 
Similarly, experiences of law and justice in or close to the urban centre of 
Rangamati could not be assumed to represent practice in rural areas. For the 
researcher, travel to the rural areas was severely restricted by state and military 
diktat. Whilst these conditions and constraints could not be entirely overcome, 
this chapter ameliorates by marrying general insights into customary cases with 
case studies of broadly representative villages, selected to demonstrate the range 
of Chakma/Pahari experiences, and in the process identifies common elements of 
those experiences. 
Analyses in this chapter first apply concepts of legal mobilisation and 
consciousness to personal, land and criminal cases related by their adjudicators, 
and where possible relate these case experiences from the perspectives of those 
personally involved. In the second part, attention turns to apply concepts of legal 
mobilisation and consciousness to the wider context of justice in three localities, 
illustrating the different ways in which community members navigate the 
complexities of the communitarian legal sphere. The questions posed are, how is 
customary law mobilised to resist the state and as a practice of identity? What 
 
 
195 
struggles for power frame the practice of law, and, finally, how do they affect legal 
consciousness? 
2. Village Culture  
2.1. Mobilisation and Pluralism 
The sub-concept of legal mobilisation not only captures the deployment of law as 
a cultural resource, but also refers to the way it is utilised by community members, 
a matter now explored with reference to the views of the headmen and karbari 
who work within the system.423 The first part interrogates actual levels of 
customary utilisation of the customary system, and the possible relationship 
between the extent to which the Chakma turn to customary law for help, and the 
multiplying routes to justice in the Hill Tracts.  
Customary officials surveyed for this project tempered their claims that customary 
justice was the primary form of dispute resolution in the villages with a pragmatic 
acknowledgement that it was no longer the sole means of settling disputes. It was 
not possible to quantify this trend precisely due to the informal nature of the 
customary system; justice was dispensed through informal, community based, oral 
processes, there was no consistent collation or analysis of customary case data. 
The majority of headmen and karbari interviewed for this study reported 
anecdotally that case numbers were decreasing year on year, with most headmen 
hearing in the region of ten cases per annum. But, despite a perceived reduction in 
caseloads, it appeared that most headmen and karbari were confident that in 
village locations, only a very small number of disputes were taken outside the 
communitarian arena, where that arena was defined to include local political 
parties willing to dispense informal justice. Headmen believed that in any case 
most disputes were settled satisfactorily without their input at a karbari/village 
level where record keeping was more sporadic. A number attributed the reduced 
                                                        
423 Pg. 64 
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caseloads to higher levels of development, and more educated, less fractious 
villagers.  
That said, each mauza and village was affected by diverse sets of condition that 
included demographic factors such as the level of Bengali settlement, physical 
factors such as proximity to the urban centre of Rangamati, economic factors such 
as the dominant mode of production, and personal factors such as the capacity and 
inclination of local headmen, karbari and political activists. These conditions 
affected local needs for policing and dispute resolution in Pahari areas, and 
produced highly localised constellations of power and competing systems of local 
justice from within the communitarian arena. In more urbanised areas elected 
members were called upon more regularly to settle local disputes, sometimes with 
the assistance of customary officials and sometimes without.424 In village Mauzas, 
however, political activists were most likely to affect customary usage through an 
unauthorised and often unacknowledged usurpation of or interference with the 
customary system. Practitioners reported that party activists frequently assumed a 
role in dispute resolution, sometimes in concert with customary officials but 
sometimes independently.425 Indeed, some headmen and karbari felt that the 
reduction in customary caseload was due to the deterrent effect of the violence of 
political punishments meted out through informal justice systems. Whatever the 
balance of power between state, customary and political actors, however, the 
striking similarity was that despite the apparent state-in-dominance legal 
hierarchy, the communitarian domain exhibited a strong internal plurality through 
the introduction of political routes to justice. 
                                                        
424 Seeking dispute resolution through elected Upazilla Porishad 
Chairman.is a right transplanted to the CHT from the plainlands. 
425 Some headmen thought the increased presence of alternative systems of 
justice at a local level affected the number of appellate cases. Three 
headmen respondents were no longer hearing any cases due to the political 
problems they experienced in their Mouzas, indeed two were unable to 
return to their villages. 
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2.2. Legal Process and Culture 
Discussions revealed a consistent process that co-opted socially respected elders, 
and community within the locality to take part in customary hearings. All 
headmen and karbari participants suggested that after a case was brought to 
them, usually by way of a written note, a committee or panel would be established 
that reflected the subject matter and seriousness of the case. Membership of 
panels included teachers, social workers, farmers, and on occasions the elected 
members of the local upazilla porishad. The majority of participants were aware of 
the Chakma chiefs reform directives, all mentioned their attempts to involve 
women in the decision-making process, and half of the headmen interviewed had 
appointed women karbari. Headmen and karbari described their customary role 
as facilitating or negotiating justice based on a broad consensus within the 
community, rather than being a judge in the sense of a state court. This was 
frequently referred to as a positive facet of customary justice when compared to 
the state system; customary justice sought practical solutions that would satisfy 
both participants and onlookers, rather than decisions that would create winners 
and losers and stoke tensions within the community. In this light, the 
appointment of a panel of respected leaders was the first step in gaining a wider 
consensus for the ultimate decision. Some respondents felt that this more 
democratic process was itself a transformation, recalling a time when headmen 
and karbari were powerful enough to make decisions unilaterally. Headmen’s 
power, it appeared, had shifted from an institutional foundation to one based on 
mutuality and community consent. 
Customary law was mobilised as a counterbalance to development, and the 
process followed reflected the need to reinforce the alterity of the Chakma/Pahari. 
Participants felt that the development they had experienced after the CHTPA 
was, on balance, beneficial to their community, citing the expanded transport 
network, the development of schools and education, access to electricity and the 
expansion of agricultural technology as the ways in which the lifeworld of the 
indigenous people had been improved since 1997. The negative effects were felt in 
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the dissolution of notions of community and culture; the infiltration of Bengali 
and Indian cinema, fashion and even pornography were identified as affecting the 
way the youth perceived their own culture. In all responses, cases relating to the 
personal laws of community predominated and amongst them, the trends were 
toward dealing with illicit relationships and elopements, marital discord and 
domestic violence. Custom exercised in this instance was conceived as a clear 
statement of culture; 
‘Customary law is good for society, it is based on traditions that started 
from the beginning of civilisation, it is good for us, it is good for 
society’.(Manindral Kumar Talukder) 
It was in light of these rapid changes that the customary system, above all others, 
represented a means through which Chakma culture could be reinforced and 
restated. All customary officials described a process which encouraged public 
participation. Participants described how they would ensure that the village knew 
when and where any prosecutions were taking place and how a public venue 
would be located. Performative elements of the customary process seemed 
knowingly linked to the need to (re)educate people as to customs and culture.  
‘The prosecutions happen in public… they are part of the village, they 
happen in an open place, people can hear and see what is going on. (The 
case) becomes an example, or inspiration that you shouldn’t do this, the 
headmen give a speech to let people know it should not happen, they 
make clear it is unacceptable’.(Manindral Kumar Talukder) 
2.3. Cases and Consciousness 
Cases relating to personal relationships were judged according to the laws of 
individual communities, but never, it seemed, did these customs displace solutions 
that were perceived as fair or even pragmatic. A typical case was presented by 
Binoy Kumar Chakma, and concerned the desire of a young man and his 
girlfriend to marry against the wishes of their parents. The boy’s parents had 
approached him to stop the marriage. Binoy had checked the background of the 
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couple and found there was no impediment to them marrying apart from the lack 
of approval from their parents. At that point he had called the karbari and the girls 
guardians for a discussion about the marriage. It appeared that the girl’s parent 
was happy for the marriage to proceed, and so the customary role was to convince 
the boy’s parents of the union’s desirability. He considered this a good example of 
customary law in practice; the approach of headmen and karbari was geared 
toward legitimising relationships in the eyes of the community, and in this case the 
positive outcome was that the couple remained happily married with two children. 
The exception was when a woman entered into a relationship with a Bengali. 
Suronjon Chakma made an explicit link between the marriage of 
indigenous/Chakma women to a Settler and the alienation of Pahari lands. In this 
instance, the approach of the customary official would be to end the relationship 
and re-integrate the woman into Chakma/indigenous society.  
Where divorce or marital disputes occurred the precarious position of women 
within the customary system was underscored further. Four cases of domestic 
abuse and divorce were cited during research, and in all of those cases the 
adjudicator sought to protect the relationship by calling for public undertakings 
not to abuse the spouse from the male party.426 Procedural reforms being 
implemented by the Chakma chief were aimed at redressing the patriarchal bias of 
the customary system by making sure that any case with a woman party included 
people from her village of origin. However, the virtual consensus revealed over the 
role of the customary system of maintaining order and equilibrium suggests such 
procedural adaptations had not disrupted the overwhelming perception of the 
customary role as sustaining marital harmony above addressing male violence.  
This was evidenced in a case where a woman had come to the headman’s court to 
request a divorce due to her husband’s drinking and violence, a situation 
                                                        
426 All of which related to male drinking, an issue that the headmen and 
karbari were aware of and perceived a role in curbing bacchanalian excess. 
These matters are explored further in the case studies section. 
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complicated by her husband’s position as a customary karbari. The karbari in 
question had a problem with alcohol and had severely beaten his wife on more 
than on occasion. On her first approach, the headmen had suggested she return to 
her husband but approached the karbari and exhorted him to stop the violence. 
The woman stated that this intervention had not stopped her husband’s 
behaviours but she had been ashamed of asking for a divorce as society favoured 
the men. She went again to the headman when she had reached the end of her 
endurance. At this point, the headman said he would have granted a divorce if the 
woman had insisted, but he counselled again that she should return, and this time 
told the karbari that any further violence would end his marriage. The headman 
described his judgement as successful, the second intervention had stopped the 
karbari drinking and hitting his wife, and kept the family together. His solution 
had kept both parties happy, his role was not to destroy anything but to keep the 
community together. But his sanguinity was not shared by the woman, who told 
that her husband remained verbally abusive and that she still wanted a divorce. 
The drive for harmony had neither protected the most vulnerable nor achieved the 
social harmony that so infused accounts of the customary legal culture offered by 
its leadership.  
Apart from family issues the other areas of formal concern for the customary 
system related to land, inheritance and public order. Despite the centrality of land 
to the wider discourse over the relationship between state and minority, the only 
land cases that could be heard within the customary system related to inheritance 
and boundary disputes within the indigenous community. In these disputes, the 
approach differed significantly from a state court in that the solution identified 
often involved dividing the disputed package of land so that each party received 
some succour from the law, an approach very different to the absolute alienation of 
land required by statutory land law. As an example, karbari Ranjit Taunchyangya 
described a dispute that had arisen in relation to a piece of unoccupied land lying 
next to an orchard. This had been specified as an inheritance to a Taunchyanga 
woman, but was being used by a fellow villager for cultivation. A committee of 
respected elders was formed to visit the land and talk to both parties to the 
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dispute. Whilst in most boundary disputes Ranjit felt an equal division of land was 
the correct way to progress, in this case the committee decided that the inheritor 
would receive the land, but the cultivator should be compensated by the ‘legal’ 
owner in cash to recognise his labour and investment. Both parties were happy 
and the judgement was adhered to because, according to Ranjit, they always 
valued the opinion of the people, and in this case the judgement was publicly 
deliberated and perceived as fair by both parties. Kulesh Bikash also flagged the 
case outcome as successful in that it avoided the case being taken either to appeal 
or outside of the customary system.  
‘I always try to bring both parties into agreement, that way it doesn’t go 
to Rajas court, if anybody is not happy, they can seek justice from another 
source’. (Kulesh Bikash Chakma)  
One final example of legal mobilisation at a local level related to the exportation of 
custom to the state courts given the recent cases recognising its constitutional 
validity. Headman Hitolar Dewan had instigated action against the Forestry 
Department over the fate of around 500 acres of land classified as reserved by the 
state. He had used his customary powers to resettle around 70 landless Chakma 
families on 100 acres of land which he asserted had been illegally taken by the 
Forestry Department. His intention was to fight the classification of the land in 
court, a suit that would, if successful, bring an additional 400 acres of reserved 
forest under customary control. His first application for the return of 100 acres had 
been successful, he sought the additional land to discharge what he felt was a 
moral responsibility to assist the most disadvantaged amongst his community. A 
similar mobilisation against the Forestry Department had taken place within the 
Taunchyangya area of Jograbil. Customary land powers mobilised against the 
state appeared a strategy gaining material support from the PCJSS and adopted 
by the more active headmen as a route to asserting and extending the physical 
boundaries of the customary domain.  
The last case selected illustrates the peace-keeping role of the customary system 
and complex relationship between the legal forums available for the resolution of 
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cases that concern criminality. In this case, a woman had been sexually harassed 
by a group of men, one of whom returned to her house and assaulted her with a 
knife. He had then absconded from the village, and the woman’s family had filed a 
formal complaint with the police and demanded his apprehension. The police 
couldn’t find the culprit so imprisoned his father in the hope of ending his self-
imposed exile. At this point, the family of the miscreant had approached headman 
Sujit Dewan, asking that he negotiate with the police. Sujit arranged for the 
victim’s medical expenses to be met by the miscreant’s family in the hope that the 
formal complaint would be withdrawn. Shortly afterwards, he was instructed by 
the JSS to try the case despite the lack of jurisdiction within the customary system 
in serious criminal matters. Still, Sujit felt this was an example of good 
cooperation between the two arms of justice, in that the culprit was so scared of 
reprisals from the PCJSS that he returned to the village, and the headman was 
able to demand compensation of 50,000 BDT for the victim whilst the PCJSS 
ensured that this was paid in full. It appeared that the state police were also aware 
of the customary/JSS prosecution, and had released his Father from the jail, 
thereby maintaining the boundaries between the Chakma community and the 
state  
In this case, both the perpetrator of the assault and victim were prepared to talk 
about the impact of the judgement on them and their families. The victim, visibly 
distressed when discussing the attack, acknowledged both that compensation had 
been paid and that there had been no threat to her after the judgement due to the 
restrictions placed on the perpetrator by the headman and the PCJSS. However, 
she wanted the perpetrator removed from the village and imprisoned, and felt 
pressured into accepting a verdict which did not reflect the seriousness of the 
crime or the effect on her health and life. Further, she had been put under pressure 
by the family of the perpetrator to withdraw the criminal suit, which she had 
refused to do. She suffered health problems as a result of the attack and felt that in 
comparison her attacker had continued unmolested with his life.  
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For his part, the perpetrator felt that the judgement had been fair; he had 
admitted his crime and showed remorse and he felt that his previous character had 
been calibrated in deciding on a punishment. He wished to make clear his regret 
for the pain he had caused to his victim through actions taken whilst drunk. 
Although the case had been heard by the headman, the perpetrator perceived the 
punishment as being a PCJSS decision, and was grateful not to be beaten. At the 
same time, he stated that the police action had never been formally dropped, 
meaning that he was effectively confined to the village, because, whilst the police 
would not venture to Mogbar they would arrest him in Rangamati. His parents 
commented that the fine had been so large that they had had to sell all of their land 
to pay it, and that the failure to withdraw the police case had left a long shadow 
over their son’s life.  
Maintaining community autonomy appeared the first priority of the PCJSS and 
received wide support from the village community. The local karbari explained 
that whilst everyone understood that this case was not customary, they agreed that 
it was Chakma rather than a police matter. He felt both parties would have been 
harassed and bribed in a formal case, while in the customary court the focus on 
equilibrium meant both perpetrator and victim had a chance to recover from the 
crime. The lines between the summary justice of the PCJSS and the customary 
court were blurred, however, with the headman musing that whilst he had 
assumed responsibility for the girl, under customary rules he would have taken 
more account of her feelings. Instead, maintaining the boundaries of community 
had taken precedence over the commission of state law, and the principles of 
customary justice which would have been more cognisant of the victims’ feelings 
in determining punishment. Whilst a negotiated solution had been reached to the 
satisfaction of the various arms of formal and informal legal practitioners, the 
equilibrium of the village community still appeared disrupted by the continuing 
ramifications of the assault and the unhappiness of its victim. 
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2.4. Remedies and Forum Shopping 
One of the perceived weaknesses of the customary system revealed by research 
related to the power of the headmen and karbari to enforce their judgements and 
the apparent erosion of the collectivity required to maintain order without force. 
Pragmatic solutions to social, personal and land disputes were only of value if all 
parties to the case were prepared to accept and implement them. The tools at the 
disposal of customary officials were limited in this regard, and the remedies that 
they could suggest were also constrained by the rules base of the system. Public 
shaming had been integral to the customary system but there appeared a wide 
recognition that this was now unacceptable and it was rarely practised. Only one 
example was offered of a punishment where shaming had been intended; this was 
a case where a young girl had killed herself after being made pregnant by an older 
man. The punishment was to water a banyan tree for a day, in full view of the 
village. The response of Manindralal Kumar Talukder was more typical, he noted 
‘There are no physical punishments in customary law, the headmen can only fine 
25 taka’. After each prosecution, he continued, they would talk to the guilty party 
and if he admitted guilt.  
‘They try to convince them to come to an agreement with the other 
person. In the case when the person does not agree that he is guilty, we 
take witnesses, we might then take the case to the formal court’. 
(Manindralal Chakma) 
Forum shopping in the minds of participants was linked to customary failures in 
enforcement. Manindralal was one of the few headmen who saw formal justice as 
a viable option for a Pahari, the far more common situation was that the 
unsuccessful party to a customary action would seek support from the local 
political parties to give power to their case. In some instances, the customary 
system was bypassed altogether by parties seeking to gain an advantage by 
eliciting the support of the armed cadres. How such a course of action ended 
would depend largely on the local constellation of power, that is the respect that 
the local customary officials were held in, and the strength of the local party. For 
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some political activists, these approaches were welcome. Headman and PCJSS 
activist Ketan Chakma noted that; 
‘The JSS don’t want to do this, the public want the JSS, because the 
headmen’s code is not powerful. The public wants to go to the political 
parties so the JSS tries to support the headmen…it is a very positive 
relationship between the political and the customary, with JSS 
supporting the headmen and karbari’. (Ketan Chakma) 
Ketan saw nuances in the relationship between the customary and political 
sphere; he felt Chakma custom required compromise to guide the settlement of 
disputes whilst other forms of justice compelled one party to be found guilty. In 
his area, custom and its methods took priority over other forms of settlement and 
customary and political officials worked together to uphold the customary system, 
with the political activists enforcing the headmen’s judgements. Karbari Buddha 
Chakma also noted the positive effect on his village of being able to call on 
political activists to address social problems, pointing to the decrease in drinking 
and gambling his partnership with the JSS had bought about. This was not 
always the case, however, and other headmen saw the involvement of the political 
parties as degrading the customary system rather than democratising it. 
Patindralal Chakma felt that  
‘It is possible that in future this customary system will be diminished 
because with time people tend to go to political parties for a solution or 
to other sources… people go to them and they can stick their nose into 
these disputes’. (Patindralal Chakma) 
The main reason why customary judgements were respected was the moral 
authority of the customary judge, headmen and karbari had to command respect 
through their actions and attitude toward society.427 During field research the 
                                                        
427 This was raised by two women headmen, Jonaki and Kalindi Chakma, 
who were critical of headmen who used their offices for financial gain, e.g. 
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suggestion was made that some headmen used their powers to effect land 
mutations for commercial gain, to the point of alienating land to settlers for the 
right fee.428 Even amongst the headmen there were whispers that some of their 
colleagues were either not competent or dishonest, a factor often attributed to the 
low capacity within the system and the lack of public reward. PCJSS and UPDF 
leaders both cited customary corruption as reasons for their becoming involved in 
the dispensation of local justice. Respondents such as headman Manindralal 
Chakma, however, drew attention to the lack of moral authority amongst party 
political law enforcers, who didn’t investigate cases, effected harsh punishments 
and were also suspected of corruption and even collusion with the army. The 
authority of the headmen and the customary system was set against the degraded 
practices of local political operators; 
‘When we practice customary law, we keep our eyes open to everything, 
when it comes to politics, the left keeps a blind eye on their side, the right 
wing is keeping their eye only on the right. They are only keeping faith 
with ideology, being less tolerant on other views and only seeing part of 
the picture’ . (Babatosh Chakma) 
Violence was identified as a common problem, one headman noting that remote 
mauzas were ruled more by armed cadres, who would force customary officials to 
sign off verdicts. A material example was offered by Santi Bijoy Chakma, who 
described the case of a couple had been caught and beaten by youths after being 
accused of an illicit relationship. He had resisted calls from local political activists 
to allow a public beating to be imposed and had insisted on the imposition of the 
customary fine of a pig and rooster. Santi Bijoy cited this as another reason why 
the CHTPA needed to be implemented, the incorporation of the customary 
                                                        
to mutate land for the benefit of settlers. Moral authority as conceptualised 
by respondents was 
428 A point also made by Advocate Jewel Dewan, Head of the local branch 
of the Legal Aid Services Trust. 
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system into democratic institutions would force the cadres to disarm and 
disappear, and facilitate a return to the uninhibited practice of customary law. 
This sentiment was shared by Sujit Dewan, who drew attention again to the 
difficult geography in the CHT. People in the field did not listen to their 
commanders at the centre, and were becoming involved in law because the 
CHTPA had not been fully implemented. There was a causal link between the 
atmosphere of fear created by the political stasis over the CHTPA and the loss of 
confidence in customary law amongst the citizenry.  
2.5. Culture and Consciousness 
In terms of legal culture then, these observations paint a picture of some 
complexity. Customary institutions were perceived as the primary source of 
justice, in most cases commanding the respect of the people and perceived as 
upholding Chakma and Taunchyangya customs. The legal consciousness 
expressed by customary officials as characteristic of the communitarian domain 
was based on ideations of community harmony, common interest and accessible 
processes that chimed with perceptions of precolonial practice. Meanwhile, there 
was evidence that the Chakma chief ‘s reforms were taking effect, with a high level 
of awareness of the requirements of gender parity, women’s participation in 
judgements, more women karbari and a definitive shift away from shaming and 
violence as legal remedies. Interactions between the relatively democratic 
governance village committees set up by political groups were perceived as 
positive where they worked in concert with headmen and karbari on issues of 
development and planning, whilst the youth committees supported customary 
officials in apprehending miscreants and bringing them to the customary system. 
In some instances, political activists operated in concert with the customary 
officials but at times the political route was viewed as a discrete alternative to the 
customary system. The main reason given for applicants bypassing the customary 
system was that judgements could be enforced through force, and that further, the 
first complainant to the political groups would receive a favoured judgement.  
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The characterisation of the customary system as a bounded completeness was 
almost entirely displaced by the frequency in which customary officials described 
its practical application as an ongoing negotiation or navigation between 
customary principles, morality and political ideologies. Yet the broad conclusion 
drawn here is that the central premise of critical communitarianism holds true in 
this account of legal processes in the Hill Tracts. The indigenous communities, in 
this case the Chakma, mobilised law as practices of their identity, perceiving its 
role as expressing their identity first as Pahari, in the sense of their law 
representing a clear cultural alterity to the state, and then, as a Chakma, in the 
sense of their law expressing their particular national identity. Undoubtedly, the 
nature and relevance of the colonially anointed system of customary law was highly 
contested at a local level, where the various demands for democratisation and 
control were constantly absorbed and synthesised according to highly local 
contexts. Indeed, each mauza and village was the loci of an ongoing rejection of 
the state, but also the site of power struggles between different groups and 
individuals as to ownership of the law.  
These struggles did not displace the customary system, however, but represented 
an evolution of historically anointed customary law to a more broadly defined 
communitarian law emerging explicitly to augment the struggle of the wider 
Pahari community to retain its autonomy. Customary law was recognised as 
integral to the subjective distinctions drawn between state and community, and 
invested with a moral and emotional resonance lacking in the organs of the state. 
At the same time, the effectiveness of moral authority alone in maintaining local 
harmony was perceived as diminishing in the face of the rapid changes occurring 
in society. The alternative local forums were mainly informal political 
adjudications and to a lesser extent, elected UP members, but neither route was 
entirely discrete from the customary system. Instead, local alliances between 
different sources of power emerged from the clash of ideologies and legal 
ontologies. At the most local level, law was mobilised to define community and 
community became the site at which identity was contested, redefined and 
renewed.  
 
 
209 
In the next section this broad conclusion is explored further through case studies 
of three separate sites spanning rural and urban locations. Legal culture is defined 
through enquiries into the way law is mobilised as a practice of identity, and the 
way research participants inside and outside the customary system experience and 
understand law.  
3. Locality Case Studies 
As the project moves to village justice, it is important again to highlight the 
research limitations created by post-conflict restrictions on movement, and 
methods used to address those limitations. For research locations within the 
boundaries of the Rangamati urban area, multiple visits to sites were possible, 
allowing a wider range of analysis within the limited time allowed. F0r village 
locations, however, visits were clandestine and limited to a maximum of three 
instances, and for this reason workshops were convened in addition to individual 
interviews to gain as wide a range of respondents as possible. Questions for both 
workshop and individual sessions were structured to reflect the wider law-in-
context approach employed by Ewick and Silbey; respondents were invited to 
share their experiences of the social and economic structures of the village, their 
perceptions of community leadership and local governance, and only after these 
broad discussions asked to share their experiences of customary law.429  
Fieldwork for this project was conducted primarily in the Rangamati district, and 
the villages selected were all within three hours journey of Rangamati town. All 
were predominantly Chakma or Taunchyangya areas, though Jograbil contained 
substantial Bengali settlements. The villages studied differed in their political 
complexion, one PCJSS, one UPDF, and one urban area of greater political 
plurality. In relation to each model area, a similar structure will be followed, first a 
profile of the headman and karbari, then discussion of the perceptions of justice in 
                                                        
429 Patricia Ewick and Susan S Silbey, ‘Conformity, Contestation and 
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness.’ (n 199). 
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the town areas, and finally examples of cases heard in the villages and an analysis 
of legal mobilisation and consciousness in the particular constellation of power in 
that area. 
3.1. Kaynda, Mouza Number 129 
Kaynda mauza was located thirty minutes by boat from Rangamati town. The 
area covers six villages, and a total population of 507 Chakma families. Residents 
listed their main livelihoods as jum farming, gardens, teak and fruit cultivation, 
and fishing. The village had seen many developments since the CHTPA; there 
were three junior schools, three primary schools and the construction of a high 
school was about to begin. Infrastructure developments had improved the 
economic position of the village, there was now a three-kilometre path between 
the villages and the road, a bridge connecting the villages to each other and water 
culverts to assist with irrigation.  
The headman was Nobodip Chakma, a headman since his Father’s death in 1988. 
In the past, he was very active and took his duties to distribute land, collect tax 
and prosecute disputes seriously. Nobodip was no longer discharging these 
functions in the Mouza; he could no longer stay due to political coercion and now 
lived in Rangamati. Maybe two to three years ago, he became physically unable to 
lead and now he only collected tax and distributed land. There were six karbari in 
the mauza, and they were currently trying to appoint a female karbari in 
accordance with the Rajas’ wishes. Nobodip expressed concern about the abilities 
of his mauza karbari; 
‘The karbari are the leaders, but they are simple minded, they are not 
critical minded, if they do solve one problem they make five more’. 
His responsibilities for issuing certificates of land ownership and developing the 
village were shared with the UP Member, who was responsible for distribution of 
government resources. In terms of village justice, however, Nobodip stated that 
his community leadership duties and village prosecutions had been superseded by 
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the political parties, who now formed a village committee for the discharge of local 
prosecutions: 
‘The headmen and karbari are not part of the committee. I am feeling fear 
for telling you this, there are powerful people in the village who are more 
powerful than the central committee (of the PCJSS). They are now 
saying that they don’t need a headman or karbari, they can do all the 
judgements themselves’.430 
When prosecuting cases, most of his judgements had been in family cases, 
elopements and minor land disputes such as over property boundaries. Headmen 
were prevented from fining more than 100 taka and sought instead to find a 
solution that both parties and the rest of the village would adhere to. Now that the 
political parties were in charge, this community consensus had been irretrievably 
lost. Nobodip stated that: 
‘You have to obey the power, you have to obey the political party in the 
Mouza, if they don’t they pay. When the political party hear of something 
wrong, they will go and use their power. They will fine (the culprits) 2 of 
3 lakhs431, in simple cases’.  
Nobodip said he no longer knew what happened in cases tried in his Mouza, 
though he gave examples of judgements he had made before his withdrawal from 
this role. In his view, the appropriation by the political parties of the customary 
system had led to a deterioration in the type of justice meted out in his mauza, and 
an erosion of customary values.  
                                                        
430 He was referring to the relative power of local activists against the 
central committee vis-à-vis the customary system, given the formal policy of 
the PCJSS was to support headmen in their discharge of customary 
duties.  
431 The equivalent of 2 -3 thousand pounds. 
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‘In the customary court, they prosecute the case in accordance with 
customary laws. They focus on keeping the balance of society, the 
harmony of society, the social order. But I think the political parties do 
not do this, they will impose fines. In customary law, there is a right of 
appeal, in political parties the verdict is the end, and the people have to 
implement it, if they don’t they will be in trouble’.  
Three visits to Kaynda mauza were conducted, once to interview the karbari, once 
with Nobodip for a workshop with a group of karbari and village elders and once 
for a further workshop with leading members of the local PCJSS, the karbari and 
two village women.432 At the outset it is salutary to note that the discomfort felt by 
the headman over his exclusion both from local leadership and from the justice 
process was not necessarily reflected in the relationships formed at ground level 
between the customary system and the local political leadership. Instead a 
complex and perhaps more functionally effective picture emerged of an expanded 
communitarian domain on the ground. 
Nobodip clarified his reasons for withdrawal from the customary justice system at 
a later workshop, describing how he had been threatened twice in the commission 
of a land dispute in one of the villages, and had decided that he could not continue 
to live or work in the mauza as a result. The case related to a land case in which his 
signature was required to end the dispute by confirming the ownership of one of 
the parties. Nobodip was taken to a house by a group of political party activists 
and forced to sign a pre-written verdict. Nobodip explained; 
‘If I don’t sign they will go into the jungle and make a complaint against 
me, saying that I don’t obey, that I am not for them. It is then a threat for 
my life. If I sign, I understand that I will be in trouble in future and as the 
                                                        
432 All the karbari participated in the workshops with and without the 
headman, and responded differently in his presence.   
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land dispute is complex, for the sake of my life, I gave my signature, 
(because it’s) better than losing my life’.  
The first Kaynda workshop at Bosonto Village, was attended by Nobodip, three 
of the six karbari of the mauza and two of the Bosonto village elders involved in 
both customary and political judgements. The karbari confirmed most of the cases 
they heard were women or family related cases, and that they were unable to 
prosecute cases such as murder or rape, which were in any case extremely rare. All 
of the karbari present were literate, and had been actively involved in developing 
the customary system to reflect the demands of the time, cases had to be 
submitted in writing and they kept records of their judgement. They were unable 
to appoint a woman karbari as single woman had to leave the village on marriage 
and married women tended to be too busy. They were aware of the chief’s 
procedural reforms and strove to involve women on their panels. They collectively 
agreed that karbari and elders were entitled to judge because; 
‘They are wise, they prosecute from their wisdom, their different 
experiences, different solutions, they are wise so the customary law can 
benefit from their wisdom’. 
There was also a level of agreement about their approach to judgement in a 
customary case; they agreed that a judgement should; 
 ‘Mainly focus on the settlement as our role is to keep the peace in society, 
and if it is just the applying of customary law, there will be no peace, so 
what is the point of the law?’  
For the karbari, their role as guardians of Chakma custom was secondary to their 
responsibility to re-establish equilibrium in the community in the event of a 
dispute, and so maintain peace in the village. Despite this rather pragmatic view of 
custom, their social role in regulating Chakma custom was still important to the 
village. Before a Chakma marriage, custom demanded that the family trees were 
discussed in a ceremony called ‘gorba hudum’, so that the strict customary rules on 
bloodlines can be enforced. The karbari were responsible for organising this 
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ceremony, weddings and funerals. These social functions remained very similar to 
the ways their fathers had practised customary law, but they also felt that custom 
was not immune to outside influence saying; 
 ‘Everything changes with time, so we know that customary law changes but we 
cannot predict what it will be in future’.  
When asked about the level of cases coming through the karbari, they thought 
that the customary system was more active now than before the Peace Accord. 
But at this point, the karbari present disagreed about how this period of peace 
had affected the commission of justice in their respective villages. Amalydan 
Chakma, the elderly head of Bosonto village, said that he avoided prosecutions in 
his village. Alongside the customary structure, the PCJSS ran a village committee, 
and a youth committee. After the CHTPA, the level of interference in the 
customary system had increased as the army no longer policed the area, whereas 
before the Santi Bahini panchayat had used customary procedures to dispense 
justice. Now, villagers would frequently bypass the karbari to take their problems 
to the village committee as they had armed force to back them up.  
Two other Kaynda karbari, Mohubdrala Chakma, and Prema Chakma appeared 
to have reached a practical and effective accommodation with the local political 
leadership however. They strongly disagreed with the idea that the customary 
system was undermined by the involvement of political actors, suggesting instead 
that in their villages, the customary system was supported by political activists, a 
position that reflected formal PCJSS policy. They reported that the village 
committees acted as agencies for their customary judgements, collecting and 
passing on information to help with dispute resolution. The youth committee 
worked for them to investigate wrongdoing and helped them to apprehend the 
culprits if properly instructed to do so by the village committee and the karbari. 
Political party activists were invited onto the karbari’s panels to assist with the 
judgement, a factor that gave greater weight to their judgements. They strongly 
disagreed with the headman and with Amalydan Chakma in pointing out, that the 
PCJSS ‘are part of us as well, that they are part of the community’.  
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These views were explored in two further workshops, without the headmen 
present, the first in Aguile village with Amalydan Chakma, two farmers and a 
businessman who were called regularly to the committee, and one member of the 
PCJSS village committee. Here, Amalydan placed greater emphasis on the 
peaceful nature of the village, with the reason for the lack of customary cases 
shifting to the relative peace of the village. 
‘It is quite peaceful, barely one case goes to the karbari court, there is no 
theft so you can leave things around and nobody takes things, so its 
peaceful. The only prosecutions we do are women related, the moral 
issues’. 
Without the headman present, Amalydan was more open about the alignment of 
the customary system with the village committee, with a youth committee also 
being appointed by the PCJSS. He felt that due deference was paid to the karbari 
by committee members. When asked if people were more likely to obey the village 
committee, its member Trisingha Chakma retorted;  
‘It’s not like that, it’s a committee who help the karbari, the karbari 
decision is the social decision…if the karbari can’t give the decision only 
then it goes to the party’. (Trinsangho Chakma) 
The position of the youth committee in relation to both the customary system and 
the village committee was also clarified, Rupanto Chakma describing the youth as 
a workforce that did the work of the village committee and karbari at social 
occasions, but also;  
 ‘They are like the police, if someone is having an illicit relationship they 
will go and catch them. Or if a couple is fighting they will go and check. 
They work independently, they catch people, and…will then take a role in 
the decision and the panel’. (Rupanto Chakma)  
It was a role Trinsangho Chakma described as being a ‘social police’; 
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 ‘It is really about social values, it is their social duty, so even in city areas, 
it happens. You don’t have to call them, the karbari does not have to 
order the youth to catch someone’. 
They work for the community in ensuring that both social rules and morality are 
upheld. 
The final workshop joined karbari and elders with the local PCJSS activist, 
Rabindandral Chakma. Though a former member of Santi Bahini and involved in 
the Gram Panchayats at the time, he was at pains to point out that the village 
committee was a different body and had a different role. The village committee 
respected traditions but tried to modernise the laws to reflect social changes. It 
existed in its own right but always collaborated with customary representatives. 
The headmen and karbari struggled to get people to obey them and the village 
committee was a necessary support, he noted; 
‘Cases are not normally held by the village committee but…they hear the 
small cases, of drinking, relationships they still prosecute because of the 
power they get from the party. It’s easier for them to implement the 
verdict, sometimes they prosecute for that reason, but …there are no 
complaints from the customary law officers because they are involved.’ 
(Rabindandral Chakma) 
The portrait painted by Rabindralal was of a mutual relationship between the 
customary system and the more powerful political actors in the Kaynda locality. 
Their power was disbursed to augment the customary system, not to undermine it 
but to ensure that the disputes were kept inside the village. Rabindralal stated 
explicitly that the reason for involving the village committee in the dispensation of 
justice was to make sure villagers did not have to go to the formal courts, where 
they were harassed financially and verbally. This was not just a pragmatic 
consideration, but an ideological one; Rabindralal felt that formal law was the law 
of the peoples from the plains. For the Chakma;  
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‘Customs and culture and tradition is medicine for the soul, they require 
government curation, the government needs to provide the necessary 
support, (our) culture is being lost, against the big ones of India and 
Hollywood…(the) government is not nurturing our culture’.  
This case study concludes with an example of a recent case heard in the Kaynda 
Para Village, related by its karbari Mohubdrala Chakma but heard by the village 
committee with his full approval.  
‘This case wasn’t in my court, this was in Panchayat Court, but I was 
involved, I was part of the panel. One man used to do theft, he used to do 
drinking and drugs. Before, he was fined and threatened with 
punishment of 20 strokes of a whip and 5000 Taka if he commits to the 
crime again. He did it again, and he hadn’t paid his fine. So, they took his 
fine from his rice and goods. He was heard again, and told that if he 
committed again he would receive 40 lashes and 10,000 Taka’. 
Mohubdrala felt that the judgement was an example of good justice. The physical 
punishment had never been meted out, but the threat of violence was a powerful 
incentive for the miscreant to conform to wider social mores. He stated that: 
They threatened him, so now he knows he will get this(beating) if he 
commits the crime again. The punishment is a prevention of the crime, 
and that is why it is beautiful.  
As a customary official, he had been instrumental in this case and in the decision to 
use a threat of violence in both the previous and present case. In his view, his role 
as karbari was to maintain and preserve both the peace of the village, and its 
autonomy; reducing the need to call on the state was a key part of his role. As a 
customary official, however, he could not invoke violence without a level of 
integration between the customary office and the PCJSS. At village level this 
integration was negotiated, consensual and complementary as participants in both 
customary and political institutions shared a common view of the legal culture as 
being a means of excluding the state from the locality. Within the boundaries of 
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community, the different ontologies of customary and political were in a process of 
constant iteration. The consensual basis of the historically grounded customary 
system was both subverted and reinforced by political activists. In the village it 
appeared that community members were actively participating in the construction 
of a legality drawing on both historicised custom and political policy, thus 
developing a legal consciousness synthesised from an amalgam of both.  
3.2. Sebakkon Mouza Number 1, Naniochari Village  
The headman of Sebakkon mauza is Mrinul Kanti Dewan, one of the most senior 
of the Rangamati headmen having been in post since 1962. He was already 
considering his retirement and expected his highly qualified daughter to inherit 
the headman position in Sebakkon, fulfilling his dream of female empowerment. 
There were twenty villages in Sebakkon mauza and sixteen karbari, including the 
six female karbari appointed under the Rajas scheme. Most of the land was grove 
land, and the limited paddy was regularly submerged when the water rose 
annually on Kaptai lake. Mrinal Kanti had witnessed impressive developments in 
the area, Sebakkon had one high school, four government junior high schools and 
eight primary schools, all villages had connecting roads, and within the mauza 
they had a community health clinic and a family planning clinic. The local 
economy was stronger and more stable than when he started as headman, and he 
had established an agricultural office in the Mouza. Mrinal felt that the scale of 
these developments was partly attributable to his interactions with local 
government, he had worked for the RHDC from 1989. He had also been elected 
as UP Chairman, and though this position was now taken by Priti Moy Chakma 
of the UPDF, they continued to work closely together on improving their area. 
The mauza did not yet have a connection to mains electricity, however, and he felt 
frustrated at what he felt to be a personal failure to raise the bribe necessary for the 
power company to bring forward the electrification of Sebakkon.  
Sebakkon is part of an area under the full control of the UPDF, the political party 
frequently attributed with acts of sectarian violence in the CHT. Mrinal identified 
Priti Moy Chakma and himself as the most powerful leaders in the Sebakkon 
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mauza. Though the UPDF openly called for the replacement of the customary 
system by democratic village governance, Mrinal Kanti reported a good working 
relationship with local armed cadres. Lately, however, there had been problems 
with the local UPDF committees usurping the karbari, and in some villages, their 
usurpation was absolute, breaching the rapprochement he had reached with the 
UPDF under which prosecutions were heard jointly by party acolytes and 
customary officials. He explained that: 
‘The conflict is that the village committee is prosecuting cases, but they 
are not using the karbari or headmen’s office, they are partial and if they 
know someone they are favouring them, (the headmen and karbari) are 
being dishonoured they are slowly going away from the cases…the 
UPDF have guns so they can do what they want’. 
This impasse had led to the number of customary cases declining over time 
because the political parties were doing all of the prosecutions. According to 
Mrinul Kanti there was a huge difference in the punishments; 
‘When they fine they are doing it by themselves, they are giving verdicts to 
whip the guilty parties, they are outcasting (sic) families, they have no 
guidelines. I can only fine 25 Taka at most, and during my 55 years as a 
headman I have never ever touched anyone, also we don’t do any 
outcasting or social shaming’.  
Despite their role in the delivery of justice, Mrinal felt that customary law was still 
an important feature of life in the villages of Sebakkon. 
‘Customary law plays a good role in the village and people have respect 
for the customary law, and they are still giving tax to the headmen, the 
Raja and the government. In terms of peace and order, customary law is 
still, there, at present the political parties are taking some of it, like the 
prosecutions, but other than that it is there’. 
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The situation described by Mrinal Kanti Dewan was investigated more closely in 
relation to the lakeside village of Naniochari, within Sebakkon. To this end, a 
meeting was held with karbari Kurnashish Khisa, who combined his customary 
role with his role as assistant chairman of the UPDF convened village committee, 
and Tapan Chakma, the secretary of the Naniochari village committee. 
Kurnashish had inherited the karbari office from his father, had been directly 
involved in the village committee for three years, and was also an active member of 
the UPDF. The Naniochari situation was striking in that the customary system 
appeared to have merged almost completely with the structures created by the 
UPDF. Most village business was conducted through the village committee, 
which comprised eleven members, of which two were women. Members were 
selected at an open meeting of the villagers at which the merits of each possible 
candidate were discussed, Kurnashish emphasised that appointments were the 
‘decision of the whole village’. The committee was chaired by an elder of the 
village, and customary headmen, karbari and UP Councillors. were seen as 
advisors to the committee. The role of the village committee, however, appeared 
very similar to the self-described role of the karbari. Kurnashish reported that  
‘According to village society, when people get married they help, they 
have a role in solving problems, any problem in village society they 
solve…Sometimes the Bangladesh government takes the decision to 
increase the water level, and if the village people are troubled, they always 
protest against this activity, to the Deputy Commissioner’ .(Kurnashish 
Khisa)  
Further, the karbari was a member of the village committee and always assisted 
with justice matters and advised on decisions. The village committee did not have 
any women members but Kurnashish encouraged them to become involved. He 
stated that: 
‘We are always trying to create opportunities for women, in economic life 
and in social life, we have a cooperative for weaving, they are supporting 
this indigenous Jumma craft’. 
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The village also had a youth committee which he described as a democratic youth 
forum that promoted social and religious work. The following case, reported by 
Kurnashish Chakma, encapsulated how the village committee and youth 
committee worked in relation to dispute resolution. 
‘A village girl and a man were lovers, they had a three-year relationship. 
They have illegally had physical relations, and the girl became pregnant. 
Everyone knew about the pregnancy, and after the baby, the man didn’t 
want to marry the female. The village committee took the decision that 
they should marry, because it was illegal. This was a secret relationship, 
they tried to find out who was the father. Two females were involved in 
the village committee so they found out from the woman who the father 
was…When they were sure, he had to marry her. Also, he had to receive 
punishment, they demanded some money. Now are they are married, and 
have two children, they are happy’. (Kurnashish Chakma) 
The method of adjudication was a village committee meeting, with the karbari 
acting as advisor, and the adjudication very similar to those meted out by headmen 
and karbari operating on their own. The only possible distinction was in the fine 
as punishment, but as both headmen and karbari often offered compensation as 
part of their judgement, even this did not distinguish UPDF judgement 
significantly from a customary intervention. 
This merging of customary traditions, political governance and local 
administration seemed to have been accomplished with little tension at the level of 
the village, despite the headman’s discomfort at the lack of customary involvement 
elsewhere in the mauza. The karbari occupied a dual role, was conversant with 
customary law but accepted the armed cadres as supportive of peace and harmony 
in the village. He continued to pay homage to the Circle chief as traditional leader, 
and even appeared to see a parallel appellate system available to his village under 
these arrangements. Kurnashish noted that if the outcome was unsatisfactory, 
parties could take the case either to the Raja’s court or to the UPDF, both of 
whom could give a final judgement. This seemed to reflect the distrust of the 
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headmen’s office apparent amongst the UPDF leadership; though accusations 
were not levelled explicitly at Mrinal Kanti, Tapan Chakma stated that some 
headmen had betrayed the indigenous people by transferring land to Bengalis for 
profit. Both political and customary justice were clearly identified as a way to hold 
cases within the Chakma community and prevent the derogation of land to 
outside parties, and political and customary actors were inseparably bound by the 
overriding joint enterprise of preventing the transfer of indigenous land to Bengali 
settlers.  
In terms of legal mobilisation, therefore, it appeared that the synthesised 
institutions at village level were directed to the overriding priority of maintaining 
the boundaries of community against the state. An augmented form of customary 
law was practised even though the UPDF leadership explicitly rejected the 
supposedly ‘feudal’ customary system. Further, in terms of legal consciousness, the 
actors surveyed still followed broadly customary processes, included and 
honoured the local karbari and recognised the alterity of the system as a significant 
community strength. The immediate political conflict, therefore, diluted but did 
not displace the consciousness of the Pahari/Chakma as defined by culture as well 
as material interests in land or even by divergent political ideology. Research again 
suggested that the legal culture formed at a local level by the intersection of the 
customary and political sphere was characterised by an inherent dynamism, as 
evidenced by the constant renegotiation of the meaning of customary within the 
complex and sometimes violent politics of the hills. 
3.3. Jograbil Mouza Number 104 
The next case study moves to the urban location of Jograbil mauza located on the 
north-western flank of the Rangamati city area, and covering the diverse 
Assambusti suburb and four of the adjoining Taunchangya dominated villages. 
After partition, a number of displaced Assamese Hindus made their home on free 
land next to Rangamati, the name of the Assambusti suburb means ‘slums of the 
Assamese’. Over the years new settlers joined the Assamese Homi community 
until it was also was home to large groups of Chakma, Taunchyanga and Marma 
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peoples and smaller groups of Rakhine, Lushai, Garo, Santal, and Tripura as well 
as ethnically Bengali Hindu and Buddhist families. All these groups rec0gnise the 
Chakma leadership of the customary system and, with the exception of the 
Bengalis, identified with the label of indigenous.433 Jograbil Mouza is defined as a 
municipal area, and has a population of around 10-12000 families. Its rural suburbs 
are now joined to Assambusti by a bridge, and due to their proximity to the town 
most lands are in private ownership and most residents are service holders and 
businessmen. 
Some Bengali Muslim families were ‘Purumbusti’, or early settlers who arrived in 
Rangamati before independence and assimilated relatively easily into this mixed 
neighbourhood. Others were the hated new settlers who arrived either through 
the transmigration policy or through illegal settlements after the Peace Accord 
was signed. Illegal settlement continued to create tension in Assambusti, with 
visible evidence of land alienation observed in the large number of precarious 
dwellings at the lake fringes. Headman Surojan told how rules on customary land 
transfer were frequently circumvented through invocation of religious protections 
of sacred Islamic premises; settlers would initially designate land as a mosque and 
thus sacred from interference, after which numerous families arrived to stake out 
their homes within the ‘mosque’ territory. The partisan apathy of the army made it 
impossible for customary functionaries in intervene, rendering Assambusti an area 
characterised by inter-community tensions and occasional outbreaks of violence. 
Later settlers had not integrated into the existing, indigenous-identifying 
community, and the previously harmonious relationship of the indigenous 
communities with their Purumbusti neighbours was a casualty of their 
unwelcome presence. The Purumbusti were radicalised by connection with the 
                                                        
433 ‘The Homi felt more endangered than the Chakma. ‘We came during 
the second world war, from the Assam Rifles, the name of the indigenous 
group dialect, and songs is Ohomian (Homi). We lost our language in this 
place.’ (Kamal Kumar Assam)  
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settlers and empowered by the change in local demography brought about by 
transmigration. 
Surojan Dewan had been the headman of Jograbil mauza for five years. There 
were six areas within the mauza, five villages and the Assambusti suburb, and six 
karbari positions. He was committed to finding women karbari to join his team, 
but had not yet found the right people. Surojan defined his role as tax collector 
and social leader, facilitating land mutations, resolving local disputes, and 
prosecuting minor incidents. Surojan strongly self-identified as an indigenous 
person and was familiar with ILO 169 and the UNDRIP after visiting Australia 
as a guest of the UNDP.  
The arrangements for local justice appeared complex. Jograbil was in a municipal 
area, so there was a para municipal council and a municipal women’s council. 
Women’s cases were sometimes referred to the municipal council, whilst some 
cases went directly to the para, and some to the karbari and headman. In 
Assambusti, there was also a youth committee, and youth wings of the PCJSS, 
and the two mainstream political parties, the Chattra League of the AL and the 
Chattra Dhol of the Bangladesh National Party. The PCJSS youth committee 
did not join prosecutions but supported the headman in social events. In Jograbil, 
diversity was not perceived as problematic, Surojan saw his role as negotiating a 
path between the different branches of formal government, and the various 
political parties. He estimated that some months he received one or two cases 
from the community or karbari, and sometimes none at all.  
The Assambusti suburb was the most culturally diverse of Jograbil mauza, but 
some of the resident communities were very small. Surojan sought representation 
from their communities when hearing cases so that they could be decided in 
accordance with that communities’ customs. In Assambusti, it was normal for the 
communities identifying as indigenous to mingle and inter-marry, though it was 
still considered unacceptable for marriages to occur between the new Muslim 
settlers and indigenous people. The strict customary laws followed in the villages 
were adapting to reflect this diversity. Surojan felt that as Chakma people were 
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the majority, some other communities were now following Chakma customs in 
law, marriage and other festivals, rather than maintaining their own cultures. 
Further, the closely related Marma and Rakhine communities were also merging 
their cultures. 
‘We have Chakma, we have Marmas, but they are not maintaining their 
own cultures, the Chakmas are picking up Marma, Rakhine 
cultures…Tripura girls marry the Assam boys, it is happening (but) it is 
not a problem in our society, in this community’  
When discussing legal cases, Surojan felt that the many indigenous and immigrant 
communities of Jograbil preferred the customary system to other options because 
of its speed and accessibility, noting that: 
‘If they go the local police or the courts, they will have to pay money and it 
is also a complicated system, takes a long time and the people get 
harassed by the government people when they are in court’. 
To illustrate the justice process in Jograbil, Surojan selected a case typical of 
Assambusti in that it captured the diverse demographic and the use of the 
customary system as an antidote to the social fragmentation generated by urban 
development. 
‘Around 9 or 10 months ago, there was a boy whose father was Chakma, 
and mother was Tripura. He had a love affair with a Chakma girl, and he 
brought her home and kept her in his home. The girl’s parents didn’t 
agree so they brought it to the community. There was a panel of elders, a 
woman’ councillor…seven members of the committee. They talked and 
investigated…the girl was below eighteen...and also the boy also was a 
drinker, they know that he drinks and takes weed, ganga. So, the 
committee decided that the girl should be handed over to her guardians, 
and after two months they saw that the boy was arrested for possession of 
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Yabba.434Now the girl is studying, and they are applauding the decision 
of the headman, if you would have decided to let them marry the girls’ life 
would have been destroyed. The hearing was held in the house of the 
parashabo female councillor. There was a crowd present as observers, 
not to participate, the hearing is public knowledge because…this is a very 
close community, so people get to know by talking’.  
Surojan Dewan appeared to negotiate the complicated political and social 
landscape with relative ease. Although knowledgeable about Chakma law, he had 
crafted a way of being ‘headman’ that was less based on Chakma identification, 
and more on his skills in representing the multiple minority communities that had 
made Assambusti home. Surojan consciously sought to develop concepts of 
community based on the relatively recent ‘indigenous’ category, and appeared to 
use local administrative and political structures to underscore that unity.  
Surojan was identified him as an influential local leader by his karbari but shared 
this mantle with the leaders of other minority communities, elected officials and 
political parties. One colleague was Larma Lushai, chair of the village committee 
in Assambusti, a member of the PCJSS and a leading member of the Lushai 
community. He had previously been an officer in the Bangladeshi police but had 
taken up politics and community work on his retirement, because he felt the rights 
of indigenous people were not respected. Larma described the village committee 
as having a dual role in his view;  
‘To protest against the government, and to make people conscious of 
their rights about their land and their culture. And the law, legality. We 
are living here, so many indigenous groups, we can’t always practice our 
customs, our cultures our traditions, so it is our duty to try and raise 
awareness of people of their customs.’ (Larma Lushai) 
                                                        
434 An amphetamine type drug common in Bangladesh 
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There are so many different communities in the area that the promotion of culture 
was conducted under the canopy of indigeneity, to the point that the Assambusti 
community was defined by its diversity; 
‘Though we are so many different indigenous groups, living in this small 
area, we try to promote their own culture, own customs, own festivals, 
own religions, everything, and we also get together, we don’t 
discriminate against any indigenous group, we try to stay together, with a 
bond, this is our duty, to maintain, promote and help to organise how to 
practice those customs and religious and cultural festivals. That is why 
the community loves us’.  
According to Larma, the village committee worked together with the headman 
and karbari, they organised social events together, and worked to overcome social 
problems together. Both Larma Lushai and his deputy Kamal Kumar Assam 
described the town committee as having a role as the village police, despite state 
police being active. Larma explained that the state police got involved in 
communal clashes but not in indigenous business. The boundary between the 
state and the communitarian was maintained by mutual consent, with the police 
attending only when invited to do so by members of the community, or when an 
inter-community dispute threatened public order. Kamal Kumar stated that their 
committee tried, first to solve problems within the community by negotiation and 
consent, and this meant trying to avoid public officials even if they were ethnically 
indigenous. Referring to the HDCs and Regional Council, he explained that 
indigenous representatives of the mainstream parties, the Awami League and 
BNP, were appointed by the government and worked for them, rather than for 
the indigenous communities. The local porishad councillor, Baching Marma, had 
no such affiliation, and had run for public office as an independent to try and 
address the bias towards Bengali people in the Rangamati porishad(town 
council).  
The villages adjoining Assambusti were once isolated from the urban conurbation 
of Rangamati, but were now connected by road and bridge. According to the 
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karbari interviewed, there was no communal land left in the area, all of it having 
been parcelled up for individual sale as land prices in the villages escalated 
exponentially. Two of the four Jograbil villages were Chakma and two were 
dominated by the Taunchyanga people. The following analysis of legal practice is 
from a Taunchyanga Village in Jograbil. Karbari Kolphoronjon Taunchyanga 
describing a plural role that involved the headman, village elders, local PCJSS 
representatives and porishad members. He felt that it made no difference which 
route to justice a villager might choose, as all these functionaries would always 
make decisions together and work in concert to prevent people from taking 
disputes to the formal justice system.  
‘(Customary law) is important because cases can be solved at a village 
level. If we go to a court we have to spend a lot of time. They take money 
for the prosecutions in a formal court, in the customary court they don’t 
need to spend money. Another reason is language…we are not 
understood if they go to formal court. In the Customary court this 
doesn’t happen so it is better… people accept his judgements’. 
(Kolphoronjon Taunchyanga) 
A further account of this highly consensual mixing of customary with political 
justice was given by one of the residents of Taunchyanga para. Uday 
Taunchyanga had brought his own land dispute to the local PCJSS committee, 
because his father had been a PCJSS leader when younger. His father was now 
sick, and the family needed money for his treatment, so decided to sell some lands 
that had been allocated to them after the Kaptai displacement, but never worked 
by them. Though they had land documents from the 1962 displacement, the 
boundaries had been drawn against impermanent markers such as Banyan trees 
and houses leaving much room for dispute. Further, the lands allocated were now 
being worked by the local karbari, who disputed their ownership and right to sale. 
They had taken the case straight to the PCJSS because they were in dispute with 
the same customary official who should have been responsible for clarifying the 
boundaries and recommending the sale to the headman.  
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‘I went to the JSS committee and they formed a committee and the 
committee asked both parties to agree. The hearing was held in Jograbil, 
so that the committee people could take the villagers opinion. The 
PCJSS made a panel including Surojan Dewan(headman), and Elti Ma 
Chakma(elder). The committee decision was to divide the land so that 
the karbari had one parcel. Both parties gave their opinion, I had left the 
place for many years, and the karbari had taken care of this land, so with 
the division of the land both of us were happy’.(Uday Taunchyanga) 
The PCJSS committee appears to have reached a solution through a compromise 
highly reminiscent of customary justice, using a process also typical of the 
collaborative approach favoured by customary officials, and ostensibly led by the 
local headman. In contrast with the rural areas of Kaynda and Sebakkon, their 
involvement did not change either the process, or the outcome, suggesting a quite 
different relationship existing between the cosmopolitan headman and political 
activists of urban Rangamati. Indeed, their adjudication of a case in which the 
parties were a customary official and a political activist appeared a scrupulously 
impartial and effective merger of the customary and political spheres. 
This section presented three case studies that broadly illustrated the diversity of 
local customary arrangements, but also suggested a similarity emerging from 
customary institutions co-mingling with other forms of dispute resolution. The 
balance of power changed in each location depending on social and economic 
circumstance, proximity to the urban centre, and the personal capacity and 
inclination of state, customary and political actors. Regardless, sharp divisions in 
ideology observed in elite perspectives of the system appeared to make little 
difference to the pragmatic accommodations reached in local practice. So, for 
example, in Kaynda mauza, though the headmen had absented himself from 
judgements due to fear of political involvement, at the karbari/village level the 
customary system remained the primary form of adjudication with the support of 
the PCJSS, indeed the mutuality of their arrangements were an exemplification of 
their formal political support for the customary system. In Sebakkon, despite the 
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UPDF’s ideological rejection of the feudal customary system, the working 
arrangement in the villages incorporated customary mores and laws into an 
ostensibly democratic system with the apparent support of customary officials. 
Finally, in Jograbil, a strong customary leader worked across state institutions, 
political parties and nations, integrated external influences into the customary 
system and using the performative elements of the system to instil solidarity into 
the diverse demographic. In Jograbil also, perhaps due to the external threat 
presented by settlers, differences between community laws were dissolving, and 
diverse national cultures fusing into a more generic and homogenous 
Pahari/indigenous identity. The concluding section of this chapter asks how these 
findings might inform understandings of legal culture in the CHT. 
4. Critical Communitarianism and Village Law 
Previous chapters traced how the CHT customary legal system was created from 
an amalgam of colonial Statute and pre-existing social practices, and re-assumed a 
centrality to the Pahari/Chakma only after the post-partition interregnums of 
displacement and conflict. On the level of strategy this act of return’ was not 
universally supported amongst the Chakma-dominated political activists, and 
even within those supporting CHTPA implementation, elite theories of internal 
change appeared fragmentary and at times in direct opposition. This chapter 
delved deeper into the mobilisation of law at a local level to present evidence of the 
effect of the apparent dissonance and splintering of elite ideologies first, on local 
mobilisations and second, on the legal consciousness emerging as a result. 
The Chakma/Pahari customary system has been formally subordinated to the 
state since the colonial era, however, village practices suggested the legal 
mobilisation of customary institutions was expressly against the state in being 
designed to forestall any loss of legal autonomy. A tentative conclusion can be 
offered from these observations; law was universally utilised as an act of resistance 
to state hegemony. Whilst the postcolonial legal form was structured with the 
state-in-dominance, even borrowing directly from colonial legislation and its 
racialised hierarchies, communities expressly mobilised the customary system to 
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serve contemporary practices of Pahari identity and continued to create law 
according to narratives of their own making.  
The villages prima facie demonstrated a strong internal plurality, with potential 
legal choices multiplying through the extension of formal state courts and 
government avenues, and informal avenues such as development committees and 
political parties. Certainly, there were examples given of forum shopping between 
customary and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, with the political parties 
thought by some to be preferable to customary justice in being able to enforce 
judgments through violence or threat. Yet the broad picture emerging from the 
case study locations was that newer legal orders more frequently worked in 
concert with customary law, expanding its domain, balancing the power of 
customary officials and causing rapid transformations in legal consciousness. The 
overriding loyalty of customary and political actors appeared to be to community, 
so that even locally, and in the most diverse locations, law was mobilised to 
reinforce the boundaries of the Pahari community in its broadest sense.  
In this way, a customary system with its roots in a colonially imposed, quasi-feudal 
hierarchy was substantially democratised by the existence of potentially competing 
avenues to justice. Where customary system institutions dominated, as in Kaynda 
they changed in practical, material aspects, for example, the composition of panels 
was enlarged to include both state and non-state actors, and their perspectives 
infused customary judgements with political ideology. Where the political cadres 
dominated, as in Sebakkon, customary actors were absorbed into democratic 
structures and political ideologies were softened and diffused by their 
involvement. A notion of community, drawn widely to include all Pahari peoples, 
not only contained different routes to justice, it acted upon them, extending the 
reach of the customary system, and in the Jograbil case study even homogenising 
the laws of different nations to serve a broader, contemporary political identity. 
Law was mobilised to reinforce notions of community, and the common legal 
consciousness appeared to be a construction of legality synthesised from the 
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political ideology of Jumma nationalism, colonial regulation and indigenous 
identity. 
More subtle transformations were also evident, suggesting that legal 
consciousness was changing in line with different forms of legal mobilisation and 
in reflection of the febrile debate within the wider social autonomy movement. 
Customary, state and political actors all, for example, pledged some degree of 
commitment to gender targeted reforms to balance the precarious position of 
women within Chakma/Pahari law. Changes in legal consciousness were 
apparent in the sense of male participants identifying and implementing changes 
to discriminatory cultural practices. There appeared a genuine commitment to 
increasing women’s involvement, and in most areas, women were involved in 
customary judgements. Further, there was an understanding expressed by all 
involved that some customary practices breached human rights provisions and 
reforms were claimed insofar as public shaming, boycotting and physical 
punishments were concerned. At the same time, and in direct conflict with these 
global values, the threat of political violence was used both to maintain 
community boundaries and to enforce judgements, infusing some of these 
reconstituted communitarian arenas with real fear, and at times subverting the 
reforming agenda of the customary leadership with the tacit consent of political 
leaders. In this respect, political mobilisation of customary law in support of 
autonomy had oppressive consequences, forcing the maintenance of legal 
autonomy above the welfare of participants.  
Despite the shadow of oppression, this chapter concludes the fragmentation of 
leadership perspectives frequently transformed each village arena into a forum for 
discourse, reform and at times of violent contestation. Silbey defined legal 
consciousness as;  
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‘Participation in the construction of legality, where legality refers to the 
meanings, sources of authority and cultural practices that are commonly 
recognised as legal regardless of who employs them and to what ends’. 435 
Through cases and village case studies, this chapter has demonstrated that the 
recognition of ‘what is legal’ in the CHT remains an open question, with the 
customary system, once a relatively fixed, almost feudal hierarchy, now at the apex 
of a community itself in the process of transformation. The presence of a 
reforming leader, the process of rapid and at times aggressive development and 
admittance of a different ideology of law through political activism now all 
contribute to the construction of a legal consciousness that hybridises a strong 
conception of community, with an awareness of the mutability of culture.  
This chapter concludes by defining legal consciousness in the CHT by reference 
to its internal plurality and the consequent democratisation of the construction of 
legality that placed the nature of communitarian legality itself as the foci of 
community. The many competing narratives and complex alliances encountered 
during field research contributed to a decentring or dispersal of power within the 
community, and potentially enabled a dynamic synthesis between conflicting 
ideologies of law. This conclusion neither denies the violence that attends, at 
times, to this synthesis, nor the possibility that such violence could equally 
reinforce existing hierarchies. It flags, nonetheless, the potentiality of such internal 
plurality on the distribution of power, and to some extent on the nature of Pahari 
identity itself.  
The final conclusion in relation to legal consciousness refers to the idea of law in 
the popular imagination, the fine and difficult distinction between legal culture 
and culture itself that attends to much of the theoretical debate about the cultural 
turn in law. In the village workshops and in wider research, legality was most 
                                                        
435Patricia Ewick and Susan S Silbey, ‘Conformity, Contestation and 
Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness.’ (n 199). Pg. 475 
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frequently perceived to reside in the customary system. Amongst those directly 
involved in the commission of judgements, customary justice was seen as superior 
in being arbitrated, community orientated, and based on the achievement of 
agreement, with the headmen and karbari more frequently defined as neutral 
facilitators of a wider agreement. The interjection of political activists, on the 
other hand, was perceived to be violent and often partial. Yet the case studies in 
this chapter suggest that there is a persistent element of alterity in legal 
consciousness which might be identified as the tendency toward harmony, even in 
areas where political activists were fully or partially in control, and even when 
those activists professed an anti-customary, anti-feudal, stance. Though legal 
consciousness had changed through the expansion of the domain, at its core lay 
notions of legality that remained rooted a different legal sensibility to state law, 
and in a wider Pahari culture retaining a conscious alterity to the state. 
The next chapter offers a contrast in turning to the practice of customary law 
within a relatively stable Chakma community in Tripura state, India, who are now 
also reforming the customary system to consolidate their formal recognition as a 
Scheduled Tribe under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
  
 
 
235 
Chapter Six. A Culture of perfection 
1. Legal Culture in Contrast 
1.1. Summary 
This thesis is framed by the assumption that the narratives that locate the practice 
of communitarian law in South Asia lie in the historical and extant forces that 
create community as a (relatively) stable political form, and the contemporary 
interaction of community with the state. So far it has explored the legal culture of 
the Chakma in the CHT, arguing that the iteration of an inconsistent, fragmented 
state and a destabilised, precarious community produced a communitarian legal 
culture characterised by dynamism, hybridity, and the diffusion of power between 
and away from elites. In short, the struggle for recognition of the customary 
system within a hostile state has transformed the system itself. The task of this 
chapter is to highlight the unusually febrile legal culture of the CHT by 
contrasting its practice in an area of relative stability in northern Tripura. Using 
the same sub-concepts of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness, it argues 
that, paradoxically, despite the apparent advantage in the Chakma being 
constitutionally recognised as a Scheduled Tribe, community in Tripura appears 
to harbour an oppressively conservative legal culture within its boundaries. 
Further, whilst power within the customary arena is concentrated in a small elite, 
customary law is the sole recourse only of the most socially and economically 
marginalised amongst the community. Both factors consequently diminish the 
relevance of communitarian law to those with the financial resources to seek 
remedy outside the boundaries of the customary system.  
The structure of the chapter broadly follows the previous analysis of legal culture 
in the Hill Tracts in deploying legal culture and its sub-concepts to establish the 
core components of critical communitarianism. The first section introduces and 
distinguishes the historical and legal context of Tripura state, and discusses the 
practical limitations encountered during field research to ensure the findings are 
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understood as a contrast rather than a direct comparison. The second part of this 
chapter explores attitudes to law and legal mobilisation amongst the leadership of 
the Chakma customary system, whilst the final section turns toward village 
practices to establish the legal consciousness emerging from the practice of 
communitarian law. The chapter concludes by drawing together these analyses to 
suggest the existence of an iteration of ‘critical communitarianism’ that has 
oppressive and contradictory consequences for its members. 
1.2. Methodology and Difference 
The considerable differences arising between the legal cultures of geographically 
proximate Chakma communities in the CHT and the Kanchanpur valley form the 
main object of this chapter. Though the same research techniques, that is 
qualitative interviews and analysis and participant observation were employed to 
collect data in Tripura state, the scope and direction of the project diverged 
unexpectedly in the two locations selected. In the CHT severe restrictions on 
movement and the presence of army surveillance meant that village excursions 
were problematic and necessarily conducted sporadically, at times when the army 
were less vigilant. Nevertheless, a rich dataset was collected from a wide range of 
political and civil society actors. In Tripura, there were few restrictions on travel, 
but research was constrained by the way the boundaries of the customary system 
had been drawn explicitly by customary elites to exclude activities deemed 
political and to mark the customary system as the repository of culture alone. 
Though some research participants were both politically active and involved in the 
customary legal system, they insisted that their activism did not affect their role 
and responsibility to adjudicate. Further, the customary leadership actively 
prevented external contact with the more politicised member of the Chakma 
community, for example, an invitation to attend the CPIM Tripura Women’s 
Committee from a prominent Chakma member was withdrawn following 
intervention from the erstwhile head of the customary system.  
These interventions, in the relatively short two-month period of research ensured 
that field data from Tripura was slanted more towards the internal practice of 
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customary law and the significance of legal culture to a particular iteration of 
Chakma identity, making a direct comparison of datasets problematic. However, 
it is suggested this is, in itself, begs questions as to the reasons why customary law 
in Tripura has been reconstructed in such an exclusionary manner, and what 
effects are observable in the legal practices produced within the boundaries of the 
Chakma community. These questions were framed and explored during research, 
and will be discussed in more detail in the concluding remarks of this chapter. At 
this early point, however, as regards methodology it seemed timely to note that the 
apparent differences discovered were perhaps reinforced or exacerbated by the 
unavoidable differences in the scope of research. And, for this reason, the term 
contrast is deployed in recognition of the less than complete alignment of datasets.  
The next section identifies the nature and origins of the differences observed in 
legal culture, first by exploring the meaning of the posited ‘stability’ of the Chakma 
in the context of the rumbling disorder still characterising the polity of northeast 
India, and then by reference to the constitutional protections provided by the 
Sixth Schedule.  
2. Stability in Disorder 
2.1. Othering the Hills 
As in the CHT, the Assamese hills were balkanised from the plains of colonial 
India in the 1873 inner lines regulations, and remained outside the purview of the 
state in successive rounds of ostensibly protective legislation. When the Simon 
Commission was convened in 1927 to examine partition issues in relation to the 
northeast, its recommendation was for the area to remain as a British protectorate 
when independence was granted, a view promoted first by local colonial 
administrators citing the irreconcilable culture between the two, and second by 
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tribal representatives who foretold their marginalisation in wider India.436 Indeed, 
in the years approaching partition, three competing visions of the future 
government of the hills territories emerged; the first as fully integrated into the 
newly independent Indian state, the second as reserved British Territories until 
developed enough to integrate with the Indian state, and finally, as an entirely 
independent territory.437 Ultimately, the geographical and political difficulties of 
detaching the hill areas from Assam, and political opposition to continued British 
rule led to the integration of the northeast hills into newly independent India.  
Partition did little to end this sense of isolation; indeed the hill territories were 
barely connected geographically to India with access reduced to a narrow sliver of 
fourteen kilometres of land by the partitioning of East Pakistan.438 Integration 
was immediately and continuously problematic, the historic and legal disjuncture 
between government of the plains and hills, contributing to ‘a certain alienation, a 
feeling of otherness that subsequently gave rise to a culture of violent 
separatism’.439 These ever multiplying regional claims to exceptionalism have 
proved the most enduring legacy of partition on the eastern borders of India, 
defining the relationship between the nation-state and the hill communities as a 
constant iteration of claims for inclusion and claims for autonomy conducted both 
through violent insurrection and political manoeuvring. Post-independence, the 
Indian government quelled insurgencies with great brutality using their special 
powers under the Armed Forces (Special Powers Act) 1958 (AFSPA),440 but 
                                                        
436 Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery: The Crisis of India’s North East. 
(n 15).Pg. 9 
437 Ibid. Pg. 12 
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usually followed violent suppression with acts of statecraft that ceded various 
levels of political autonomy to dissident minorities, and levered control of the 
militias through dividing their ranks. Multifarious struggles for autonomy and 
recognition have thus cleaved the former state of Greater Assam into the new, 
ethnically aligned states of Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, and Mizoram.441 
Tripura is differentiated from the former Assamese territories by its history as an 
independent principality until its eventual secession into the state of India in 
1949.442 With only 2% of the state bordering India, and 98% bordering Bangladesh 
and Myanmar, Tripura is one of the least developed and most isolated states of 
the Indian union.443 Ethnic conflict is a dominant feature of the political landscape 
in Tripura and also relates to the state’s geographical proximity and historical 
integration with Bengal. Though Bengalis settled in Tripura well before 
colonisation, the roots of its extant conflict lay in the more recent mass migrations 
of Bengali Hindus following both the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and the 
Bangladeshi war of independence. On Tripura state’s northern borders, a mainly 
Kokborok led insurgency found traction in disquiet over the upsurge in Bengali 
settlement and their increasing political dominance. Northern Tripura 
experienced waves of insurgent activity from the late 1960’s until the mid-2000’s, 
first under the auspices of the Tripura National Volunteers, and from 1978 
                                                        
national government power to intervene in what was Assam and Manipur 
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441 Ibid. Bhaumik states that at least 134 militias were known to operate in 
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through the communist led All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the anti-
communist National Liberation Force of Tripura (NFLT).444  
The same forces of land alienation and displacement evident in the CHT drove 
the Kokborok led rebellion, but the Kokborok had no legal basis for recovering 
their territory, due largely to the historic hostility of their own rulers to the 
practice of swidden agriculture. Though absent of direct British rule, Tripura was 
effectively encircled and controlled by the powerful colonial authorities of Bengal 
and Assam. Many of the pressures existing in the CHT were also factors in the 
steady reduction of dependence on jum before Partition, that is the reduction of 
land through forest reservation, the territorial annexation of much of the plainland 
territories held by the Manikya dynasty in the precolonial era, and the greater tax 
yield from plough cultivation.445 Far from resisting strategies of conversion, 
however, Tripura tribal rulers mirrored the activities of CHT colonial authorities 
in their strategies to reduce reliance on jum; from 1888 they reserved land in the 
Tribal Reserve Area and the jhumia resettlement colony scheme to encourage 
cultivation.446 As a result, by 1931 there was clear evidence that tribal communities 
across Tripura were increasingly engaged in non-agricultural occupations, and 
jum was losing its centrality as the mode of production.447 Post partition, familiar 
issues of land alienation and displacement eroded the territory and majority power 
of the Kokborok speaking tribal majority.448 Land commons were never legally 
recognised, and land reforms introduced in the Tripura Land Revenue and Land 
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447 Ibid. 
448 Walter Fernandes, ‘Tribal Commons and Conflicts in Manipur and 
Tripura in Northeast India’ (2012) 
<https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7287/1283.pdf?se
quence=1>.  
 
 
241 
Reform Act 1960 only enshrined a legal entitlement to individual land registered 
with the state.449 This led to further land alienation amongst tribal communities 
still reliant on the commons, due to their relative lack of knowledge of the 
registration system. Then, in the 1970s, the construction of the Dumbur Dam 
submerged over 23,000 square kilometres of mainly tribal Kokborok land, forcing 
many of its residents back into subsistence farming.450  
Historically, Tripura’s ruling Manikya dynasty not only promoted immigration as 
a means of augmenting their wealth and their power, but explicitly encouraged the 
import of cultured and educated Bengali people as a development strategy. 
During the colonial era, Bengalis occupied administrative and judicial positions in 
the Manikya government, with incentives including the grant of permanent 
Talukdar rights to migrant middle class Bengalis moving into the state.451 The 
Manikya Princes were intellectually infatuated with the Bengalis, adopting 
Bengali language as their national language in the 19th century and in the early part 
of the 20th century inviting the Bengali cultural icons to reside at their Agartala 
Palace.452 Post partition, this cultural affinity with Bengal attracted huge numbers 
of displaced Bengali Hindus from Muslim Pakistan, eventually outnumbering the 
tribal majority in the state.453 Population shift and land alienation appeared once 
more to stoke the flames of insurgency in the northeast. 
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In the midst of this disorder it might appear counter-intuitive to position the 
Tripura Chakma as a ‘stable’ community, but the term is utilised knowingly to 
invite contrast both with their tribal brethren in Tripura and their Chakma 
brethren in the CHT. Though the Tripuri and Chakma communities maintained 
friendly relations for two centuries in the face of rapid Bengali settlement, the 
involvement of Chakma people in the Tripura tribal rebellion was negligible. The 
Kanchanpur valley was geographically buffered from the main sites of conflict in 
the southern and western areas of Tripura state, and the Chakma community 
numerically too small even within the theatre of tribal politics to challenge 
Kokborok dominance. Both the ATTF and the NFLT were active in the states’ 
northern hills, but research participants recalled only two provisioning raids on 
Chakma villages in nearly 30 years of insurgency.  
For the Chakma, land commons were almost entirely eroded before partition, and 
at the time of fieldwork jumming was the preserve only of the poorest and most 
marginalised minority of Kanchanpur Chakma. Having experienced none of the 
sudden displacements of the Kokborok, however, research participants did not 
consider access to land commons as an issue for their community. Indeed, during 
fieldwork, it was not uncommon to hear Kanchanpur Chakma echo the Tripura 
Maharajas in their positive descriptions of Bengali settlers bringing ‘civilisation’ 
and ‘development’ to Kanchanpur. For reasons of history and geography, 
therefore, the Tripura Chakma avoided both the homogenising effect of British 
regulation on their law, and the chaotic and conflict-ridden environment that still 
characterises both the CHT region of Bangladesh, the neighbouring states of 
Assam and Mizoram, and adjoining areas of Tripura state itself. In the tumult of 
insurgency that engulfed the former hill territories on both sides of the 
Pakistan/India border after partition, the Kanchanpur valley appeared as a calm 
eye of a particularly violent storm.  
Stability has been invoked in this thesis to describe the avoidance of armed 
conflict with the state by the Kanchanpur Chakma, and the relationship of relative 
equanimity with other tribal groups in Tripura state. Notwithstanding, the forces 
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driving insurgency and revolt elsewhere in the hills provided an important context 
for the study of communitarian law in suggesting a parallel causality for the 
importance attributed to the customary system in Tripura. When the borders 
were drawn around the CHT, Indian Chakma were denied the demographic 
concentration necessary to claim territorial autonomy in India. The relatively small 
concentration of Chakma and their geographical isolation have simultaneously 
insulated them from direct conflict but also heightened their marginalisation in 
both state and tribal political arenas insofar as resource allocation and political 
power were concerned. In this light, the heightened focus on cultural 
homogeneity and legal autonomy might be seen as the polarisation of cultural 
identity exercised as an everyday resistance.454  
2.2. The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution 
The nature of state and Constitution in India differed significantly from that of 
Pakistan, understandably perhaps given the size and diversity of the Indian polity. 
In India, institutional structures were federal in nature, with substantial 
devolution of state power to developed regional governments.455 This structural 
difference was underscored by the powerful provisions contained in the Indian 
Constitution as to the protection and promotion of the rights of both ‘backward 
classes’, broadly the Dalit caste, and tribal groups, known now as ‘Scheduled 
Tribes’ as defined by the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution.456 The Sixth 
                                                        
454 James C Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
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Schedule of the Indian Constitution now provides for a limited form of self-
governance by the tribal communities of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Mizoram and Tripura.  
Beteille recounted how the consecration of ‘tribe’ as a constitutional term 
complicated an already contested anthropological understanding of non-state 
communities, arguing that the only similarity between those communities falling 
under the Sixth Schedule was their exteriority to the Hindu Caste system.457 In 
this manner, the category of ‘tribe’ in an India context held a particular legal 
meaning ascribed by the Sixth Schedule, but at once echoed their subordination 
within a civilisational hierarchy carefully crafted and legally enshrined by the 
British. Yet the constitutional juxtaposition of tribal recognition and 
redistributive justice has created resource incentives for the recognition of culture, 
and, according to Kapila, a tendency on the part of the Indian state to recognise 
ever more categories of difference in pursuit of unity and its redistributive ends.458 
As a result, the number of Scheduled Tribes has increased exponentially both in 
numerical terms and as a proportion of the total population since 1947, and 
spawned a burgeoning number of minority communities who are self-governing to 
varying degrees.  
The ‘otherness’ argued by Bhaumik as driving the splintering ethnicities and 
provincial state formation in northeast India, and the resource advantage 
conferred by constitutional recognition of tribal status appeared closely 
entwined.459 However, notwithstanding the alignment of cultural recognition 
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with resource distribution in the Sixth Schedule, the spatial separation 
maintained by its provisions has proved stubbornly coterminous with under-
development and under-investment.460 The material advantages conferred by the 
Schedule on the tribe have proved inadequate to the task of redressing the gross 
social inequalities that existed between the marginalised hill communities and the 
elite Hindu castes at the time of partition.461 As a result, the bounded autonomy 
offered by the Indian state has done little to quell local desires for greater 
independence. Indeed, Chandra argued the Sixth Schedule only imperfectly 
contained a paradox in which Scheduled Tribes were simultaneously infantilised 
through protection and excluded from development, fanning unbearable tensions 
in the north east that threatened to destabilise the Indian state.462 The much later 
and still ambivalent conversion of the state of Bangladesh to a similar path 
suggests, however, that the forced assimilation of communities produced and 
stabilised through the politics of colonial difference was also ineffective in 
facilitating the integration of communities historically defined by their alterity to 
the state.  
2.3. The Mechanics of Recognition 
Recognition of tribal identity under section one of the Sixth Schedule confers a 
limited right to self-government;  
‘An elected autonomous district council, with legislative and judicial 
powers, can be constituted under the Sixth Schedule. The council is 
empowered to make laws on land, water, forest, village or town 
administration, marriage, divorce and social customs.463  
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Once established, an Autonomous District Council (ADC) can decide whether 
state legislation applies to their area of administrative control, though the Sixth 
Schedule provides that recognition of tribal laws must be consistent with the rest 
of the Indian Constitution. Further provisions create a material advantage to 
communities who achieve Sixth Schedule recognition; government jobs and 
university places are reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. A Scheduled Tribe can 
submit their customary code to the state High Court, so that it becomes part of 
the legal framework of the state and will be used to adjudicate mainly on personal 
laws.464 Under the Sixth Schedule a formal written customary code is necessary if 
customary law is to have legal standing in the state system.  
Recognition through the Sixth Schedule is not a neutral process but one that has 
a significant material effect on the practice of customary law. Just as the stratifying 
legislative framework of the Sixth Schedule serves, arguably, to construct a 
‘primitive’ identity amongst the communities of the northeast, so the process of 
legal codification produces a form of customary law that must sit within a legal 
hierarchy in which the state ultimately defines and controls the very nature of the 
law. Such recognition accentuates the distinction between law and process 
suggested in the earlier part of this dissertation as uncharacteristic of customary 
law. Codification of an oral system fixes laws that have previously been fluid, and 
requires the judicial elements of governance to be isolated from the all-
encompassing social rules and norms of village life.465 Further, during codification 
each indigenous community must consider reform of the law insofar as 
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consistency with the Constitution is required. The Sixth Schedule is thus 
constitutive of law on a subjective, psychological level, and in a material sense.  
The Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council(TTADC) convened in 1992 to 
administer all of the Tribal areas of Tripura state which together comprise around 
68% of its territory and about 30% of its population.466 Seats on the Council are 
divided between tribal communities, with the Chakma community holding three 
seats out of thirty based on their relative population.467 Despite the continuing 
unrest in Tripura state, the TTADC was considered a relatively successful 
example of tribal government under the Sixth Schedule insofar as it heralded the 
transfer of lands back to tribal groups and developed educational and economic 
opportunities for them. In the 2015 elections the Communist Party of India – 
Marxist (CPIM) won all seats. 
Tribal areas in Tripura are exempt from the Panchayati Raj provisions of the 73rd 
Amendment to the Indian Constitution due to the arrangements for autonomous 
rule afforded under the Sixth Schedule. The provisions consolidated 
institutionalised democratic village government and set out a structure for its 
delivery, which included requirements for village democracy, the delivery of local 
justice and women’s representation. Tribal areas in Tripura have elected village 
councils with appeals possible to the Special Body, in this case the TTADC. The 
Panchayat structures being introduced by the Tripura Chakma mirror these 
provisions, and will, if absorbed into the formal structures of the TTADC, secure 
additional resources for village government. Chakma law was already formally 
recognised insofar as tribal cases are referred from the Tripura High Court to the 
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customary system in matters of personal law. Codification will enable the High 
Court to apply customary laws directly. 
2.4. The Migrants’ Story 
Both Beteille and Kapila emphasised that many communities which do not 
conform to the autochthonic understanding of tribe now receive Sixth Schedule 
recognition. The Kanchanpur Chakma are one such group, proudly avowing their 
migrant status and eschewing the indigenous/Adivasi identity that frames much 
political discourse in the CHT. Chakma oral history suggests that around 1760 
the first wave of Chakma immigrants settled in the Gomoti valley of northern 
Tripura, and then won favour by supporting the reigning Maharaja Krishna 
Manikya in subduing raids by the Mizo groups of the Eastern hills.468 After 
Gomoti, the Chakma established further settlements in the northern Kanchanpur 
and Pechartal areas, with a steady stream of Chakma drawn to the rich lands of 
northern Tripura. Most contemporary Kanchanpur Chakma trace their 
occupancy to pre-1947 migrations.469  
The Chakma now form the fourth largest tribal community in Tripura, after the 
indigenous Kokborok speaking Tripura community, the Jamatia, and fellow 
migrants, the Reang.470 Their numbers have increased significantly since partition 
again due to the proximity of Tripura to Bangladesh, and the considerable 
population transfers caused by the shocks of displacement and war in the CHT. 
In the state capital of Agartala, the earliest post partition migrants, led by exiled 
                                                        
468 Pannalal Majumber, The Chakmas of Tripura (Tripura state Tribal 
Cultural Institute and Museum 1997). 
469 Oral accounts confirm that the Chakma settlements of Kanchanpur are 
exclusively pre-partition. In one village meeting the headman stated that all 
he knew of his origin was that his Father was born in the village and had 
lived to be 100 years old.  
470 The 2011 census suggested the population of Chakma at around 80,000 
against 592,255 Tripura/Kokborok amongst the tribal groups. 
 
 
249 
Chakma leader Snehar Kumar Chakma, remained strongly attached to the CHT 
and campaigned ceaselessly for its secession to India.471 During the insurgency, 
the porous southern border with Bangladesh provided a safe haven for Chakma 
fleeing government persecution in their CHT homeland, with as many as 250,000 
Chakma occupying the five large refugee camps in the Silichar region at the height 
of the conflict in the 1980s.472 Though agreement on repatriation was reached in 
the early part of the 21st century, many of these Chakma, some born and reaching 
adulthood as refugees in India, melted into the existing Tripura borderland 
communities to swell the southern Chakma population. 473 These divergent 
historical trajectories leave the southern Tripura intimately connected through 
kinship and political solidarity with the Chakma of Bangladesh, and distinguished 
from earlier Chakma migrants to Kanchanpur. Whilst declaring solidarity with 
their CHT brethren, the Kanchanpur Chakma had little material connection to 
their now distant homeland.  
The Tripura Chakma had a reputation for a strong cohesive intra-state network 
and a passionate attachment to their language, culture and values.474 Within the 
State of Tripura, however, the differences between the precolonial and post-
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colonial era settlements of the northern and southern Chakma affected 
perceptions of the way Chakma law was deployed. The Kanchanpur Chakma 
referred to their Southern brethren as ‘Jiratiwa’, a mildly derogatory term that 
referenced their tendency to move frequently between India and Bangladesh, 
using the border to avoid any inconvenience conferred by membership of a 
particular state. In the practice of law, the Jiratiwa were said to follow Chakma 
laws superficially, whilst the Kanchanpur based customary functionaries 
maintained ‘pure’ Chakma cultural values as central to their community life. 
Whilst solidarity with the CHT Chakma was often vividly expressed, the effect of 
the CHT war on the purity of these traditions was frequently referenced. This 
understanding of a particularly vivid and historicised iteration of Chakma law 
distinguished Kanchanpur denizens even from other Chakma groups within 
Tripura state. 
To summarise, the Kanchanpur Chakma are posited in this thesis as a group who 
have experienced a level of historic continuity and social stability unusual in the 
northeast of India, and the CHT. They are avowedly migrants and reject the 
indigenous identity that formed a major element of political discourse in the 
CHT, and which also drove the legal mobilisation of social movements in 
Bangladesh behind a particular iteration of Chakma/Pahari law. They do not 
claim access to land commons as they have not suffered significantly from land 
alienation in the post-partition period. They were, however, politically and socially 
marginalised in both state and tribal governments due to the small size of their 
population and their concentration in the relatively remote Kanchanpur area. In 
the next section, these broad conditions frame analysis of the mobilisation of 
Chakma customary law in Tripura, tracing the progress of its resurgence to this 
marginalisation and theorising its effects on the distribution of power within the 
Chakma community and the legal consciousness produced. 
3. Custom Returned in Tripura 
Previous chapters used the sub-concept of legal mobilisation to locate legal 
discourse as an element of strategies designed to cement identities and ideologies, 
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and thus to understand the deployment of law as a cultural resource.475 The 
overarching concept of critical communitarianism was also invoked to illuminate 
the interdependency of communitarian and state law, whether that relationship be 
one of opposition to the state, or for the state. In relation to the CHT Chakma, 
‘critical communitarianism’ offered an apt frame to illuminate the development of 
the customary system in articulation with state violence, and the effect of that 
violence on legal culture. This thesis concluded that in the CHT, conflict 
produced a legal consciousness characterised by an inherent dynamism and 
democratising tendency. The next section raises similar questions in relation to 
the Tripura Chakma, namely, how far was the Chakma customary system in 
Tripura mobilised as ‘act of return’ and thus an element of strategy? How does the 
legal culture and consciousness found in the customary system contribute to the 
practice of Chakma identity in Tripura? And, finally, how does mobilisation and 
consciousness affect the dispersal of power within the Chakma community in the 
context of the Sixth Schedule? 
3.1. Mobilising for Perfection 
To answer these questions, attitudes to law expressed by the customary leadership 
in Tripura were collected and analysed to understand how and why customary 
law was mobilised by the Tripura Chakma, and the legal consciousness produced 
by this mobilisation. Again, the sub-concept of legal mobilisation is deployed in 
this section to refer to the way legal discourse transforms into strategies that 
cement identities and ideologies and becomes a practice of identity, whilst legal 
consciousness refers to ‘the way individuals experience and understand the law 
and its relevance to their lives’.476  
                                                        
475 Sally Engle Merry, (n 195) 
476 Merry (n 195). Pg. 64 
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In Tripura, the driving force behind the mobilisation of customary law was found 
to be immediately distinguishable from the CHT, in that voluntary and 
consensual revitalisation of customary law observed was a mobilisation conducted 
for the state, rather than in opposition to it. In 2016 the customary system was in 
the throes of major institutional reforms, originally triggered by a request from the 
TTADC through Tripura Chakma leader Niranjan Chakma for the Chakma 
community to seek recognition of their customary code under section 4 of the 
Sixth Schedule. It transpired that the various levels of Panchayat government 
which at the time were actively considering a potential draft Tripura Chakma 
Customary Code were also relatively recent institutional innovations. Indeed 
before 1997, there was no Panchayat hierarchy, no leader of the Tripura Chakmas, 
and no appellate system. The account offered by Niranjan Chakma for the reasons 
for wholesale reform of the system was that a direct request had been made to him 
as a government official to lead the revitalisation of the Chakma customary system 
so that it was consistent with the wider Panchayat system enshrined in the 73th 
amendment of the Constitution.477 Apart from this tenuous link to the exterior 
world of the TTADC, the pressure to reconstitute and reform the customary 
system appeared to be entirely generated from within the Chakma community 
itself.  
As the Tripura Chakma attempted to strengthen their legal and cultural 
institutions in order to gain formal recognition from the Indian government, their 
reconstruction of Chakma law reflected an oft quoted attempt to find the ‘true law’ 
or at least the closest approximation permitted by Sixth Schedule recognition. 
Until relatively recently, village law was practised with minimal hierarchy and 
formality through the informal village karbari, who adjudicated disputes, 
organised social functions and acted as the local spokesman of the Chakma 
                                                        
477 This amendment enshrined Panchayat government across all areas 
except those governed by ADC in Tribal Areas, and was followed by the 
Panchayats (Extension To The Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, (PESA) 
which extended it to Schedule Five communities.  
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villagers. Participants recalled that if the karbari was unable to resolve a dispute, 
villages in close proximity provided an informal appeal system, meaning that even 
the dispute resolution system was absent of an institutional hierarchy, being 
always, even on appeal, a mediation by peers. For some village level participants 
this iteration of the Chakma system was regarded as truly traditional as it had 
been passed from generation to generation as the vehicle through which Chakma 
law was dispensed. In terms of scope it was mainly concerned with personal laws, 
social disputes and the social work functions of the karbari in assisting those who 
were destitute and in need of assistance, and appeared to be perceived largely as 
the preserve of the villages.478 For others, however, the zeal for reform was 
motivated by distaste for the conduct and practices of the headmen and their 
failure to maintain and apply Chakma social laws consistently before the reformed 
panchayat structure had been introduced. They recounted the partiality of 
headmen who favoured relatives in adjudications, and the corrupt practice of 
retaining fines imposed for wrongdoing for personal use. Over time, this lucrative 
malpractice incentivised the levy of higher than necessary fines, further reducing 
the moral authority of the village headmen and causing the customary system to 
fall into disrepute. Revitalised customary law addressed the perceived 
degeneration of customary offices by introducing an explicit element of formality 
and hierarchical scrutiny into what had been an informal and extremely flat 
structure.  
The reforms initiated before the millennium were focussed on the development of 
a new institutional framework for the customary system and on a written Chakma 
Customary Code to be administered through the new hierarchy. Niranjan 
Chakma worked with Chakma representatives to build a model structure for the 
                                                        
478 None of the sites visited during fieldwork were dependent on jum 
agriculture and the karbari had no role in allocating land for cultivation. In 
Kanchanpur Town, there appeared little need for dispute resolution, but 
the customary system was still cited as important to the social rituals and 
festivals of the Chakma. 
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conduct of customary law. A four-level structure had been agreed at the state-wide 
Chakma customary conference in 2012, and implemented across Tripura in the 
years following. The outcome was a new institutional framework which 
referenced the model of panchayat governance of wider India in comprising a four 
level hierarchy consisting of the karbari court(village level), the Chagala 
Court(area level), the Suleane Court(valley level), and the Rayja Parisad 
Court(state level).479 In the new institutional framework, the higher level 
Panchayats were charged with defining and administering Chakma law, 
providing an appellate function to village Panchayats, and overseeing social 
activities. At the same time, the mode of customary appointment at all levels of the 
Panchayat structure shifted from hereditary to selective.  
By 2015, the panchayat structure was well established, but the Chakma Code had 
not been agreed by the community or recognised by the state. A further state-wide 
conference was held in 2015, at which representatives from Tripura were joined by 
Chakma dignitaries from Mizoram, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The Tripura 
Chakma intended to adopt the existing recognised Mizoram Chakma Code 
notwithstanding some minor differences over the role of religion, with the 
president favouring an entirely secular foundation to the Tripura Chakma Code, 
so as to emphasize its law-ness. At the time of writing, the Tripura Chakma Code 
was awaiting submission to the Tripura High Court pending resolution of these 
issues.  
                                                        
479 The Tripura Panchayat Act was introduced to implement the 74th 
Amendment to the Constitution, which enshrined Panchayats as the 
required mode of local government. This amendment did not apply to 
Scheduled Areas, due to the autonomous arrangements already in place 
for local government in designated tribal areas. The Panchayats Act 
appeared to set a standard for recognition, however, when it came to 
formal incorporation of a community code by the state Courts. The effect 
of recognition will be to make the customary system the primary 
adjudicator or personal law cases amongst the Chakma community, with 
the state Courts being an appellate body. 
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The governing panchayats appeared to provide space for the development of 
Chakma cultural identity, drawing on tropes of power through harmony, and 
reinforcing the spiritual unity of the Chakma nation despite their cruel division by 
state and nation-state borders. In this sense at least, it appeared that the Tripura 
customary system had been revitalised as the foci of culture, and a practice of tribal 
identity. At the same time, the identity practised through the customary law 
seemed entirely at odds with highly variegated, politicised, fractious and adaptive 
Chakma/Pahari of Bangladesh. The Kanchanpur Chakma harnessed their 
marginalisation toward an essentialised cultural nationalism, evident in the 
deployment the conception of Chakma society as ‘perfect’. The six-monthly 
meeting of the Gandachara Chagala Panchayat in July 2016 focussed on building 
community solidarity through emphasis of the social and cultural aspects of 
Chakma traditions.480 At the beginning of the meeting the Chakma flag was 
raised, whilst delegates chanted: 
‘The souls of whole nations are found in the village 
Chakma villages should be perfect 
Chakma nation should be perfect’ 
The programme included performance of Chakma songs, poetry, plans for Bizou 
celebrations and a celebration of the pinon-hadi, the traditional costume of 
Chakma women. Chakma identity was strongly aligned to village life, and village 
life to a concept of perfect order, and example of the ‘exaggerated Chakma 
nationalism’ Roy associated with a community under severe external threat.481 
By mobilising as perfectly ordered, the president and functionaries repeatedly 
represented customary legal practice as static, timeless, and above further reform 
or intervention, distinguishing their mobilisation as a practice of identity from the 
                                                        
480 The Panchayat was attended by approximately ninety people, of which 
around ten were women.  
481 Roy (n 329) describes the nationalism of both the CHT and Tripura as 
‘accented expressions of creativity around an idealised indigenous national 
ethos’. 
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foment of the CHT. As long as customary law was mobilised to sustain the 
perfect order of the Chakma community, this perfection necessitated a high level 
of conformity to the social mores of the Chakma as defined by the senior members 
of the Panchayat system, who were all male elders of the community. The concept 
of perfection thus appeared to reinforce an ultimately conservative iteration of 
Chakma identity, whilst the confinement of customary law to the social rather 
than political sphere underscored the localised power of the Panchayats in the 
regulation of village life and militated against a productive engagement with 
external influences. The Panchayat leadership appeared to align Chakma 
customary law with an introverted and essentialised nationalism, the ideation of 
customary law being a practice of identity that reinforced the separation of the 
Chakma from other tribal groups and transformed their marginalised position 
into an element of that identity.  
3.2. Consciousness and Identity  
The focus on customary leadership in the preceding section suggested that in 
Tripura, the communitarian arena was isolated, the practice of law introspective 
and self-referential, and legal mobilisation instigated as a practice of a highly 
essentialised Chakma identity. In the following section the effects of its 
mobilisation ‘for the state’, that is as an augmentation of formal recognition under 
the Sixth Schedule, is explored in relation to the legal consciousness expressed by 
the customary leadership.  
Amongst the highly literary and culturally aware leadership of the Kanchanpur 
Chakma, law was part of a rich oral heritage that stretched back to the days in 
which the Chakma had no government and employed customary laws to regulate 
the boundaries and behaviour of their community. The first common sphere of 
consciousness related to the preservation of the unique Chakma legal culture. 
Again, in sharp contrast to the CHT, Chakma culture and its legal manifestation 
were closely aligned with portable symbols of community identity, and with a 
ruleset that would allow the strict delineation of community without reference to 
territorial occupation. These views were expressed frequently and passionately;  
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‘Even as we migrated to various places our forefathers did not lose our 
knowledge (the law) creates awareness among the people of the 
importance of our traditions…gives unity, and creates a feeling of 
brotherhood amongst the Chakma’. (Prodip Kumar Chakma) 
Law was perceived as an essential component of a Chakma identity that 
referenced a migrant past and created the strong sense of belonging that people 
need to survive such frequent uprooting. It provided one of the only remaining 
strands of symbolic unity across the now disparate groups of Chakma that 
populated Bangladesh and India, but also marked Chakma distinctiveness and 
community boundaries within the crowded arena of Tripura’s tribal politics. In 
Tripura, despite their relative stability and avoidance of direct conflict, discussions 
of Chakma identity were frequently couched in themes of the loss and suffering 
caused by the division of the Chakma nation through migration and conflict. The 
Chakma were a most unfortunate nation in their history, but were united again in 
their common practice of community law; 
‘The Chakma are mixing with other communities, they are losing their 
identity, they are losing their culture, so this customary law is very 
important’. (Kinmohan Chakma)  
Identity practices were therefore aligned with a strong sense of marginalisation, 
forcefully expressed in frustrations at the long delay in Chakma law being 
recognised as part of the state legal canon. Those Chakma who did not 
participate in or follow the law undermined the unity of the Chakma, and were 
even attributed with making it possible for the state government to drag their feet 
over formal recognition of their Code.  
The most elegant exemplifications of law intertwined the practice of Chakma 
identity with the role of law in maintaining order within the community. In the 
absence of state regulation, the Chakma had developed their own language, 
culture, script, and laws that allowed them to settle disputes peaceably. 
Customary law; 
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‘Maintains peace and security in society and controls the behaviour of the 
villagers…it is one of his most important duties to maintain unity among 
all of the villagers living here.’ (Nirmol Chakma) 
Internal order was necessary to preserve external unity and was integral to the 
previously discussed notions of Chakma identity and the idea of the village as a 
perfectly harmonious organism. The frequent reversion to the idea of law and 
custom representing order against chaos confirmed a lack of penetration of the 
formal system of law into the Chakma village communities, and the practical 
necessity of the customary system in the absence of formal policing. In even the 
most serious criminal matters such as rape and murder there was little appetite to 
invite police involvement; at village level the customary system was seen as the 
right arena for all transgressions of social codes to be solved. For the village state 
law did not penetrate their social world, and Chakma law formed the only 
bulwark against the disorder of the external world. In personal law, however, 
there appeared a much more pragmatic mobilisation of the system, at least 
amongst the more urbanised Chakma. For this group, expressions of the law as 
perfection were undermined by the easy avoidance of its tenets. One member of 
the customary leadership described how his daughter had transgressed in 
marrying an Indian Hindu, a matter regularised by the payment of a fine to the 
local customary council. In Kanchanpur Town, where most of the Chakma 
interviewed were service holders and businessmen, the social function of the 
customary system was to the fore, with the resolution of disputes rarely necessary 
and the imposition of personal laws highly negotiable. 
The idea of customary law holding chaos at bay was commonly perceived and 
expressly linked both to the historic identity of the Chakma as a self-governing 
community and to widespread understandings of disorder at the boundaries of the 
Chakma community. Kanchanpur was no longer isolated from the external world; 
it was physically connected to the state capital of Agartala and to Assam, and its 
people had experienced both positive and negative effects of its closer integration 
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into markets and state.482 The ruling Marxists in the TTADC and Tripura state 
Assembly had successfully improved access to education and literacy, but were 
held responsible for an unequal distribution of government resources and the 
consequent epidemic of unemployment and underdevelopment affecting much of 
the northern areas of Tripura. In one village, participants reported that drug use 
was endemic, a consequence of high unemployment and relatively easy access to 
the cheap opiates transported through Tripura from China and Myanmar. There, 
Chakma law as a potent symbol of order and identity and its unifying role was 
underpinned by a more practical utilisation of customary powers to address drug 
misuse and gambling through campaigns and direct interventions. The local 
Chakma youth committee, an offshoot of the customary office of headman had 
launched an awareness campaign for youths about the dangers of drugs, and 
actively intervened to stop illegal gambling sessions that took place in the 
adjoining fields. In the light of this rapid and potentially destructive social change, 
youth leaders asserted that; 
‘The law brings unity amongst the Chakma and helps us to take decisions 
unanimously for the welfare and development of society…without this 
system there will be chaos in society, there will be no peace and 
tranquillity’. (Subham Chakma) 
This widespread discernment of law as maintaining harmony in the face of the real 
threats of dissolution was accompanied by a simultaneous appreciation of the 
economic benefits that accrued to the Chakma as the wealth of the region 
increased. In this respect, state recognition of Chakma law was again explicitly 
connected with the need to assert a strong Chakma presence within the arena of 
tribal and state politics. Social unity was seen as a vital corollary to this presence, 
reinforcing the idea of the Chakma as a nation, with one voice. Within the 
                                                        
482 Less than 50 years ago the Kanchanpur Valley was still only accessible 
by boat. There are now roads to the Capital and to Assam, and a rail link 
running within 20 kilometres. 
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community, however, there was also an appreciation of emerging class 
differentials that increasingly appeared to divide the Chakma into village and 
town, educated and illiterate, service holder and subsistence farmer. The 
customary system was perceived as a way of negotiating these schisms, binding 
the Chakma with cultural and social markers that transcend emerging class/caste 
division. Customary law provided a social adhesive that transcended boundaries 
and maintained a particularly Chakma sense of history. 
It’s for the better in a sense, when the developed community has come, 
we have adopted many things, business and education, in my (village) we 
have kept a sense of community, the Panchayat is in control, so that 
everything goes equal for all and everybody lives peacefully’ (Anil 
Chakma) 
This perception of Chakma law emphasised its social nature, its ability to 
transcend the boundaries of geography and class in drawing the numerous 
diaspora Chakmas home to perform social rituals. It was also perhaps the most 
limited concept of Chakma law, espoused by an active CPIM member who 
described Chakma law solely as a social system; customary practices created an 
island of rural tranquillity and a sense of belonging for his community that all 
Chakma could subscribe to whether they remained in Kanchanpur or not.  
In the poorest, most marginalised Chakma groups, the customary system had an 
additional and much more material relevance to the Chakma; it was mobilised to 
provide elementary welfare to those unable to care for themselves.483 Lack of 
Chakma representation at state and TTAC level meant that resources for 
                                                        
483 Anil and colleagues explained that in areas where jum was the main 
source of livelihoods it was practice for the karbari to collect small 
amounts of cash monthly to be committed to social welfare of the most 
vulnerable. 
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development were channelled to the more powerful Bengali and Tripura 
communities. 
‘Earlier we had the political powers. We had an MLA484 just for the 
Chakma community, but the government has made different 
constituencies so that now there is only one MLA. There is no other 
community or organisation that looks after our interests (the customary 
system) is the only one that helps and protects and us and allows us to 
move forward as a community’.( Basunti Chakma) 
In the absence of political power, the newly centralised customary system created 
the impression at least of a solid, undivided community and looked after the 
interests of the most excluded Chakma people through a communitarian pooling 
of resources in the absence of state redistribution.  
The mobilisation of law as emblematic of a distinct Chakma identity in tribal 
politics, the invocation of perfection to describe the community, and the 
consciousness of law as a means of maintaining order and harmony combined to 
create one final and highly significant distinction from the CHT. Together, these 
movements effected an accentuation of the boundaries between the Chakma and 
other tribal communities, thus reinforcing difference and extinguishing the 
possibility of a consciousness arising beyond the limited communitarian realm of 
the Chakma tribe. In the CHT, consider how, at the intersection of state and 
community, a connection between land commons, territorial autonomy and 
community was forged in the colonial era that shaped the resurgence of customary 
law as a symbol of community in the post-colony. Then, consider how a legal 
consciousness that moved beyond the Chakma community to the powerful if 
unstable notion of a wider Pahari community emerged from the homogenisation 
of land regulation of the commons. In Tripura, in stark contrast, it appeared that 
the working of the Sixth Schedule exaggerated the differentiation between tribal 
                                                        
484 Member of the Legislative Assembly 
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nations and created a perceived competition for state resources. Further the 
customary system re-formed through state recognition looked inward and 
backward to a de-historicised and static iteration of Chakma law. 
3.3. Mobilisation and Participation 
The level of legal mobilisation linked directly to participation in the customary 
system, and the method of selection for leadership positions within the customary 
system. Recognition of customary law by the High Court firmly located it within a 
state centric legal hierarchy, and thus necessitated adjustments to its institutional 
foundation and laws to align with the Constitution. Customary institutional 
structures had to mirror those of a formal constitutional Panchayat in having an 
elected membership of which at least a third of incumbents should be women.485 
Insofar as the Chakma Code was concerned, the laws themselves had to reflect 
constitutional provisions on gender equality and also reflect the rights conferred 
on citizens by the Indian Constitution. The notion of perfection jarred 
uncomfortably with an overarching structural framework that by its nature 
necessitated change.  
In discussions with the customary leadership, this paradox was simultaneously 
acknowledged and dismissed as unrealistic in the context of Chakma society in 
Tripura due to the lack of suitably qualified candidates for customary office. 
Insofar as Panchayat membership was concerned, a process of selection occurred 
at the Panchayat meetings, where members were proposed and seconded but it 
appeared that once proposed, those present universally endorsed candidates. At 
the level of the karbari, although elections were required, in practice some villages 
continued to select the karbari with hereditary entitlement. This meant that at the 
                                                        
485 Although neither the 74th Amendment to the Indian Constitution 
related to Village Panchayats, nor the Tripura Panchayats Act 1996 did 
not apply directly to areas under the TTADC, the form was adopted to 
align customary reforms with the constitution. 
 
 
263 
time of research, half of the karbari interviewed, whether they had been subjected 
to a selective process or not, were also the hereditary descendants of the previous 
karbari.  
Privately, it was made clear that the process of selection for higher level positions 
was dominated by the erstwhile leadership of the customary system, who would 
identify potential candidates from the community prior to Panchayat meetings, 
discuss the appointment with them and vet their suitability. This micro-
management of the selection process appeared to originate in concerns about the 
capacity of some individuals to hold customary office. In striking contrast to the 
CHT, and in spite of the gender provisions in the Tripura Panchayat Act, the 
customary system in Tripura was entirely male dominated. There were no female 
members in the higher-level Panchayat, and no female karbari. The reasons for 
this imbalance were attributed by male customary functionaries to the lack of 
capable women, and the unwillingness of most women to give time to activities 
outside the home.486 These problems were encapsulated by the head of the 
customary system, Niranjan Chakma encapsulated these problems;  
‘We too are trying to modernise, to absorb the principles of the modern 
world. Women used to be prohibited from attending village councils 
now they are not. We are trying to persuade women to become more 
involved but it is difficult’. (Niranjan Chakma) 
Privately, however, women discussants described customary institutions as hostile 
to women. The process of selection was described as favouring men, with 
participants reporting that women had been prevented from expressing their 
views in Panchayat meetings and were never selected by the leadership. One 
workshop participant described a situation where an unqualified and unwilling 
woman had been selected for membership of a panchayat while a qualified, willing 
                                                        
486 Comments ranged from the need for women to undertaken household 
and childcare duties to the ‘laziness’ of Chakma women. 
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and opinionated woman had been ignored. This was indirectly confirmed by 
President Niranjan Chakma, who felt that some women would disrupt the system 
with their views. Thus, the systemic introversion and the mobilisation of 
customary law to deliver harmony sustained the balance of power in favour of the 
older male founders of the reformed system. 
Women’s participation in the customary system appeared more common in 
villages. The process described for dispute resolution resembled more the 
informal and participative process found in the CHT. Hearings were held in 
public and featured a panel of an odd number of villagers, the size depending on 
the seriousness of the matter. Karbari Nirmol Chakma recounted that all villagers 
had a right to participate in customary judgements, and had the right to express 
their views in hearings. In his village one third of all members were women, and if 
the appointed president of the village committee were a man then Nirmol would 
ensure that the vice president would always be a woman. His colleague Anil 
Kumar reported a similar level of involvement and described a process where 
women’s issues were always discussed with women as part of the judging process. 
He also noted the tendency of women activists to prefer to exercise power in the 
political arena.  
Despite the overwhelming patriarchy of customary institutions, and particular 
criticism of the continued acceptance of polyandry in Chakma law, the same 
women critics described a role for the customary system in creating gender parity 
in the villages. This was because many karbari attached importance to education 
and promoted education equally between boys and girls.  
‘Improvements must be won by changing the behaviour of the women, by 
educating the women and giving instruction on the importance of the 
society and knowledge to them about the importance of getting involved. 
Some of the karbari are trying hard to get the women involved the 
customary legal system’. (Chitra Milaka Chakma)  
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The village level panchayats still offered rural women a role in public life and 
recourse to justice that was not hitherto available to women in the most 
disadvantaged sections of the community. This suggested again the possibility of 
curious inversion, that the recent revival of customary law might involve the 
imposition of an oppressive hierarchy on a relatively egalitarian customary 
practice, as a direct result of the process of recognition. 
3.4. Mobilisation and Politics 
The absolute distinction drawn between customary institutions and the political 
arena was also noteworthy in its sharp contrast with the CHT, where customary 
institutions barely contained power struggles, and culture itself was highly 
politicised. In Tripura, participants uniformly regarded the Panchayat system as 
entirely independent from the main sources of formal power in the state, that is the 
Tripura state Assembly, where there is only one elected Chakma MLA, and the 
TTADC, where there are three elected Chakma members. Explicitly party-
political positions were not tolerated within the customary system, and the 
direction of Niranjan Chakma and the most senior members of the local 
Panchayats was that the custom and politics did not mix. Some customary 
officials participated in wider state politics but could not express party-political 
views within the system, Anil Chakma reiterated the position that ‘the panchayat 
system is politically neutral, a member belonging to any party can take part but 
when he does he is only a Chakma’. Those research participants willing to talk 
about their political activism appeared acutely aware of the Chakmas marginalised 
position as a minority group in both state and tribal governments. Despite their 
prevailing discontent with the relative lack of political power, however, these 
material concerns did not permeate customary forums. The much earlier divorce 
of the customary sphere from resource allocation, that is its disaggregation from 
the allocation of jum land, had extinguished the connection between customary 
law and the regulation of Chakma economic life. This bifurcation of custom from 
resources appeared to play out in the contemporary division of the social from the 
political. 
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Of the customary officials who shared their political views, all were members and 
activists within the CPIM, and their attitudes toward customary law provided 
some insight into its subordinated position within the political and legal arenas of 
Tripura state. The party was seen as the source of development, progress and 
power, and their involvement in politics motivated by a desire to advance the 
progressive aims of the Chakma community within the Tripura polity. 
Development and progress were perceived as positive for the Chakma 
community, in terms of communication and transportation, education and 
economic wellbeing, but negative side effects were also noted. The customary 
system was conceptualised as a counterbalance to progress, the source of stability 
and continuity in the face of change. Perfection, it seemed, was a soothing 
antidote to the economic and political maelstrom that surrounded and permeated 
Chakma society in Kanchanpur. The result was a system as rich in symbolism as it 
was lacking in power; the mobilisation of Chakma law reinforced community 
identity, but at the same time underscored the subordinate position occupied by 
Chakma nation. 
In conclusion, it appears that the mobilisation of customary law has been for the 
state, in being generated within the Chakma community under the auspices of the 
state’s constitutional provision for autonomous tribal government. Although legal 
mobilisation occurred in conditions of economic and political marginalisation, the 
effects of engagement with the state generated an elite legal consciousness 
reflecting a highly essentialised and conservative iteration of customary law. 
Harmony and order were invoked as elements of Chakma identity, and legal 
culture appeared introspective and redolent of an idealised Chakma past. The 
limited transformations through custom appeared located at ground level, in the 
villages, where the pre-reform system had operated as a relatively egalitarian and 
informal system of regulation. The mobilisation of customary institutions in 
Tripura to meet the requirements of recognition on state terms appeared to have 
the paradoxical effect of imposing a conservative, patriarchal hierarchy, ossifying 
the practice of Chakma law, and reducing even the possibility of solidarity 
emerging between the Chakma and other tribal groups.  
 
 
267 
4. Legal Culture in the villages 
The next section tests whether this initial hypothesis as to the nature of legal 
mobilisation and its effects on legal consciousness holds true in the practice of 
Chakma law in the villages. It deploys the sub-concept of legal mobilisation once 
more to understand how people turn to the law for help, and how legal practice is 
informed by the identity practices of its leadership. In the first part, the process, 
case type and remedies of the customary system are described and analysed, and in 
the second, legal mobilisation and consciousness of system participants is 
illuminated through an analysis of customary cases and participant observation of 
a village Panchayat. 
4.1. Process, Cases and Remedies 
The process described by the various functionaries and participants interviewed 
was fairly similar; a case was usually triggered by a request to the headman to 
investigate, usually a letter was required and occasionally a small payment would 
be taken by the village headman. The headman would first form a committee of an 
odd number of villagers, five or seven or eleven according to village size. The 
hearing would be in a public place, anywhere the villagers could assemble to 
watch, and the participation of the villagers in the hearing was encouraged. The 
applicant was first asked to state their case followed by the respondent. They were 
allowed to call witnesses, but in the absence of witnesses, the Chakma custom of 
oath taking was invoked. The villagers could question the respondent to the claim 
and could also offer their opinions to the committee. After the parties and 
witnesses had been heard, the committee would retreat to discuss the case and a 
communal decision would be taken. The karbari would then deliver the 
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judgement, usually recorded in writing, and describe the sanction that had been 
decided on.487  
Amongst the karbari there was also a consistent account of a reduction in 
customary cases, directly attributed to the rise in literacy and the increase of 
service holders in the area.  
‘The number of cases is reducing because the literacy rate is increasing 
among the Chakma and another reason is that a new customary system 
has been developed in the Chakma community so that people fear they 
will get many kinds of punishment if they do any kind of anti-social 
activities’. (Bhubon Mohar Chakma) 
Though the Chakma were becoming more rather than less peaceful, fear still 
appeared to play a large part in any adjudication by the village courts. This form of 
communitarianism seemed reliant not on consensus but on an exercise of power 
by the karbari, even if the source of that power was his ability to martial the 
support of the wider community.  
The customary system was also described as the means through which social 
order was maintained, a function that extended beyond the personal to cases of 
assault, theft and communal disputes. At the village level the police accepted the 
jurisdiction of the customary panchayats in all cases, with the exception of murder. 
A miscreant would only be referred to the state jurisdiction if they had refused to 
accept or respond to the decision taken by the village panchayat. The relationship 
between the state police and the customary system was perceived to be a 
                                                        
487 The process was described in the Santipur, Gandachara, Silichari, and 
Kanchanpur discussions, as well as by Nirmol Chakma, Chandra Sur 
Chakma, Gunu Ban karbari, Gopul Chakma. The descriptions were 
similar in most respects, although some karbari said there were cases and 
decisions that they might consider on their own. Before the reforms to the 
system it was more common for karbari to act on their own without 
participation in the wider system. 
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consensual one, in that both the Chakma and the police agreed that matters 
internal to the Chakma community should be resolved by the customary system. 
At the margins of the system were cases which breached community boundaries, 
where karbari would use their powers to support the police. Customary officials 
also played a role in regulating inter-community disputes; 
‘If there is communal violence and a quarrel between Chakma and non-
Chakma they decide the cases with other tribes if possible, and if not, we 
refer to the police or court system. If any boy of another tribe gets 
involved with a Chakma girl illegally then the boy has to pay a fine of 1500 
to 5000 rupees’. (Santi Raton Chakma) 
In these instances, the customary system expanded to include a regulatory 
function beyond the boundaries of the Chakma community. The various 
customary systems were mobilised to contain inter-tribal disputes within tribal 
governance and to ensure that tensions were diffused without recourse to the 
state. The acceptance of equivalence between the customary systems of the 
Chakma and other tribal communities allowed customary offices to be utilised in 
defusing and containing communal disputes.488 But, at the same time, the drive to 
formalise Chakma law was seen as elevating their Chakma law above those of 
minority communities who use highly informal and unrecognised systems of 
community adjudication.  
Of the disputes described and observed the majority related to family, marriage 
and relationship breakdown. All research participants confirmed that personal law 
formed the largest body of cases in Chakma law. In Tripura, Chakma law was 
frequently linked to the maintenance of Chakma identity by ensuring that the 
                                                        
488 Equivalence in terms of engaging on a community by community basis, 
customary duties in Nomen Para, for example, negotiating if necessary 
with the Reang who occupied part of the territory. From the Chakma 
leadership, however, the Reang were often termed a backward or primitive 
community.  
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bloodlines are maintained and that property, albeit individually owned, was 
retained within the Chakma community. The proposed written Chakma Code, 
mirrored the Mizoram Code that regulates marriages, and child custody, divorce 
and inheritance. The only land cases heard fell more within the category of dispute 
resolution, relating to boundary disputes between Chakma/tribal neighbours for 
example.  
Judgements were always designed to restore the unity of the Chakma after the 
disequilibrium of a transgression. 
‘If any party is given punishment then after that the karbari will also try to 
end enmity at the meeting, so that the relationship between the parties 
becomes closer. I want everyone to be satisfied by the judgement, and all 
the people who attend the meeting to consider it to be just’. (Niranjan 
Chakma) 
Fines were the only remedies available and these were limited to 3000 rupees. A 
Panchayat ruling required all fines to be used for community benefit, in order to 
restore the honour of customary office after the extortions of some karbari had 
brought the system into disrepute. Prior to reform of the system, Niranjan 
Chakma explained it was common, for harsh physical punishments to be meted 
out, but educated people had suggested that such punishments were 
unacceptable. Social boycotting had previously been a common practice, which 
involved a transgressor being denied any sustenance, assistance or social standing 
in his community.  
‘In the Chakma community there is no prison, no jail, and this is one type 
of prison that we can put the convicted person into, he cannot have any 
type of communication, he will not get any communication, his whole 
family is included in the boycott’. (Gopul Chakma) 
After a boycott was imposed, a transgressor could restore their social position 
through contrition or the payment of a fine. A boycott was described as punitive 
and restorative in effecting change in the behaviour of the person through the 
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most powerful sanction possible, but was perceived reducing in effectiveness as so 
many people left their villages to work in Agartala. Now, the Chakma state-wide 
panchayat had explicitly banned boycotts due to its inconsistency with the 
requirements of the Indian Constitution. 
‘We talked to some educated people, from India and they said that we 
should not do this as it was a breach of our constitution, the right to 
speak freely and the right to move freely. There are eight fundamental 
rights in our constitution and we cannot be in breach of them’. (Niranjan 
Chakma) 
The final forms of remedy referenced were the imposition of a religious sanction or 
the acceptance of a religious penance. This was a controversial area given the 
complete disjuncture between law and Buddhism reported by Niranjan Chakma. 
It was not uncommon, however, for headmen and karbari to describe a religious 
meditation as suitable penance.  
With judicial panchayats only infrequently convened it was not possible to observe 
a wide variety of customary cases in progress, so headmen and community 
members were asked to share their experiences of village justice through their 
recollections of recent Panchayat cases. Where possible participants in the cases 
were interviewed. This enabled a comparison between existing practice and the 
aspirations of the panchayat leadership, and revealed a disjuncture between 
aspirations of its leadership and the experience of law on the ground. Moreover, 
this disjuncture between ideal and practice was neither concealed nor denied, but 
accepted as an inevitable consequence of the need to present to external parties as 
being cognizant of constitutional provisions. Regardless of the Constitution, the 
village remained Chakma territory, a space in which any measures necessary to 
maintain perfect order were justified. Legal practice appeared as yet unaffected by 
formal recognition, and unapologetically immersed in a customary consciousness 
that largely predated it.  
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4.2. Personal Law  
In personal law cases the methods applied to resolving the disputes were 
described as more closely approximating a mediation in which the aim was to 
maintain peace and harmony in the community. In relation to marriages the 
karbari played a vital social role in organising and funding the marriage ceremony, 
and a judicial role in making sure that marriages were conducted in accordance 
with Chakma law. Marriage was used to regularise illicit relationships where 
possible, a role consistent with the forms of marriage permitted under Chakma 
traditional law. One case described a situation where a young woman had run 
away to her boyfriend’s house, and after mediation both sets of parents agreed to 
the marriage. The karbari imposed a nominal fine for the transgression, but the 
most important aspect was considered to be the formal sanction of the 
relationship by the community. In more controversial circumstances their 
judgements must satisfy not only the parties to the disputes, but also the 
community witnessing and participating in the hearing. In another, the 
performative nature of the hearing seemed to have direct import on the 
apportionment of guilt and the sanctions imposed. Villagers described a case 
related to an affair between two married people, who had been caught together by 
the villagers. At the panchayat they were found guilty, and both were fined for 
committing anti-social activities, and their partners, at their request, were given 
the opportunity to forgive or divorce them. If divorce was chosen, their property, 
including children would be divided with the greater share going to the man, 
unless he was considered solely responsible for the marriage breakdown. In this 
case they were forgiven. After the judgement, their respective partners were given 
an opportunity to speak, and they asked that the adulterers apologise to them 
publicly in front of the panchayat and village. Public judgements such as this were 
seen as deterrents to future wrongdoing as the punishments were visible and 
known across the community. Law was mobilised to achieve harmony and to 
impose an internalised discipline.  
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All of the cases recounted were personal cases, and the selected examples illustrate 
how a legal mobilisation to preserve unity, and a legal consciousness founded on a 
concept of perfect order reinforced and preserved the status quo. In two cases, one 
described and one observed, social boycott were employed against women who 
sought divorce through the customary route. In the first case, of divorce in Ula 
Talukder Para, the husband of a Chakma woman seeking a divorce through the 
formal courts bought his case to the Panchayat. The wife was called to the 
Panchayat but failed to attend and a social boycott was imposed. The woman filed 
a divorce petition in the formal court, but it was referred back to the customary 
system due to the Scheduled Tribe status of the Chakma.489 The woman’s divorce 
was granted but she was sanctioned for not obeying the summons of the 
customary leader and found guilty of making a false complaint. The boycott 
imposed by karbari Jamil Singh Dewan meant that; 
‘ The woman is not allowed to mix with the Chakma community because 
she did not obey our rules and regulations. When she dies the Chakma 
community will not participate. She will have to move physically out of 
the village and will not be given any shelter in Chakma community or 
villages. The woman is not allowed to remain in the area where the 
Chakma live, she must stay with other communities’. (Anil Kumar 
Chakma) 
Both the karbari and community members were present when he recalled the case 
and felt that the woman’s absolute repudiation of Panchayat authority made a 
social boycott the only viable option, regardless of its prohibition as a remedy. The 
woman’s recourse to state law to realise her equal rights as an Indian citizen led to 
the absolute denial of her identity as a Chakma. 
                                                        
489 The Chakma already have the right to govern themselves by their own 
law as a Scheduled Tribe, the submission of a written code merely clarifies 
the content of that law and allows the formal courts to apply it directly.  
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The second example of the precarious position of woman within the customary 
system was observed in the Santipur Panchayat. It featured a case brought by a 
husband whose wife had deserted him to live again with her parents. Sixteen men 
and two women attended the hearing. The husband as complainant stated his 
wife had escaped their marital home and was now refusing to return from her 
father’s house. As part of the reading of the complaint, the panchayat was told it 
was her third marriage, and the child that she carried to the hearing was not her 
husbands, but the son of her second husband, a Bengali. In response, the wife 
stated her husband had beaten her twice and whispered about her to her in-laws, 
torn her clothes off, shouted at her and roamed naked in the house. Whilst she did 
not want to separate from her husband, she could not live with him in his brother’s 
house, where she felt she would be abused. She asked for an undertaking from her 
husband that he would not maltreat her again. Her husband responded that his 
wife wore jeans rather than traditional dress, and refused to have sex with him, 
which was why he beat her. Even though his wife had been married to two men 
before him he did not want a divorce, he simply wanted his wife to stay with him.  
In a fractious meeting of over three hours, the young woman was constantly 
questioned and exhorted to return to her husband by successive members of the 
Panchayat, including the two women present at the hearing. During the course of 
the meeting she became increasingly angry and distressed, frequently crying and 
once hitting her young child repeatedly through her obvious frustration. 
Throughout the hearing she made clear that she considered herself to be at 
physical risk should she be required to return to the house. Still, the Panchayat 
unanimously found that the woman was guilty of mistreating her husband and 
ordered her to return home, adding that if she escaped after the Panchayat 
meeting her husband would have no responsibility in the future. The verdict was 
endorsed by the women members, who argued that a woman’s duty is to satisfy 
her husband, to be considerate of his needs and to understand his limitations. No 
undertaking was sought from the husband in respect of the beatings, though the 
Panchayat stated action would be considered if she was beaten again. Still, the 
wife refused to return to her marital home and with her child was effectively 
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ejected from the protection of her parents and the Chakma community as a result 
of the Panchayats judgement.  
Conversations with panchayat participants after the case revealed the ways in 
which the pursuit of perfect order harshly punishes the non-conformist, 
particularly if they are women. One panchayat member explained that the decision 
illustrated why panchayat was important to keep unity among the people. 
Headmen would always encourage unity and cooperation, but also had to create a 
fear of punishment among the villagers to reinforce order. In this case, there was 
no need for discussion or reflection because the community were able to base their 
decision on her poor character, as shown by her previous marriages with two men 
and her refusal to make a life with her third. A woman participant in the hearing 
argued her presence was necessary to ensure bad women were punished properly, 
and that the Panchayat must always consider the character of a person both in the 
past and in the present. The judgement was not just of behaviour but of this 
woman’s previous character, her failure to satisfy her husband and to wear her 
traditional dress. Both women considered the Panchayat decision a fair 
judgement, which bound all villagers and parties to the hearing. The case 
represents a stark representation of the clash of legal ontologies, a real person was 
on trial rather than an abstraction, and the criteria for judgement was the perfect 
order of Chakma society. 
This panchayat was attended by the head of the customary system, Niranjan 
Chakma, and heard by the senior official valley panchayat, suggesting that 
continuing use of social boycott, in spite of the drive for recognition, was not a 
question of delayed implementation, or of non-compliance with the ambitions of 
the leadership. Rather, social boycott as punishment was clearly sanctioned by the 
leadership and justified on the basis of the young woman’s bad character. Thus, 
whilst the Chakma community looked outward and valued the appearance of 
modernity when engaging with the state, in terms of legal mobilisation and 
consciousness, Chakma law reflected a highly insular and particular iteration of 
Chakma identity. Chakma law brooked no dissent and placed unity and 
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cohesiveness above the supposed influences of state law and constitution. These 
observations fuel the conclusion of this thesis, ergo that the absolute but highly 
limited legal autonomy provided under the Sixth Schedule encouraged 
introversion, and caused the concentration of power in a particular section of the 
Chakma community.  
4.3. Land and Formal Law 
Section 2.4 attributed the decline of jum agriculture in Tripura to the 
encirclement of the Tripura principality by the British and the attendant policies 
of the Manikya princes, arguing that the rapid adoption of settled agriculture 
reduced the customary role land administration to marginal significance. During 
fieldwork this was evidenced by the low prevalence of cases recalled in relation to 
resource management, but one case was offered to demonstrate the intersection of 
state and customary courts. The vendor of a land package excited a complaint to 
the Panchayat by asking for the land to be returned to him after 20 years. When 
the vendor refused to participate in the Panchayat he was boycotted from Chakma 
society, and the case continued to be heard in the Tripura High Court. The 
outcome was the vendor’s imprisonment for fraud due to the falsification of land 
documents to the court. This was said to exemplify the advantages of customary 
law, in that the drive to settle to the satisfaction of both parties would have 
engendered a division of the property regardless of right or wrong, and both 
parties would have claimed a partial victory. But it appeared that for this plaintiff 
at least, the possibility of an absolute solution, or the complete alienation of 
property to his ownership appeared more attractive regardless of the risks 
attached to a formal adjudication. With regard to land, the shared ethos of the 
customary system was not consistent with the transfer of private lands even 
between members of the same community. 
4.4. Disorder  
Resort to the state police and criminal courts was considered highly irregular, and 
the Panchayat appeared essential to the dispensation of community-based justice 
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and maintenance of order within the community. This role was consequent to 
recognition as a Scheduled Tribe, which carried with it an expectation that the 
Chakma policed themselves, and referred to state functionaries only in the most 
serious crimes or when a crime transgressed community boundaries. In relation to 
cases of social disorder, it appeared that the non-state system, though 
autonomous, would support state intervention where another community 
committee a crime against the Chakma. Within the Chakma community, 
however, there appeared a strong tendency to close around the matter, especially 
in the more remote areas. In the Kanchanpur area, state police would not interfere 
in a case as long as the Panchayat was managing it, even when serious criminal 
activity was suspected. Cases suggested that within villages, the harsh 
punishments ostensibly prohibited from customary practice remained integral to 
village justice, as demonstrated by this 2016 case, in which three villages had 
attempted robbery of a neighbour’s house, and had sexually assaulted a woman in 
the process. They were apprehended and a Panchayat convened.  
‘On that day the three persons were made naked and had one brick tied 
to their penis. The villagers were made into two straight lines and the 
convicted person had to move along the middle of the line, they were 
kicked by the villagers and finally they had to return the money to the 
owner and pay a fine to the panchayat’. (Nirmol Chakma) 
This was perhaps the most extreme case recounted in terms of criminal 
transgression, and was widely known within local communities as a recent 
example of good justice. Judgement and punishment were highly performative in 
subjecting the miscreants to extreme and populist violence and humiliation. Such 
punishments were rare, but though ostensibly banned under the reformed 
customary system, they were strongly supported by customary officials and 
villagers as the best means of maintaining peace and harmony within the 
community. The Panchayat solved the problem, prevented a re-occurrence of a 
serious crime, and just as importantly allowed the miscreants to be re-integrated 
into society. Its relevance to the village was in translating the ideal of unity and 
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harmony into a lived reality, the villagers and victims participating in the 
construction of an alternative legality, with the punishment designed as a shared 
experience and a communal bond. 
5. Conclusion 
In the summer of 2016, the Kanchanpur Chakma prepared to commemorate the 
17th August as a ‘black day’, in the lexicon of Chakma history and culture. The day 
when Radcliffe’s partition was announced was the point at which the Chakma 
were rent asunder, their numerical concentration and therefore their power 
dispersed across different nation-states.490 In highlighting the consequences of 
partition, customary leaders hoped to draw attention to the role played by 
partition in dividing them into insignificant numerical minorities. For all this 
activity, however, the mourning of Radcliffe’s decision appeared a symbolic act, 
unaccompanied by any strategy of resistance or indeed any attempt to build 
solidarity with other Chakma groups across state borders. Rather, it appeared the 
marginalised Chakma preferred instead to turn away from their brethren and look 
inward to survive. Introversion and insularity infused the legal culture of the 
Kanchanpur Chakma, and provided an extraordinarily potent contrast with the 
CHT in Bangladesh. To conclude this chapter, the most salient points are drawn 
from fieldwork to ground the final conclusions of this thesis.  
The relationship of the Kanchanpur Chakma to the state was governed by the 
provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, with its highly specific 
provisions as to the benefits accruing through recognition. As a minority within 
the tribal groups of Tripura, the Kanchanpur Chakma were marginalised in both 
                                                        
490 https://nenow.in/north-east-news/chakmas-tripura-observe-black-day-
protest-inclusion-cht-undivided-pakistan.html. Since India abandoned its 
geo-political ambitions in relation to the Hill Tracts the secessionist 
position has all but disappeared from the manifestos of all the main parties 
in the CHT, with only the UPDF expressing any desire for an 
arrangement with India. Ahmed, (n 38) 
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state and tribal political arenas. However, as a Scheduled Tribe, the Chakma had 
exercised their constitutional right to legal autonomy under Section 4 of the Sixth 
Schedule, and were in the process of augmenting existing customary institutions 
in preparation for full recognition of their written code. Whilst recognition 
enshrined a degree of autonomy from the state system in relation to personal and 
social regulation, it also formally subsumed both institutions and code into the 
state hierarchy. This state-endorsed autonomy was evidenced in fieldwork by the 
way in which formal policing of Chakma villages was apparently delegated almost 
entirely to customary institutions. This suggested a situation of ‘classical’ 
pluralism, insofar as recognition defined and placed the customary system within a 
state-centred hierarchy of law. In contrast to the CHT, however, the 
subordination of community to state was sought after and welcomed by 
customary leaders, with state recognition seen as augmenting the power of the 
Chakma against other tribal communities. 
In Tripura, the motivation for revitalising the customary system was not a 
counter-hegemonic strategy. Customary resurgence was driven by a highly insular 
ethno-nationalism, by an elite who valorised state recognition as a means of 
establishing hegemonic power over their own community and to gain favourable 
against other tribal groups. Further, it appeared the historical de-coupling of 
customary law, land administration, and territorial ambitions in Tripura 
drastically reduced its political relevance, confining practices to the social world of 
the village. In the battle for material resources, real power lay outside the confines 
of the customary system in the political arenas of state and tribal politics. Whilst 
recognition under terms dictated by the state had not necessarily caused the 
reduction of the customary system to a cultural artefact, it had underscored its 
marginalisation.  
Consequently, unlike the CHT, the borders of the customary legal system in 
Tripura exhibited little porosity, with leaders seeking actively to prevent external 
influence from encroaching on the customary domain. Chakma customary law 
was conceptualised by its leaders and adjudicators as pure and unsullied by 
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political or civil society activism. Though constitutional recognition presupposed 
the alignment of customary institutions with the statutory panchayat system, and 
required improvements in women’s participation and the removal of physical or 
psychological punishment, in Tripura even these limited reforms were pushed to 
the margins of customary legal practice. Thus, the process of recognition 
appeared to harden the boundaries between customary and state law, whilst the 
perceived perfection of the Chakma village militated against the kind of ground 
level legal transformations observed in the CHT. Law was mobilised as an 
identity practice in support of an imaginary and essentialised Chakma culture, and 
the legal consciousness developed through participation in legality seemed to 
underscore that identity.  
To conclude, in the relatively stable Kanchanpur Chakma community, untouched 
by the resistance movements either of the CHT or Tripura, unwilling to align 
with the international movement for indigenous people, and enamoured with the 
limited recognition the Sixth Schedule conferred, customary leadership mobilised 
law in support of a conservative interpretation of law and society. The legal 
consciousness emerging from their accounts reflected a community identity 
infused with tropes of harmony, order and perfection, even where the forces of 
disorder and the unruly consequences of social integration impinged upon this 
ideation of Chakma society. Further, the pursuit of perfection created an 
environment where internal dissent could be construed as a ‘fault’, and where the 
most powerless and marginalised of the community were denied influence and 
compassion.  
The next and final chapter of this thesis compares the legal cultures of the 
Chakma systems of the CHT and Tripura state, and conclusions presented as to 
the presence of critical communitarianism can be ascribed to one or both 
locations, and its meaning to the politics of recognition in Bangladesh and India.  
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Chapter Seven. The Location of Resistance 
1. Thesis Overview 
1.1.  The Ultimate Paradox 
Running through each chapter and argument of this thesis has been the 
proposition that conflict between a state and a community is more likely to 
empower a community than formal constitutional recognition, at least when the 
terms of recognition have been wholly determined by the state. At the outset, this 
was posed as the ultimate paradox, in that potentially an oppressed community 
could be empowered through the infliction of sustained violence, and an 
ostensibly empowered community could be marginalised through the process of 
recognition. The primary conclusion of this thesis is to confirm this premise. With 
legal culture, or specifically the concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ illuminating 
field research, it is possible to suggest their troubled engagement with the illiberal 
state of Bangladesh produced a more egalitarian, porous, dialogic, liberal legal 
culture that mirrored democratisation caused by war, displacement and its 
aftermath. This thesis has confirmed that the iteration of community with state 
since the colonial era has had productive consequences, and that in the broadest 
possible terms, the cumulative effect of conditions of conflict has been the (still 
continuing) transformation of an erstwhile hierarchical, patriarchal customary 
system into a site of inter-community dialogue, political discourse, wide 
participation in legal cultures and socially engineered change. This conclusion is 
underscored by the contrast with Tripura Chakma, where the process of formal 
recognition has cemented dubious traditions and produced a conservative and 
oppressive legal culture. 
Theoretically valid as this statement is, there is no way of calibrating the 
democratising benefits of this transformation with the many painful transitions 
that initiated it. Suffice to say, the costs for the Chakma and the wider Pahari 
community have, and continue to be, considerable. A substantial but 
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undocumented number of Pahari people died in the course of the insurgency, and 
another 70,000 mainly Chakma families spent nearly two decades in foreign 
exile.491 The incidence of gender violence was also significant, with mass rapes 
and kidnappings being used as a weapon of war.492 Since the formal cessation of 
hostilities, outbursts of communal violence and isolated displacement have 
frequently disrupted the fragile peace, and internecine political violence has 
claimed hundreds of lives since the CHTPA was signed.493 And, amidst this 
rumbling disorder, and despite grudging Supreme Court recognition of 
customary jurisdiction - in effect their constitutional rights to common land – 
Bengali settlement of the Hill Tracts continues, often illegally and always with the 
full protection of the Army.494  
Beyond the admittedly discomfiting confirmation of this broad premise, however, 
field research offered insight into the granular effects of conflict and disorder on 
the culture and practice of customary or communitarian law. Theoretically, this 
thesis has extended the utility of the legal culture school by the appropriation of 
                                                        
491 The numbers of casualties are difficult to ascertain. Mey suggested that 
10,000 people were killed in 1981 alone. Amnesty International carried out 
a series of reports during the 1980s documenting single atrocities. Levene 
argued that the cumulative effect of militarisation was the genocide of the 
Pahari people. Mark Levene, ‘The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Case Study 
in the Political Economy of “Creeping Genocide”.’ (1999) 20 Third World 
Quarterly 339. Janneke Arens, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds - Foreign Aid 
and Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ (1997) 32, Economic and 
Political Weekly 1811. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, ‘Life Is 
Not Ours’ (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 1991). 
Wolfgang Mey, Genocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (1984). 
492 Ibid. 
493 The latest rift, caused by a split in the UPDF has claimed around 70 
lives. https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/special/2018/07/17/the-rift-
in-the-hills 
494 A recent example of the continued violence by settlers can be viewed 
here, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/09/18/20-years-
peace-accord-indigenous-bangladeshis-still-attacked-land/ 
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critical communitarianism as a means of theorising communities as the foci of 
resistance and the site of alternative legal meaning. Further, this concluding 
chapter suggests lessons can be learnt from the light shed on the mechanics of 
these transformations in the CHT, and concomitantly on the ways in which 
formal state recognition can limit or even extinguish the transformational 
potential of the communitarian domain. In this detail, insights are found into the 
way change is generated in communities and their legal systems that could 
potentially inform the ways communities themselves approach the practice of law, 
and also influence development interventions in the customary sphere that occur 
in both peaceable and post conflict contexts. 
This concluding chapter first summarises the thesis, and then uses the core 
concepts of legal mobilisation and legal consciousness to present comparative 
conclusions as to the nature of legal culture in the two locations studied. Finally, it 
reconstructs the legal cultures of the CHT and Tripura Chakma in accordance 
with the concept of critical communitarianism, arguing that dynamic and 
contested environment of the CHT creates a communitarian arena in which legal 
culture is formed by a febrile dialogues and contestations that represent the 
democratisation of community since the formal cessation of hostilities. 
Concomitantly, it suggests that in Tripura, the stated perfection of the 
communitarian realm is an oppressive force, requiring the most marginalised to 
choose between belonging and agency. For the more empowered community 
members, the customary system holds only an emotional resonance while they 
pursue true power in party or tribal politics. 
2. Thesis summary 
2.1. Summary of Theory and Concepts 
The theoretical exposition in chapter two recounted how the foundations of 
contemporary liberal and Marxist political theory were lodged in the twin 
concepts of the self-possessed and politically equal individual, and in the 
normative superiority of the progressive state. This thesis chose a communitarian 
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approach to analysing law that understood the notion of community as a neutral 
unit of social organisation, formed in a postcolonial context by narratives of 
oppression and marginalisation. Its location was in the former hill territories of 
colonial India, a region where hill communities were legally valorised in the 
colonial era, assuming a stable political form characterised by their anteriority 
both to capital and the state. Using postcolonial readings of Marx, communities 
were identified as anterior locations with a potential for resistance formed on the 
bonds of the immediate and local communitarian context. The discussion of legal 
pluralism explored the close alignment of the communitarian domain with legal 
practice insofar as tribal communities were concerned. With this established, the 
erection of state borders was identified as an opportunity to contrast the legal 
cultures of one nation, the Chakma, now divided through Partition into two 
stubbornly autonomous communities. Through a deconstruction of the legally 
plural environment in the CHT and in the Indian State of Tripura, the web of 
influences and intrigues that produced, sustained and transformed the 
communities of the hills was explored.  
As a preamble to the conclusion it is helpful to refer again to the conceptual frame 
guiding this exploration. Legal culture was selected precisely because its analytical 
tools directly connected the narratives surrounding legal practice and the legal 
ontology produced by those narratives. Whilst accepting that communities were 
the focus of power relations, this thesis sought instead to explore communities as 
sites of legal meaning. Fitzpatrick suggested that: 
‘If law continually becomes itself and is sustained in its responsiveness to 
exteriority, there must nonetheless be a positioned place where this 
responsiveness can be made determinate’.495  
                                                        
495 Fitzpatrick, Peter (2005). ‘The damned word’: culture and its 
(in)compatibility with law’. Law, Culture & the Humanities 1 (1), 2-13. 
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The ‘positioned place’ in the locations under scrutiny was the immediacy of a 
community territorialised through colonial intervention and transformed through 
divergent experiences of de-colonisation, within an overarching framework of a 
postcolonial legal form of legal pluralism. Practices that were not previously 
defined as legal became so through this engagement, and in the post-partition era 
were further shaped by the violent intrusions of the state into the hitherto 
protected world of the Pahari/Chakma.  
2.2. Summary of Historical Context 
Chapter three offered a historicised reading of Chakma history and the 
relationship between the expanded concept of the ‘Pahari’ community and the 
customary legal system. First, it analysed the colonial jurisprudence that 
engendered the legal division of the northeast hills from plainland India, positing 
Maine’s politically influential theorisation of tribes ruled by ossified tradition, or 
‘status’ rather than ‘contract’, as the driving force behind the balkanisation of the 
territories and peoples of the region. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 
secured the excluded status of the CHT region, but also had the paradoxical 
effect of producing a community that had not existed before, bound to a particular 
territory and legally homogenised at least insofar as the common property frontier 
was concerned. In the second part, decolonisation was shown to erode colonial 
structures as the centralised and majoritarian state in various guises sought to 
assimilate the hill territories into its technologies. The early phases of a Chakma-
led insurgency against the state sought autonomy and an end to the ‘feudal’ system 
of customary governance. The imperfect and divisive Peace Accord in 1997 redrew 
the customary domain as the site of a struggle for power and resources; utilising 
the CHT Regulations 1900 provided the only tenuous route to constitutional 
recognition for the now much oppressed and marginalised hill peoples within a 
majoritarian state of Bangladesh.  
In comparison, chapter six showed the history of the Tripura Chakma had been of 
relative isolation from the state. Though jum farming was the originary mode of 
production, rulers of the principality were more successful in introducing plough 
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cultivation, the practice of jum was pushed to the margins, and land commons 
were reduced to insignificance. On secession into the Republic of India, Tripura 
state became subject to the national Constitution, and the Chakma achieved 
recognition as a Scheduled Tribe in 1976. The Chakma customary system had run 
along the lines of informal panchayats, until the recent campaign to systematise 
and codify laws to gain formal recognition of Chakma legal institutions at the 
Tripura High Court.  
2.3. Summary of Research Data 
Field research was largely focussed on the Chakma community in the CHT 
region of Bangladesh, an area where the Chakma dominated the ‘imagined 
community’ of the Pahari/Jumma.496 The research questions posed sought first to 
understand the power relations and cultural and political narratives surrounding 
the customary/communitarian system in the CHT, and then to identify the legal 
culture produced in a postcolonial and post conflict environment of such 
complexity.  
In relation to the Hill Tracts, the narratives that surrounded the communitarian 
legal arena were shown to have emerged from a painful history of resistance to 
state dominance in the postcolonial era. Chapter four started with an internal 
state perspective on legal pluralism in the CHT, suggesting that a Janus-like 
position of public and material support for the customary system co-existed with 
an apparent longer-term ennui. Field data confirmed the customary legal 
institutions defined in the CHT Regulations were re-appropriated during the 
peace process by both political activists and customary leaders, in order to garner 
material advantage or ‘extra power’ in negotiations with the state and to a 
hegemonise the by-then divided Pahari. Thus, in addition to the pragmatic or 
strategic deployment of customary law to gain constitutional legitimacy for the 
                                                        
496  Anderson, (n 88). Van Schendel, ‘ (n 63) 
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Pahari cause, the customary system was deployed as a symbol of the artfully 
constructed Jumma nationalism, and as a signifier of indigenous/Adivasi identity.  
Beyond this stated solidarity, it was clear that the Peace Accord was a source of 
division within sections of the Chakma/ Pahari leadership, and in any case had 
only ever been negotiated with one political party and its Chakma leadership. 
Further, the ideology of Jumma nationalism had always contained an inherent and 
unavoidable antagonism between the Chakma-generated idea of a single, Jumma 
community and the de facto social diversity that had been contained within the 
colonial regulations and re-emerged constantly to destabilise Pahari solidarity. 
Field research suggested these tensions within the Pahari community caused a 
splintering of both Pahari and Chakma elite, infusing the communitarian legal 
arena with some of the tensions of the wider polity, and contributing to the 
internal plurality to the communitarian legal arena.  
Chapter four also analysed qualitative data gathered from those at the borders of 
the community, suggesting that the boundaries of the customary system were 
necessarily porous. The struggle for autonomy and against the state relied on 
support from a much wider alliance of civil society and development activists in 
Bangladesh and beyond. This thesis suggested that Bengali supporters divined in 
the Adivasi-led resistance a potent of a more inclusive, less oppressive iteration of 
Bangladeshi statehood. Thus, the social movement that grew around the Pahari 
struggle infused discourse with a broader language of both indigeneity and human 
rights. One of many paradoxes and contradictions of the project emerged in that 
activists mobilised customary law in support of claims for autonomy and land 
restitution, but also sought to increase legal choices and strengthen legal 
pluralism, thus potentially weakening customary institutions and the strong 
identitarian aspects of its practice. In conclusion, it appeared that this broad 
alliance had strategic reason to perpetuate the continuity myth of the customary 
system since its resurgence was closely connected to a particular representation of 
Pahari cultural alterity, but beyond this assertion of a common identity, 
perspectives on the form and jurisdiction of customary institutions differed 
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considerably. Further, a proportion of Pahari political leaders, notably the 
UPDF, still rejected customary institutions as feudal relics. 
Chapter five presented case study evidence suggesting that leadership divisions 
had the effect of transforming customary law at village level into an arena 
characterised by dialogue and discourse. In the studied locations, the desire to 
maintain the borders of community overrode the differences in legal culture and 
consciousness perceived amongst political, customary and civil society activists. 
The resort to alternative dispute resolutions was far less noticeable than the 
impact of discourse on legal mobilisation and legal consciousness within the 
erstwhile customary system. Customary law was mobilised against the state, to 
maintain the boundaries of the Pahari community, and to reinforce the identity of 
the Chakma respondents as Pahari or indigenous. However, within each 
immediate and local setting, participants synthesised customary and political 
justice into workable systems that borrowed from global, national and local 
concepts of law. 
In terms of ground level practice, practitioners and villages appeared to absorb 
and synthesise the multiplicity of perspectives and influences that had appeared to 
fracture and dissipate the solidarity of the leadership. The liberating and 
transformative consequence of this plurality was the diffusion of power within the 
customary system, the various competing perspectives giving rise to various local 
‘struggles’ in a Foucauldian sense, with positive effects of widening participation, 
increasing the level of local discourse over legal meaning and remedies, and the 
absorption of transformative influences of human rights and indigeneity. At the 
same time, limited instances were uncovered where the urgency of maintaining 
the borders of community caused an oppressive closure; the individual 
predicaments of some Pahari citizens was subordinated to the broader strategy of 
maintaining community boundaries. A fuller exploration of this phenomenon was 
limited by the difficult fieldwork conditions, insofar as village legal practices could 
not be directly or widely observed. 
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Chapter six sought to contrast these findings with the operation of the customary 
system in Tripura state, India, where the Chakma had experienced conditions of 
relative stability since their migration, at least in the sense that Kanchanpur had 
avoided the swirling rebellions of India’s northeast. Though absent of direct 
conflict, however, the surrounding maelstrom in the postcolonial northeast 
framed the interaction of the small Chakma community with the state, producing 
a prevailing sense of marginalisation and threat. Custom was resurgent in Tripura 
because the Chakma, a Scheduled Tribe since 1976, sought to formalise the status 
of their law under the constitutional mechanisms for recognition contained in the 
Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India.  
The resurgence of custom had been instigated by the cultural leaders of the 
Chakma community, and though driven by an essentialised Chakma nationalism, 
was absent of any clear political strategy. A largely elderly male leadership 
construed the precolonial rural societies of the Chakma as ‘perfection’. In terms of 
legal consciousness this was observed as causing a hierarchical, ossified and static 
iteration of Chakma law, and exaggerating the differences between the Chakma 
and other tribal communities. Further, it appeared that within the customary 
arena, power was concentrated in male elders, the ‘harmony ideology’ so central to 
their legal culture resulting in an oppressive requirement to conform or leave. 
Situations were observed where the most vulnerable of the community, namely 
women and children, were placed in situations of great jeopardy. 
3. Critical Communitarianism 
The core concept of ‘critical communitarianism’ utilised tools developed by legal 
culture theorists to theorise non-state communities as both the sites of power 
struggles and of legal meaning. Its innovation was to place the communitarian 
domain firmly within the context of state/society relations in order to understand 
the complex connections between the legal practices of non-state communities 
and the social relations that frame them. Critical communitarianism in effects saw 
state law as an integral element of communal cultures. It was defined in chapter 
two as positioning communities as; 
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‘The cultural foci of mobilization for, or resistance to, state law in the 
political context of state-society relations. It dwells on legal cultures as 
practices of those identities that have become embodied in legal 
consciousness and that have been generated through state-society 
relations as well as struggles for power’. 497 
This perspective placed community at the centre of a rich analysis of legal culture, 
privileging the insights of community members into way law was strategically 
deployed, and utilising practical examples of communitarian law to explore legal 
consciousness. Studying the Chakma community in two locations presented an 
opportunity to compare legal mobilisation in very different contexts and to 
enquire into the ways various interested community members had participated in 
the construction of legality. The conclusion will first analyse the comparative 
findings in terms of the political context of state/society relations, legal 
mobilisation and legal consciousness, before attempting to reassemble these 
constructs in the guise of critical communitarianism. 
3.1. Mobilisation and Recognition 
Legal mobilisation was defined as encompassing the way in which individuals and 
groups turned to the law for help, and the ways in which social movements 
deployed law as a cultural resource. This section summarises conclusions on the 
nature and impact of legal mobilisation of customary law in pursuit of state 
recognition, and the ways in which people turn to the law for help at a village level. 
The political context of state/society relations in both research locations was of an 
unstable constitutionalism caused by the colonial legacy of racial and ethnic 
division. Resistance to state law, or otherwise, on the part of the community was 
inextricably linked to whether or how the state chose to recognise minority rights 
and the form of that recognition. In chapter two the politics of difference was 
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discussed with reference to its application in liberal states, and its role in 
extending and enriching concepts of equal rights by incorporating identity facets 
drawn from communitarian fields.498 This was critiqued as assuming that equal 
rights presented a neutral space in which community cultures could be negotiated 
in dialogic practices, when in reality the frame of dialogue was determined by the 
state.499 In this thesis, the partiality of the state was laid bare in that 
state/community relations were still explicitly recognised as backward 
communities in both locations. However, recognition on terms that reflected 
colonial tropes was found to have paradoxical consequences.  
This was because, semantics aside, the legal and constitutional frameworks that 
framed state/society relations were highly divergent; Bangladesh consistently 
pursued violently assimilationist policies, ostensibly privileging equal rights in 
their constitution whilst denying the historic marginalisation of the hill territory 
communities. In India, the opposite was true in that state recognition was 
minutely specified in constitutional provisions that mirrored the protective 
legislation of the inner lines. Whilst the shared language of colonialism in both 
constitutions reflected the historic marginalisation of tribal communities across 
the northeast, the type of recognition possible within the respective constitutional 
frameworks differed considerably, as did the type of recognition sought.  
Connolly’s typography of recognition distinguished the frame of state/society 
relations insofar as recognition is concerned.500 She identified four types of 
recognition of non-state justice systems(NSJS) as reflecting broadly the range of 
approaches observable in different national contexts. The first model was of total 
abolition of NSJS and their absorption into state law, second, was the complete 
                                                        
498 Chapter two, section 2.1 
499 Chapter two, section 2.2 
500 Connolly B, ‘Non-state Justice Systems and the state: Proposals for a 
Recognition Typography’ (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review239 
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incorporation of NSJS into state law, the third was a limited incorporation into 
state law which involved the delegation of legal jurisdiction within a framework of 
state control, and finally, the no incorporation models which ceded sovereignty or 
granted a more limited sovereignty that allowed an NSJS to operate alongside the 
state system without interference. These notions helpfully illuminate the 
propositions of this thesis as regards the legal framing of conflict in Bangladesh. 
It concludes that the conflict strewn history of the Chakma in Bangladesh was 
reflected in a dissonance between the type of recognition sought and the type of 
recognition offered by the state. Until very recently, Bangladesh recognised 
customary law only insofar as its jurisdiction was confined to the personal and 
social domain. Recognition of customary structures on the same terms as 
plainland Bangladesh would involve a total or partial incorporation of customary 
law into the state law framework, and the total subordination of the system to the 
state.501 However, the Chakma sought recognition on terms that more closely 
resembled the no incorporation or avoidance model of the First Nations in the 
Americas. Broadly, the combination of the Chakma/Pahari political strategy of 
seeking autonomous rule, and the legal mobilisation of customary jurisdiction over 
land and resources amounted to a situation akin to the delegation of sovereignty, 
even though residual power in the CHT Regulations was reserved to the state. 
This was unpalatable to many factions within the illiberal, fragmented, and 
centralised state in Bangladesh, and was one reason behind the continued stasis in 
implementing CHTPA provisions. The more recent assertion of customary 
                                                        
501 Ibid. Connolly uses the example of Salish in Bangladesh of a fully 
incorporated system in that it completely replaces the state. See also Golub 
S, ‘Non-state Justice Systems in Bangladesh and the Philippines 
(University of California, Berkeley 2003) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/G
olubNonstateJusticeSystems.pdf> 
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jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh represented a small but 
significant step toward legal recognition of the Chakma on their own terms.  
Further, set against the fragmented elite positions observed within the Chakma 
community of Bangladesh, the terms of recognition appeared to broker agreement 
and create grounds for community mobilisation against the state. Thus, the legal 
mobilisation of the CHT Regulation established the Pahari, not the Chakma, as 
the cultural foci of resistance. The struggle for recognition of the Pahari reinforced 
a community identity first raised into being through the homogenisation of law 
and land commons under British rule, and then revitalised in the imaginary of 
Jumma nationalism. The terms of recognition chosen by political and customary 
leaders reinforced these elements of identity. Even the colonial tropes of 
homogenised backward tribes had the effect of dissolving the boundaries between 
the fractious Pahari nations to reinforce their identity as a community. The 
features that distinguished state/society relations were firstly, the fact that there 
were no terms or processes manufactured by the state to determine the limits of 
recognition, and secondly, that legal mobilisation against the state was an act of 
agency by the Chakma/Pahari. These factors had the effect of mitigating the risks 
of essentialism that had been identified as accompanying processes of recognition 
set out in section 2.2 of chapter two. 
The State of India had constitutionalised the protections of the colonial era in the 
provisions of the Sixth Schedule, offering a form of recognition that would effect a 
full incorporation of communitarian law into the state. The Tripura Chakma were 
recognised as a Scheduled Tribe in 1976, and were members of the tribal council, 
the TTADC since its inception in 1985. Even before the recent mobilisation of 
customary law, their migratory history, and the early erasure of jum as a source of 
livelihood had denuded the customary system of its centrality to resource 
allocation, confining it to the social rather than political sphere. The Kanchanpur 
Chakma had embarked upon the task of achieving state endorsement of the 
Chakma Panchayat structure on terms entirely determined by structures of state 
recognition. The process through which recognition was sought was instigated 
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and led by the Chakma to engage with a distant and disinterested state, and their 
motivation appeared primarily a desire to accentuate their difference from other 
tribal groups and gain extra resources through their assumption of formal 
jurisdiction over village affairs. The Chakma sought state support for their 
advancement in tribal politics through the recognition process, and their ire was 
therefore not directed at removing state influence, or addressing state power, but 
at other tribal communities, Primarily, their legal mobilisation for recognition was 
an identity practice that reinforced the insular and divisive nationalism observed 
during fieldwork.  
The conclusion is that the search for recognition in Bangladesh has an 
empowering effect, despite being unfinished, and still prey to the whims of 
political and military branches of the state. First, with the state offering little 
succour to communities and no interpellating framework for recognition of their 
laws, the Chakma/Pahari have defined the terms of recognition and worked to 
coerce or persuade the state into recognising them. Second, the dissonance 
between state and community created dialogic encounters, both between 
community representatives and the state and within the community itself, that 
have reinforced or strengthened the solidarity of the Chakma against the state 
even as fragmentation of subject positions occur within the community. 
Extending and deepening the politicisation of the Chakma/Pahari had indirectly 
drawn a wider audience to and participation in debates over the hill communities 
future. Power, through discourse has dispersed beyond the elite to multiple sites 
or constellations.  
The opposite was true in Tripura. The process of recognition provided a means 
for a small community elite to reshape the customary system in their image, and 
extend their hegemony over the wider community. Rather than inspiring 
discourse, constitutional recognition appeared an act of closure, immuring the 
already insular Chakma from the contested realm of tribal politics, and avoiding 
the dialogue that might change the law by using recognition to reinforce the 
boundaries between the customary system from the political world.  
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3.2. Mobilisation and Resistance 
The next question, then, is whether this community in the Hill Tracts could be 
identified as the cultural foci of resistance to state law? This element of critical 
communitarianism references the strategic mobilisation of communitarian law as 
an anti-hegemonic strategy or an act of strategic essentialism.502 
The answer, clearly, is that despite the deployment of derogatory tribal metaphors 
as a means of defending the borders of community, the legal mobilisation of the 
CHT Regulation placed the Pahari community as the ‘cultural foci of resistance 
to state law’.503 Recognition was sought precisely to secure the wider Pahari 
community from further oppression and encroachment by the state, and drew on 
colonial statute to reinforce the solidarity and thus the strength of the Pahari. The 
ends, which were to achieve as close to sovereign domain over the CHT territory 
as possible, justified the means, which was the public facing acceptance of 
pejorative and essentialising labels. These labels, in relation to discourse within 
the community, had already been superseded by the nationalism of the Jumma, 
and the assumption of indigenous identity by the political and customary 
leadership.  
At the same time, the external presentation of a unified Pahari position to the 
Supreme Court and to the government could not conceal the continued 
dissipation of solidary within the Chakma community and the wider Pahari. This 
illusory solidarity appeared to produce a customary arena in which culture and law 
were subjected to constant revision through the synthesis of competing sources of 
dispute resolution, and dialogue and contestation between participants. Despite a 
legal mobilisation phrased in colonial language, plurality within community 
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prevented any essentialised notions of either community or law emerging from 
within its boundaries.  
In answer to the same question in Tripura, the answer must be that legal 
mobilisation of the customary domain naturalised narratives of oppression within 
the Chakma community. An essentialised and insular nationalism exhibited 
during fieldwork constantly referenced imaginary tropes of bucolic perfection, 
whilst the practice of customary governance and law reinforced these tropes by 
demanding exit from the community if norms were transgressed. Perfection 
required dissonant voices to be silenced, which in practice meant that those 
seeking political power or tending toward social change sought to exercise in the 
political sphere. The Chakma mobilised law for the state, rather than resisting its 
advance. Rather it was the cultural foci of resistance to the hegemony of other 
tribal communities. 
3.3. Mobilisation in the Villages 
Coulthard suggested that essentialised notions of culture could be deployed to 
‘transcend not reinforce oppressive structures and practices. This proposition is 
now considered in relation to legal mobilisation in the villages.504  
This thesis showed that though the Chakma-led PCJSS dominate regional 
politics they have, since the early days of the insurgency, struggled to achieve 
hegemony over the smaller nations and even over sections of their own people. Yet 
the state only engaged the PCJSS/Chakma insurgents; as a result, the CHTPA 
exacerbated divisions within the Pahari, and caused the bipolar conflict of state 
and community to evolve into a decentred internecine war of continuous low-level 
violence. Political representation was fragmented, with competition for control of 
village areas between the PCJSS and UPDF leading to spasmodic 
confrontations. A further dissonance was notable in the differences between the 
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leadership’s theories of change. The Chakma chief viewed the customary system 
as complete in that the structures and institutions were believed to be sustainable 
and capable of emic change. Etic change was resisted. Political leaders from both 
main parties believed democratisation was necessary. The PCJSS asserted 
support for customary functionaries whilst intervening directly in judgements 
where they felt necessary whilst the UPDF were unapologetic in their drive to 
supplant the hereditary system with a technocratic alternative. This context 
framed the practice of customary law in the villages visited for field research.  
The surprising conclusion as to local legal mobilisation in the CHT is that, rather 
than the presence of political sources of dispute resolution weakening the 
customary system, the opposite appeared true. Customary laws were mobilised to 
maintain order and return equilibrium in the event of social or personal issues 
arising in the villages. In each village location, different constellations of power 
had emerged in which customary and political justice worked in concert. Political 
representatives supported customary leaders to resolve disputes and to preserve 
elements of the historic, hereditary harmony focussed customary system within an 
expanded communitarian domain. This appeared the case even in UPDF areas, 
where, despite the scepticism of leaders as to the utility of customary law, 
Sebakkon political representatives understood it as emblematic of identity and still 
paid tribute to customary functionaries. 
Thus, the way in which state law infused legal culture in the communitarian 
domain was twofold. First, the overwhelming and unifying objective of all parties 
to customary judgements was to retain jurisdiction over customary cases within 
the Pahari community. This overriding consideration caused the dissonance in 
elite perspectives to become the subject of discourse and dialogue in local arenas 
around how best to contain and solve issues as they arose locally. This also had the 
effect of changing the customary arena, with, for example, an alien violence as 
remedies seeping into some areas to prevent a drift toward state law and its 
superior enforcement mechanisms. The effect of such dialogic justice was also to 
increase participation in law by previously excluded groups, with mobilisations 
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occurring in respect to women’s participation as functionaries, and panel 
members. Each village, it seemed, contained a microcosm of the contestations so 
evident at an elite level, but each village mobilised law to resolve dissonance over 
legal meaning in order to protect the legal culture of the Pahari. The conclusion is 
that the presence of discourse and the role played by customary law in providing a 
dialogic forum ensured, first, that this process of creative exchange infused the 
legal culture of the Pahari with a dynamism and mutability that belied its colonial 
origins, and contributed to the development of a Pahari identity as empowered 
and autonomous. Second, it suggested that the mobilisation of customary law to 
synthesise dissonant perspectives and solve problems within the boundaries of 
community created a legal practice that placed oppressive practices outside the 
norm. 
In Tripura, the opposite was true. Though state legal culture as expressed in the 
Constitution of India expressly addressed gender discrimination, gender 
representation and the necessity of removing cruelty from punishment, the 
Tripura Chakma appeared immured to external influence by the provisions of 
recognition. The performative elements of legal mobilisation, suggested that 
customary law was used as a harsh deterrent to villagers, and more generally acted 
to sustain the insularity of the Chakma against other tribal communities. 
3.4. Legal Consciousness 
In relation to legal consciousness, the question structuring this aspect of research 
asked what defined legal consciousness within the Chakma communitarian legal 
system? Legal consciousness was defined earlier in this thesis as participation in 
the construction of legality, or more simply the way that individuals experience 
and understand the law. Chapters five and six used legal consciousness as an 
analytical tool, through which the law could be located within the pattern of social 
practices observed and described in village settings.  
In relation to Bangladesh, chapter five concluded that the expansion of the 
customary legal domain could be observed through the legal consciousness of 
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those seeking help from the law, more precisely in their definition of informal 
political routes to dispute resolution as legal, and in the active involvement of a 
wider range of participants in the customary arena itself. At the same time, village 
case studies suggested that the ideologies of local political activists did not 
completely supplant customary values, nor did the violence latent in their system 
of adjudication displace the more common legal consciousness based on 
harmonious settlement and arbitration.  
Rather, legal consciousness appeared infused with a wide range of sources and 
influences reflective of the porous boundaries of the customary system. Whilst 
legal consciousness was more commonly formed around customary institutions 
and values, the rapid changes in the wider culture of the Pahari affected the way in 
which those institutions were perceived and utilised. Customary law and its 
institutions were seen as imperfect, incomplete, ‘weak’ in the sense of being unable 
to enforce judgement, and both requiring of change and reform and open to those 
changes. At the same time, customary law was commonly perceived to be of the 
community, kinder, tolerant of human weaknesses and capable of achieving 
consensus. The link between jum agriculture, the right to land, and culture itself 
was universally perceived and understood. In the village case studies, legal 
consciousness was the ‘positioned place’ in which the internal plurality observed 
earlier in this concluding chapter was synthesised, and customary law the practice 
of an identity that was as open, mutable and fluid as culture itself.  
In contrast, the notion of perfection pervaded the legal consciousness of 
customary practitioners in Tripura. The revitalised customary system had been 
constructed around the technocratic requirements of Sixth Schedule recognition, 
at least insofar as the shift towards a formal hierarchy and a written code were 
concerned. The harsh nature of customary justice was observed both amongst 
male elders and female participants; legal consciousness was formed around a 
notion of law’s primary role being the maintenance of a high standard of Chakma 
conduct, with the consequences of breach being expulsion from the community. 
The reason appeared to be that customary social practices were defined by a small 
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and highly particular subset of Chakma leaders, who institutionalised legal 
meaning from essentialised historical tropes. This thesis concludes that the 
process of Sixth Schedule recognition privileged male, educated and elder 
members of the Chakma community, and afforded them great power in 
determining at what point further legal meaning should be constrained. This elite 
and unrepresentative minority fetishised village harmony to the point of 
oppressiveness, harmony and order were consciously invoked to restore order 
even if the consequence of that restoration was palpable harm to those 
participating in justice.  
3.5. Critical Communitarianism 
This thesis concludes that critical communitarianism has proved a powerful lens 
through which the role of law in defining community identity and generating 
resistance can be observed.505 It has guided an interrogation of legal practices of 
two communities of the same nation, exposed their differences and offered a 
means of establishing why those differences might arise. The remaining question 
is to ask whether a condition of critical communitarianism has been established in 
these locations. 
The answer in respect of Bangladesh is affirmative. The Pahari community 
proved to be the cultural foci of mobilisation of resistance to state law, in a 
political context where customary law has been mobilised expressly to achieve 
constitutional recognition. This elite mobilisation of law reinforced the identity of 
the Pahari as one community attached to their territory and thus to the idea of 
land commons in defiance of the state. This mobilisation explicitly rejected a 
recognition based solely on cultural grounds and insisted on the rights to land and 
resources denied and ignored since Partition. Pahari identity was shown to be 
conflicted at a strategic level, but highly mutable at a local level. In village 
                                                        
505 Barzilai, (n 5) 
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locations, law was mobilised in support of legal autonomy and law was 
experienced as an identity practice. At the same time, community members were 
in the process of constructing a legality that referenced both the political and 
cultural spheres, they adapted law to suit the new society, democratising its 
practice and not only resisting the state but providing an example of how 
difference could be negotiated across communities. 
In Tripura, however, it seemed the mobilisation of customary institutions to meet 
the requirements of the Sixth Schedule was not an act of resistance but an act of 
supplication. Recognition was sought not to repel state law but to place Chakma 
law more fully within its structures. Law was mobilised to reinforce the position of 
the Chakma community within the crowded arena of tribal politics, and to impose 
a restrictive and highly conservative iteration of law on the rural population. The 
preconditions of critical communitarianism were not met.  
4. Conclusion 
The original contribution of this thesis has been to engage with the paradigm of 
recognition through the prism of critical communitarianism, explicating the 
intricate connections between exterior resistance to state dominance, and the 
interior world of community. It has demonstrated the politicisation of 
communitarian law has transformational effects on legal culture, empowering its 
participants to construct a legality as dynamic and mutable as their highly labile 
culture. The comparative aspects of this project have highlighted the stark 
contrast between communities of the same nation, both using law as a practice of 
identity, but one mobilising to engender community solidarity against the state 
and in support of resource claims, and one mobilising for the state to gain 
advantage over other communities. The invocation of critical communitarianism 
to illuminate state/community relations has confirmed the core hypothesis, which 
was mooted as the paradox of state violence producing vibrant and dynamic 
communities, state recognition producing essentialised identity and accentuating 
the exclusion of already marginalised communities. At the outset, it was suggested 
that if proven, this hypothesis could offer original insights into the mechanics of 
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legal transformation of practical relevance and the paradigm of recognition, and 
these insights are outlined below. 
4.1. Post Conflict Implications 
Over the last five years, Bangladesh generally and the CHT in particular has 
experienced a rapid deterioration in their prevailing conditions. In Bangladesh, 
Islamist violence has become increasingly common and the government 
increasingly illiberal as a result. In the CHT, the army has consolidated its control 
over the area on the pretext of stemming the internecine violence between Pahari 
groups. Meanwhile, the Indian northeast remains disordered in the sense of being 
the location of multiple rebellions against the Indian state, as well as communal 
disputes between the many tribal communities, many of which are in competition 
for state resources and political power. Though these conditions encase the 
Kanchanpur Chakma, their involvement is limited, ironically, by their small 
numbers and lack of power. The two Chakma communities studied in this project 
have experienced de-colonisation quite differently despite their close geographical 
proximity and shared precolonial history. 
These contrasting conditions enabled a comparison that suggested that in 
Bangladesh, a toxic post-conflict relationship between state and community 
affected legal culture in two ways. First, it exaggerated the boundaries between 
state and community, diminishing the appeal of formal alternatives and turning 
attention to internal reforms of customary law to meet the demands of changes in 
culture. Second, it opened the customary arena to influence from armed cadres, a 
factor that had surprisingly little effect on the day to day dispute resolution of 
insofar as personnel are concerned, but introduced violence into erstwhile 
harmonious processes. Finally, it transformed the customary arena into both a site 
of resistance and a site of dialogue. Customary law has been shown to be a means 
of repelling the state, but also a means of healing the divisions caused by previous 
and current contestations. 
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Specifically referring to a post conflict environment, Isser suggested that 
customary justice systems were; 
‘An enduring and influential component of the justice landscape as a 
whole and that policymakers and practitioners who ignore or seek to 
undermine them are doomed to fail’.506 
In the same article, she noted the difficulty of engaging with customary justice 
systems in the aftermath of war, when situations are complicated by the legal 
conflicts and population displacements that inevitably follow. Nonetheless, there 
was a tendency to see informal or customary justice as a major element of post 
conflict nation building. This thesis adds to that literature by highlighting the 
potential risks of focussing on customary systems in a post conflict setting without 
accounting for the transformational effect of conflict on communitarian 
hierarchies and legal practice. This thesis has demonstrated that though 
Chakma/Pahari customary law was ostensibly built around the colonial system, 
ground level practice admits multiple actors into the system, and further, provides 
evidence that the arbitrative elements of customary justice have been eroded by 
the presence of armed cadres. This suggests reform or state-building programmes 
in similar situations should treat ostensibly customary systems critically, and seek 
an expansive, open, and locally situated definition of communitarian law when 
planning interventions. 
4.2. Development 
This expansion of the customary domain to a broader communitarian circle also 
suggests that past development strategies in the CHT have been misguided in 
focussing entirely on customary leaders when seeking to empower communities 
through law. In recent years it has become more common in development not only 
                                                        
506 Isser D (ed.), Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn 
Societies (United States Institute of Peace Press 2011). Pg. 326 
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to acknowledge the power of non-state law but to engage it to deliver legal 
empowerment. This was the case in the CHT from 201o -2013 when the capacity 
building cluster of the UNDP-CHTDF project invested part of its €20 million 
programme in funding logistic support and training to headmen through the 
Circle Offices. Particular concerns over the precarious position of women in the 
system ensured that training encompassed customary law, land responsibilities 
and gender parity. Over subsequent years, all headmen and karbari received 
training at least once, whilst the Circle offices benefited from investment in 
technology, staff and advisors.  
This research has demonstrated the failure to engage with political actors will 
have undermined this investment. During fieldwork, no area was immune from 
political influence, with some areas being controlled by politicians rather than 
customary functionaries, and others where the balance of power was held 
resolutely in political hands. The UNDP, however, shied away from engagement 
with political activists, partly due to a fear of state censure and partly through a 
poor understanding of the ubiquity of political involvement. This thesis has 
demonstrated a considerable breach emerging between the external facing 
presentation of the customary system as unified and traditional, only for that 
presentation to dissipate when witnessing and discussing village justice. Again, 
the lesson for development organisations is to engage constructively with ground 
level practice as part of the planning of interventions.  
4.3. The Paradox of Recognition 
Finally, this thesis returns to its core premise, the ultimate paradox that the 
customary system in the CHT appeared to be an empowered and empowering 
institution precisely because it was the subject of such fevered attention at both 
strategic and local levels. Conflict had led to the rebirth of the customary arena as 
a sphere of dialogue in which community tensions and external adaptations could 
be synthesised. The terms of this dialogue were not set exclusively by the state but 
emerged from the community itself through a synthesis of competing perceptions. 
Meanwhile, established process of recognition in India contributed to the 
 
 
305 
essentialised identity presented by the Tripura Chakma, and appeared to 
underscore and legitimise illiberal legal practices in the community. This was in 
spite of specific constitutional measures that required consistency between the 
rights-basis enshrined in the First Schedule and protections for tribal 
communities in the Sixth. This process seemed to relate to the concentration of 
power in the hands of a small and elderly community elite, and the strongly 
exclusive nationalism that engaged concepts of perfection to order Chakma village 
life. The result was an oppressive variant of legal culture, which used customary 
provisions to enforce strict standards of behaviour by way of harsh punishments. 
Concomitantly, the discursive and contested CHT communitarian arena 
exhibited a dynamic culture and contained participants with strongly held views 
on the necessity of change, particularly in relation to gender parity. 
This thesis concludes that the processes of recognition are indirectly responsible 
for this divergence in the nature of communication between state and community, 
and the porosity of the borders of the communitarian system. In Bangladesh, the 
Chakma/Pahari have been the object of state hostility of such brutality that this 
has inevitably affected the political consciousness of the community. Further, the 
oppressive force of the state caused the customary legal domain to be receptive to 
external influence, through global discourse such as human rights and indigeneity 
and more local influencers through liberal social movements. It was not 
recognition per se that caused such a dynamic legal culture to emerge from 
conflict, rather this thesis concludes it is conflict itself that disperses power and 
creates intra-community dialogue through the process of dispute resolution. In 
stark contrast, however, the Sixth Schedule betrays its colonial roots in fixing legal 
cultures and empowering self-appointed elites over the citizenry.  
Though this conclusion relates to a contrast between illiberal Bangladesh and 
ostensibly liberal India, it has implications the politics of recognition in other 
locations. Whilst this thesis cannot resolve those questions, it can at least draw 
attention to their utility. In Bangladesh conflict, contestation and dialogue 
resulted from the oppressive and tragic history of conflict in the region, and from 
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the constant questioning produced by persistent attacks by state on community. 
In contrast, the Sixth Schedule seemed to immure the Kanchanpur Chakma from 
discourse, from solidarity with other tribal groups, and from immersion in ideas 
that might engender change from within. In conclusion, it is suggested that the 
extent and speed of change in Bangladesh related to a rapid politicisation and 
radicalisation that enforced the boundaries of community and increased their 
porosity. Constitutional recognition in India reduced the pace of change to that 
commensurate with the elderly elite custodians of law and produced a form of 
nationalism that places the Chakma lifeworld firmly in precolonial mores. 
The primary purposes of recognition in northeast India appeared to be the 
containment and pacification of communities now deemed a risk to the state, 
despite that apparently liberal roots of the Sixth Schedule. It is perhaps no 
surprise that in post-conflict conditions, certain branches of the Bangladeshi state 
are seeking a similar constitutional rapprochement. Yet the dangers, alluded to by 
Coulthard in his rejection of the politics of difference is that constitutional 
recognition forms yet another cipher for colonisation and effects a removal of 
troublesome communities from the political mainstream. In Tripura, this 
conclusion seems all too palpable, and the ultimate paradox is confirmed by their 
oppressive practices. 
5. Two Cases  
This thesis ends as it started, with a final short exploration of two cases, both 
inviting questions and suggesting alternative potentialities in the possible future 
trajectories of the customary systems of the Chakmas in Bangladesh and India 
respectively.  
In Khagrachari on 29th December 2016, headman Ok Yu Sein heard a land dispute 
between two brothers who had inherited land from their Father with that 
instruction that it be divided equally. The applicant was a subsistence farmer who 
had complained about the division of the land because, although he had agreed 
the division at the time of his Father’s death, he had not realised that his brother 
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had drawn the dividing line so as to include a valuable Segun(teak) tree he had 
planted as a sapling and which would hold a high cash worth on maturity. His 
younger brother, a service holder and wealthy man, argued that their Father’s will 
had been properly drawn up and witnessed, and that his brother had agreed to the 
split of the land at the time and thus had no legal right to the land in either state or 
customary law. The case turned on whether the documented division should be 
upheld, or whether customary recognition could be afforded to the justice of the 
poor Brother’s claim. Ok Yu Sein found unreservedly for the younger brother, 
stating that given the papers were properly constructed and the older brother had 
signed them, the customary system had no locus to interfere with this formal 
transfer. On questioning both the successful defender of the division and the 
headman arbitrator, both shared the view that the only important factor was the 
documents, properly signed by both brothers, which showed the demise of land. 
Yet privately Ok Yu Sein mused that the younger brother was wealthy enough not 
to need the cash receipt from the tree, and bemoaned his own lack of power to 
offer a suitably customary solution. This would have involved, at the very least, a 
division of the cash receipt, and the arbitration that ensued might well have led to 
an even more generous settlement that reflected the poverty of the petitioner. In 
the face of the formally documented land demise, however, mediation would not 
work as the younger brother could seek settlement at a formal court or with a 
Councillor. Though technically a customary case, the boundaries of the system 
had been maintained by accepting the legal imperatives of formal law. 
The second concerned an elopement in Tripura and the customary penalties 
imposed on the love-struck couple, one a Chakma and one a Mizo, the tribal 
group holding power in Mizoram state. Niha Chakma and her husband Richard 
Puia had met at college in Agartala, and, facing opposition to their mixed 
marriage, eloped together after their studies had finished. Persuaded to return by 
Niha’s parents, a fine of 10,000 rupees was imposed on the couple for absconding 
together, and as Richard was not a Chakma, Niha’s family paid the substantial 
fine when they arrived back in Kanchanpur. Anil Chakma, the headman 
responsible for the case described it as successful, in that the couple were married, 
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Richard had converted to be a Chakma and a Buddhist and that with the 
payment of the fine, Niha’s place within the Chakma community was affirmed. 
Niha’s grandmother confessed she had instigated the Panchayat involvement to 
ensure her granddaughter was not expelled from the Chakma community, and 
was now happy to welcome Richard into her family as a Chakma.  
Nevertheless, a private interview with Richard and Niha revealed a rather 
different view of the Panchayat and the role of customary justice. They were happy 
with their marriage as had intended to stay together, and happy to indulge Niha’s 
parents and grandparents insofar as the Panchayat was concerned. But they had 
never engaged directly with the customary Panchayat and would not have paid the 
fine personally. Richard laughed at the idea of a conversion to Buddhism or to 
being a Chakma. He had agreed to be Chakma in Tripura to please the family, 
and would continue to be a Mizo in his home state of Mizoram, where there 
would be another Mizo ceremony for his family when they eventually settled there. 
Society was freer in Mizoram, and Niha would be able to wear any clothes that 
she was comfortable in rather than traditional Chakma dress. As for the 
Panchayat, this young couple both felt they had succumbed the Panchayat ruling 
to appease their parents but were clear that the limits of its jurisdiction lay not only 
in the physical boundaries of the state but in the waning appeal of its self-
conscious traditionalism. 
In the first case, though the boundaries of the customary system in Bangladesh 
held, the customary law provided an institutional framing for legal decision highly 
reminiscent of a formal court rather than an arbitration based on communitarian 
concepts of justice. In Tripura, a conservative and hierarchical legal culture was 
simply indulged or ignored by the youth, raising the possibility that the customary 
system, though incorporated into the state courts, would lose its power over the 
social world through its rigidity in the face of changing social mores.  
In Bangladesh, this thesis has deduced dynamism and internal plurality from 
accounts of customary practice in selected village locations and the accounts of 
law-making from the customary officials and political activists now so closely 
 
 
309 
involved in the delivery of local justice as to be instrumental in expanding 
customary institutions to encompass ostensibly more democratic means of 
providing justice. The terms of peace set out a process whereby customary law 
will be embedded in the new Councils, and controlled by elected bodies. It must 
be possible that at the point these provisions are activated, a similar closure to that 
viewed in Tripura will occur, that is formality replacing dynamism in the practice 
of customary law.  
Customary law was engulfed in the first case example, and ignored in the next, 
both cases, for quite different reasons, suggested the legal cultures reconstructed 
in this thesis contain the seeds of their own destruction. The cases chosen to end 
this thesis suggest the threat to the vibrant critical communitarianism in the CHT 
might not arise directly from political meddling or even from state oppression but 
through the bureaucratisation that recognition will almost certainly herald. Even 
now, it might be said that political involvement is representative of a change in 
mindset and approach within the community. Ergo, the very adaptivity that has 
seen a resurgence of customary justice might contain an emerging threat to the 
identity and law of the Chakma, that is not directly from the state but from 
changes to legal consciousness caused by the embrace of recognition and the 
imitative response elicited from within the community. Recalling Fanon and 
Coulthard, this thesis closes with a warning that the dangers of pursuing 
recognition lie in its interpellative effects, especially in a postcolonial context in 
which recognition involves an abasement of community identity in the pursuit of 
power. Yet where recognition is demanded and fought for, this thesis suggests 
that struggle itself creates an adaptive and resilient legal culture and transforms 
the interior of community. Concomitantly, it has shown that recognition 
bestowed on terms set by the state encourages an essentialised and static iteration 
of community that serves the purposes of pacification as effectively now as in the 
colonial era. There is still no more effective form of colonisation, it seems, than 
that visited in the cultural realm and nurtured and carried within.  
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